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ABSTRACT 
In 1986, Egypt implemented a succession of comprehensive econOmIC 
reforms both in the agriculture sector and more generally such as the Economic 
Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) of 1991. Since then, the 
agricultural sector has been gradually transformed from one characterised by 
central planning and governmental controls to one that is more free market oriented. 
This study employs the Policy Analysis Matrix technique to evaluate the 
impacts of reform policies on eleven major crops (wheat, maize, sugar cane, soy 
bean, broad bean, cotton, rice, tomatoes, potatoes, long and short berseem) and their 
associated crop rotations (crop mix) during the period 1986-2000. The PAM offers 
six tools of economic indicators. The first (private Cost Ratio) is used to identify 
the competitiveness of crops domestically. The second (Domestic Resource Cost) is 
employed in an attempt to identify those commodities in which Egypt has a 
comparative advantage/disadvantage. The third (Nominal Protection Coefficient for 
inputs and outputs) is used to measure the d,vergences between the domestic and 
international prices for inputs and output. The fourth (Effective Protection 
Coefficient) reflects the complete pattern of incentives to farmers in the tradable 
commodities markets, combining the separate influences of polices represented by 
the NPCO and NPCI measures. The fifth and sixth (profitability Coefficient and 
Subsidy Ratio to Producers) estimates the net protection effects afforded to each of 
the major sectors by the whole range of policy intervention. 
The most important fmdings are that: (1) The Egyptian pricing policy in the 
reform era is still encouraging domestic production of importable products (by 
setting their prices above world prices) while export products are taxed relative to 
their equivalent world prices. (2) Cotton, the main historical export commodity, is 
shown to be grown with a comparative disadvantage since it receives the highest 
levels of subsidy. (3) On the other hand, wheat showed a remarkably positive 
example for the high response from farmers to the reformed pricing policies with an 
increase in its area and its productivity by 83% and 60% respectively. (4) There is 
a high response of change in planted area to water charges. The conclusion of these 
analyses is that the impact of policy changes has indeed been positive, especially in 
relation to areas of crop production. But many remains to be done, for example, 
growers' still face problems in marketing, accessing to inputs, processing and trade. 
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Introduction: 
In the last few decades, many changes have taken place in the world 
economic system as new forms of trade relations, known as regional trade 
agreements (R T As) I have arisen. These changes should signal to the 
developing countries that there must be a change in economic policies if 
benefits are to be gained from the new global trade regime. 
Egypt, as a developing country facing various economic problems, is 
trying to meet the challenges imposed by the new system. This can be done by 
adapting its economic situation to get the maximum gain (or the minimum 
loss) from any changes. The problems of adopting and applying an economic 
reform policy in the 1980s was one of the challenges that faced Egypt. The 
Egyptian agricultural sector may be considered the leading sector in the policy 
reform that started in 1986. 
The Egyptian agricultural sector has been subject to a wide variety of 
government interventions since the 1950s. The major two goals of these 
interventions have, through most of Egypt's history, been to provide a cheap 
agricultural surplus to the manufacturing sector and to keep food prices low for 
the urban population. The main forms of intervention have been price controls 
on major (strategic) commodities, state trading and marketing of inputs and 
outputs, subsidies on inputs, area controls, predetermined low prices for major 
I By the end of the second world war new forms ofRTAs were fonned such as : 
a) North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which consists of USA, Canada, Mexico. 
b) APECs 21 Member Economies which consists of Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; 
Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; 
Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; 
The Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America; 
Vietnam. c) The European Union which includes, Belgian, Denmark, Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, UK, Austria, Finland, Sweden. 
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crops and an overvalued exchange rate, which in turn implicitly taxed 
agricultural exports and subsidises competing imports. The net effect of these 
polices had been to encourage resource transfers from agriculture to other 
sectors, especially the industrial sectors, which were highly protected. 
The performance of the agriculture sector suffered heavily as a 
consequence of those policies. For example, the sector's average growth rate of 
less than 2% fell below the population growth rate of 2.8% during the period 
1981-1992, whereas over that period a minimum rate of 4% was needed to 
sustain the government's growth rate target of 5%. Self-sufficiency ratios for 
major commodities fell significantly compared to historical levels. For 
example, the wheat and maize gaps increased from 577 and 50 million tons 
respectively in 1960 to more than 1706 and 73 million tons in 1970, and 
further to 6558 and 1045 million tons respectively in 1983. In addition, the 
agriCUltural trade balance fell sharply from a surplus of US$ 287 million in 
1961-73 to a deficit estimated at US$ 1786 in 1974-86. 
At the macro level, substantial macroeconomic imbalances started in 
the mid-1970s and continued in the 1980s, with the government budget deficit 
averaging about 20% of GOP. Unemployment also increased, jumping from 
about 5% in the mid-1970s to some 10%-15% of the labour force in the 1990s. 
The economy was increasingly overburdened by a debt overhang debt 
outstanding and disbursed (DOD) which hit the US$ 50 billion by the end of 
June 1990. Government expenditure peaked at 63% of GOP in the 1982 fiscal 
year, compared to an average 40% for all developing countries in the mid-
1980s 
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These indicators left the government of Egypt no choice other than to 
seriously implement a comprehensive economic reform. This occurred 
progressively; an economic reform started in the agriculture sector in 1986, 
followed by a stand-by arrangement (SBA) with the IMP in May 1991, 
coupled with a structural adjustment loan (SAL) from the World Bank in 
November of the same year to facilitate reform in the areas of pricing and 
subsidies, the foreign exchange system, interest rates, the money supply, and 
the budget deficit. This was the first real structural adjustment package (SAP) 
in the history of Egypt. 
Aim 0/ the study: 
The agricultural sector as a whole contributes about 17% to GDP, of 
this 4% is from livestock production while the remainder is from crop 
production2• Since crops are both the dominant output and as such have been 
subject to the majority of policy intervention, the study concentrates on crop 
production. 
The main aim of the study is to analyse the outcomes and impact of the 
agricultural policy reforms in Egypt from 1986 until 2000, in terms of their 
impact on the efficiency of resource allocation, and the structures of incentives 
and protection. This requires data on governmental interventions in the 
markets for the major exportable, importable and fodder crops in Egypt. The 
impacts of government intervention on price policies for major agricultural 
commodities will be estimated with respect to producers and society as a 
whole. 
2 The importance of livestock in the Egyptian agriCUltural sector is discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 2. 
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Analysing the reform policy for the agriculture sector raises a number 
of questions. 
I. What have been the effects of these new reform policies on 
production of crops and crop rotations? 
ll. Have these policies led to the allocation of scarce resources 
efficiently among competing crops? 
ill. Will these policies help the government to achieve its goal of 
flourishing agricultural trade and food security? 
IV. What are the effects of these policies on producers' outputs, 
prices, incomes and subsidies received? 
These questions are answered here at the farm gate level using the policy 
analysis matrix (PAM) approach as the policy tool. The farm gate level is used 
to provide understanding of the likely responses of farmers. 
Outline of the Study 
The study analyses the impact of policy reforms for the main 11 
sectors and their 14 possible rotations (crop mix) that constituted about 94% of 
total crop value and 98% of the total planted area. Theses sectors are: wheat, 
cotton, rice, maize, broad beans, soybeans, sugar cane, tomatoes, potatoes, 
long berseem and short berseem. This study attempts to offer answers to a 
number of questions and offers the policy advisor in Egypt a full picture for the 
performance of each sector and asks whether policy reforms led to an efficient 
reallocation of resources. Specifically, we demonstrate that the applied policies 
are in the right way to achieve the expected prosperity in agricultural 
production (as what achieved in wheat, rice and maize production) or failed to 
meet its target (as in cotton and potatoes production). The study also provides a 
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comprehensive framework for other policy analysts who wish to apply the 
PAM as the study offers way of its estimation in depth how the PAM can be 
constructed most compactly and logically using empirical data. The data 
provided in our study provides a resource for other researchers. 
The data used in our study come mainly from secondary data published 
by national institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reclamation (MALR) and the Central Agency for Mobilisation and Statistics 
(CAMPS) and from international sources, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Bank and the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ECSWA) 
publications. 
A brief introduction to each chapter of the thesis is presented here. 
Chapter 2 identifies the contribution of the agricultural sector to the national 
economy, and presents a historic overview of its performance and features 
during the last two decades. The chapter also reports on the cropping patterns, 
the rotation system, the relative importance to costs of farming inputs, and crop 
profitability. 
Chapter 3 provides the background to the mam features of the 
agricultural polices followed in Egypt from the Second World War until 2000. 
A major concern in this chapter is the changes in the production of major 
crops. The chapter is divided into four main sections: (i) Egyptian agriCUltural 
policy before the 1952 revolution, the socialistic era (under Nasser's regime), 
and the open door policy era (Sadat's period); (ii) °the aims, structure, 
components and tools of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
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Programme (ERSAP); (iii) the agricultural sector and the ERSAP; (iv) a 
preliminary statistical evaluation of policy reforms. 
Having described the performance of the agricultural sector and 
provided a background on the associated policies in different time periods of 
Egypt's history, chapter 4 discusses the policy analysis matrix (PAM) as a tool 
for assessing the effects of policy reform. This chapter presents the structure of 
the PAM methodology and discusses the economic indicators by which 
reforms are measured. This chapter is divided into four major sections; (i) an 
illustration of the PAM matrix; (ii) the modelling of PAM economic indicators, 
in which six indicators are of major concern; (a) Private Cost Ratio (PCR); (b) 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC); (c) Nominal Protection Coefficient for 
Outputs (NPCO); (d) Nominal Protection Coefficient for Inputs (NPCI); (e) 
Profitability Coefficient (PC); (f) Subsidy Ratio to Producer (SRP); (iii) data 
and tables needed to conduct the PAM; (iv) an illustrative numerical example 
of constructing a PAM matrix. 
Chapter 5 presents the type of data created for the purpose of PAM 
manipUlation and the methodology use for estimating the social (world) 
reference prices for major agricultural commodities and inputs. The chapter is 
divided into 5 main sections (i) estimating the shadow exchange rate; (ii) 
estimating the parity price for traded outputs such as cotton, maize, sugar cane, 
wheat, soybean, broad bean, rice, potatoes and tomatoes; (iii) estimating the 
parity prices for traded inputs such as fertilisers (nitrogenous, phosphates and 
potash), pesticides and seeds; (iv) estimating parity prices for non-traded 
inputs such as irrigation water, land, labour, animal work and manure; (v) 
estimating parity prices for farm machinery such as tractors and water pumps. 
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Chapter 6 reports on the results of the estimation of measures such as 
the private cost ratio (PCR) and comparative advantage using domestic 
resource cost (DRC), net private profitability (NPP), net social profitability 
(NSP),and social cost benefit (SCB) for major commodities. This chapter also 
makes a comparison with the results of comparative advantage estimates made 
by other researchers. The final section of chapter 6 investigates whether reform 
has generally imprOVed private profitability and the efficiency of agricultural 
production. 
Chapter 7 is concerned with assessing the Egyptian protection policies 
and their effect on major agricultural commodities and inputs, using the 
various nominal and effective protection coefficients (NPCO, NPCI and EPC). 
The final section of chapter 7 makes a comparison with protection coefficient 
estimates made by other researchers. 
Chapter 8 assesses the Egyptian agricultural policies and their effect on 
producers, using the profitability coefficient (PC) and the subsidy ratio to 
producer coefficient (SRP). 
Chapter 9 bridges the gap in the partial equilibrium nature of the PAM 
analysis by linking the results obtained from the P AMs in a way that allows us 
to analyse and predicts the impacts of changes in policy. The final section of 
the chapter estimate the impact of introducing water charges on the 
profitability (as measured by the PCR) and hence the area planted to each crop 
in Egyptian agriculture. 
Finally, chapter 10 presents a summary of the major results from the 
previous chapters and makes some recommendations. 
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2.1 : Introduction: 
The perceived importance of the agricultural sector was shared by most 
economies all over the world until the start of the industrial revolution in the 
nineteenth century, when industrialisation was seen as the key to economic 
development in most economies, especially in the developed countries. In most 
underdeveloped economies agriculture is still considered one of the important 
sectors in the economy. This is particularly true in Egypt, which has 
traditionally relied heavily on the agricultural sector as a source of finance for 
economic development programmes. In addition, it is the main supplier of raw 
materials needed for the industrial sector as well as the principal source of the 
population's food requirement. 
The main aim of this chapter is to discuss the importance and 
contribution of the agricultural sector in the Egyptian economy, as well as the 
development of domestic production and yields of the major crops. Hence, 
section two discusses the size of the population and the labour force in the 
Egyptian agricultural sector. Section three presents a short description of 
Egypt's agricultural sector: the current cropping pattern, the rotation system, 
trends in planted areas, yields and production, production costs, farm gate 
prices and relative profitability for major crops. Section four draws on the main 
findings of all the previous sections. 
2.2 : The Role of the Agricultural Sector in the Egyptian Economy 
2.2.1 : Agricultural land, population and employment 
Although Egypt's total land area (100,145 thousand hectare) is three 
times more than that of the United Kingdom (24,299 thousand hectare), the 
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arable land in Egypt constitutes only 2.5% of the whole (compared with 28.3% 
in UK), the rest of land area being desert. Despite the proportion of arable land 
to total area in the UK being over eleven times that of Egypt, the agricultural 
sector in Egypt is considered one of the most important sectors in the 
economy. For example, in satisfying the increased population food requirement 
it is responsible for feeding 64 million (2000 FAO estimate). Also, it makes a 
significant contribution to employment, GOP, and exports (as will be discussed 
below). 
The majority of the cultivated area in Egypt is restricted to the Nile 
Valley and the Delta area. Total agricultural land is distributed among "Old 
Land", comprised of the Nile River Valley and the Delta (72 percent of the 
total), "New Land" or reclaimed lands (25 percent of the total), and the small 
proportion consisting of rainfed areas and oases. 
Agriculture is still a central source of employment and gross domestic 
product (GOP). The Egyptian agricultural popUlation has been estimated at 31 
million (1980-2000 average) which constitutes 45% of the total population (see 
Figure 2-1). It is the second main economic sector in terms of employment, 
using 37% of the country's labour force during the same period (see Figure 2-
2). 
In contrast, the employment shares of industry and services increased 
from 20.1% and 35.7% in 1980 to 22.3% and 47.9% in 1998 respectively. In 
this respect, EI-Ashry (1992) stated that "historical observation has suggested 
that this contribution of labour by agriculture to other sectors of the economy is 
a key requirement for development and modernisation. It is certainly true that 
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the proportion of the labour force in agriculture has generally declined with 
time and development". 
FIGURE 2-1: DISTRIBUTION OF 
POPULA nON DURING THE PERIOD 
1980-2000 
.... -
FIGURE 2-2: DISTRIBUTION OF 
EMPLOYMENT BY SECTORS DURING 
1980-2000 
Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002, The World Bank. 
TABLE 2-1: PERCENT OF EMPLOYMENT BY MAIN ECONOMIC SECTORS 
Year Agriculture Industry Services 
80 42.4 20.1 35.7 
81 40.3 21.9 36.0 
82 39.1 21.9 37.6 
83 41.0 21.2 36.2 
84 40.6 20.1 36.2 
85 Na Na Na 
86 Na Na Na 
87 Na Na Na 
88 Na Na Na 
89 42.4 20.7 36.8 
90 39.0 20.7 40.1 
91 31.3 24.8 43.8 
92 38.4 21.5 40.1 
93 35.3 21.7 43 .0 
94 35 .2 21.5 43.3 
95 34.0 21.9 44.1 
96 Na Na Na 
97 31.3 22.2 46.2 
98 29.8 22.3 47.9 
99 Na Na Na 
2000 Na Na Na 
Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002, The World Bank. 
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Figure 2-3 shows that the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 28% in 
(1965-79) to 20% and 17% in the 1980s and 1990s. Rapid growth happened in 
the industrial! and services sectors and consequently their shares in GDP 
fonnation increased. For example, the share of industry in GDP rose from 28% 
in 1965-79 to 30% and 33% in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The share of the service sector rose from 44% in 1965-79 to 50% over 
the same period. The agricultural value added increased from 5.06 (constant 
1995 US billion $) with an annual growth rate of 2.4% in 1965-79 to 9.56 
(constant 1995 US billion $) in 1990-2000 with an annual growth rate of3%. 
Hence although agricultural production has risen considerably during this 
period, there has been a relative decline in the importance of the sector, as it is 
typically the case in developing economies. 
FIGURE 2-3: THE COMPOSITION OF GDP BY MAIN ECONOMIC SECTORS 
(AGRlCULTURE, INDUSTRY AND SERVICES) IN THE PERlOD 1965-2000. 
Source: Wodd Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002, The W orId Bank. 
I Including the petroleum sector. 
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2.2.2 : The Importance of Livestock in the Egyptian Agriculture 
The value added of the agricultural sector during the 1990s is estimated 
at about £E 10 (constant 1995 US billion $), nearly 25% of which is 
contributed by livestock sector. The majority of livestock and poultry 
production is relatively intensive and produced in a smaller, subsistence 
oriented farms in the Delta region (while other parts of the country are desert 
and therefore can not support natural forage for intensive grazing). These 
farms provide about 80%, 90% and 70% respectively of the produced beef, 
milk and dairy products and mutton. 
To keep pace with human population growth, the livestock production 
index had almost tripled by the 1990s compared to the 1960s (see Figure 2-4). 
In addition, livestock (during the last two decades) are no longer used 
extensively for animal power as before and most production have been sold for 
slaughter. Irrigation water is now pumped by electric and diesel engines. 
FIGURE 2-4: LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION INDEX IN THE PERIOD 1960-2000. 
(1989-91=100%) 
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Source: Table A2-1 
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Livestock and poultry compete with crop production for direct food use 
because they consume maize, barley, wheat and pulses. Livestock also 
compete directly for land because during the winter a large portion for land is 
devoted to berseem, which could be used to produce other competitive crops 
such as wheat, broad beans or other winter vegetable crops (De Boer et aI, 
1996). 
2.2.3 Trade performance. 
2.2.3.1 : Merchandise trade by partner (1990-2000). 
Egypt has been the centre of trade and enterprise in the Middle East 
region for centuries owing, in part, to its excellent location. Being situated 
between Africa, Asia and Europe makes it the crossroads between the East and 
the West. However, the contribution of Egyptian exports to the world economy 
is relatively small, falling from about 0.2% in the mid-eighties to 0.1 % in 1990 
and further to 0.07% in 2000 (see -- 2-1). 
The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) are Egypt's 
largest trading partners accounting for 50% of Egypt's foreign trade (1990-
2000 average). 53% of all Egyptian imports originate from these two sources 
(see Figures 2-5 and 2-6). 
Relations with Europe dominate Egypt's trade policy. The (EU) 
accounts for about 38% of Egypt's foreign trade (1990-2000 average). The EU 
accounted for 39% of exports and some 33% of imports in 2000 (see Figures 
2-5 and 2-6). Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and France are the most 
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FIGURE 2-5: GEOGRAPIDCAL DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPTIAN IMPORTS IN 
1990 AND 2000 
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FIGURE 2-6: GEOGRAPIDCAL DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPTIAN EXPORTS IN 
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important trading partners. In 1990, Egypt imported more than three times as 
much (in value terms) from the EU as it exported to the EU2• 
2.2.3.2 " Composition o/merchandise trade (1980-2000). 
Egyptian exports of primary products account for about 68% of Egypt's 
total merchandise exports during the period (1980-2000 average). This share 
declined by 31 percentage points between 1980 and 1990, although it has 
stabilised subsequently. The decline was mainly due to lower levels of fuels 
and agricultural raw material exports. The share of manufactured exports grew 
by 289% between 1980 and 1990, but it fell in 2000 by about 13%; such 
exports have experienced sharp fluctuations during the 1990s, mainly due to 
variations in exports of textiles and clothing, which account for about 50% of 
manufactured exports. 
TABLE 2-2: COMPOSITION OF EGYPTIAN TRADE (1990-2000) 
Imports (%) Exports (%) 
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 
Primary Products 41.0 43.7 41.0 89.1 57.8 
Agriculture 38.6 38.7 31.9 22.4 19.2 
Food 32.4 31.5 22.8 6.8 9.7 
Agricultural Raw Material 6.2 7.1 4.4 15.6 9.5 
Fuels 1.1 2.6 6.1 64.2 29.4 
Ores and metals 1.3 2.4 3.0 2.5 8.9 
Manufactures 59.0 56.3 59.0 10.9 42.5 
Chemicals 12.6 11.6 4.3 
Manufacture goods by materials IS.7 15.0 36.1 
Machinery & Transport equipment 22.S 25.3 0.7 
Miscellaneous Manufacture 2.2 7.1 1.4 
Total (5 Mn) 4,860 11,738.9 13,963.7 3,046 3,444.1 
World(SMn) 3,51(;,41% 6,5(i5,299 3,431,703 
Source: Calculated from: World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank 2002. 
: ESCWA2002 















2 In 1990, Egyptian imports from the EU accounted for 3861.2 million USS while exports to 
the EU were estimated at 991.7 million USS. 
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Egypt's main imports are machinery and transport equipment, whose 
share comprises about 41 % of manufactured imports and almost 24% of total 
imports (1990 and 2000 average). Food product imports declined from 32.4% 
in 1980 to 31.5% in 1990, and further to 22.5% in 2000, primarily reflecting 
slower growth in the volume of food imports. 
2.2.3.3 : Agricultural trade performance (1960-2000) 
The Egyptian agricultural trade balance was in surplus during the 
period (1961-73) that Egypt had a controlled economy, estimated at US$ 172 
million and since then it has experienced a record agricultural trade deficit 
from the mid- 1970s (when Egypt adopted the "Open Door Policy") until now 
(see Figure 2-7). 
This agricultural trade deficit is a direct result of the dramatic growth in 
food imports, particularly wheat and wheat flour imports, which increased 
during the period 1974-80 by an average of£E 251 million, equivalent to about 
five times the average of the period 1960-73. This is presumably in part due to 
the rapid increase in population (2.8% annual growth) which was well in 
excess of the 2% growth in agricultural output. This means that the domestic 
production of major crops, especially wheat, failed to meet the growing 
demand for food. Consequently, imports increased and the rate of self-
sufficiency rapidly declined (Al-Ashry, 1992). 
Figure 2-7 shows the trend of agricultural imports. and exports over the 
period 1960-2000. The agricultural trade deficit grew from US$ 1712 million 
3 Greater detail about the Egyptian agricultural policies including the "Open Door Policy" will 
be given in Chapter 3 
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in 1974-85 to US$ 2473 and further to US$ 2651 million in 1986-89 and 1990-
2000 respectively. 
Table 2-3 shows the relationship between agricultural and aggregate 
Egyptian trade over the period 1960-2000. The share of agricultural exports 
decreased throughout the last three decades. It fell from 71 % in the 1960s to 
about 55% in the 1970s and further to 23% in the 1980s, reaching 14% in the 
1990s. This fall in the agricultural share is presumably due to the severe 
intervention in agricultural sector and the consequences that resulted (greater 
detail concerning the ways and methods of interventions and its effects will be 
given in Chapter 3). 
FIGURE 2-7 : AGRICULTURAL IMpORTS AND EXPORTS TRENDS IN EGYPT DURING 
1960-2000 
(US$ million) 
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Source: FAO TradeYearbook, several issues. 
The share of agricultural imports in total imports is more stable than 
that of exports, fluctuating around 30% throughout the period, although as 
Table 2-3 reveals, there was a slight decline in the 1990s, both in absolute 
terms and relative to total imports. The fall in the agricultural import share may 
be explained by the considerable growth in crop yields for important cereal and 
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grain imports; for example, wheat yield increased by 50% in the 1990s 
compared to its level in the 1980s. 
TABLE 2-3: TOTAL AND AGRICULTURAL IMpORTS AND EXPORT IN EGYPT IN TIlE 
PERIOD 1960-2000 
Agricultural Total 




1980-89 3243.70 8617.40 
1990-2000 3129.73 11575.36 
• Column (3) = Column (1) I Column (2) 














Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002, The World Bank. 







Figures 2-8A and 2-88 describe the composition of agricultural imports 
and exports. The country is a large net food importer, with cereals and wheat 
as its principal imports whose shares of total agricultural imports declined from 
averages of 37% and 30% respectively in the period 1980-89 to 36% and 25% 
in the period 1990-2000. Except for edible oils and fruits and vegetables, 
whose shares have almost doubled throughout the 1990s compared with the 
1980s, other important import shares have been stable over the last twenty 
years. For example, dairy products 5%, tobacco 4%, live animals 3%. Import 
shares for meat and meat preparation and sugar varied between 6-7%, and for 
coffee, tea and cocoa between 3% and 4%. 
Egypt's exports of agricultural products in general have declined in 
value in the 1990s compared with the 1970s and 1980s. This decline is mainly 
due to the dramatic decline in textile exports, which fell by 56% between the 
1980s and 1990s as a result of both lower cotton output production and lower 
prices. For example, the share of cotton exports in total agricultural exports fell 
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FIGURE 2-8A: IMPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS DURING 1980-2000 
1980-89 1990-2000 
FIGURE 2-8 B: EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS DURING 1980-2000 
1980-89 1990-2000 
Source: Calculated from F AO Trade Yearbook, Several issue 
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from 42% in 1994 to about 25% in 1997. In contrast, cereals and preparation, 
rice and fruits and vegetables expanded their share in total agricultural exports 
in the 1990s relative to the 1980s by 13%, 12%and 8% respectively. 
2.3 : Features 0/ Egyptian Agriculture. 
2.3.1 : The Cropping Pattern 
The "Cropping Pattern" refers to the allocation of the cultivated area 
among different crops. The crop mixes, as well as the area devoted to each 
crop, are determined by the cropping system and crop yields. The "Optimum 
Cropping Pattern" is used to describe that combination of crop that maximises 
net agricultural income. 
The cropping pattern in Egypt is affected by many factors, for example, 
the limited agricultural land area and water resources, the small sizes of farms 
(due to fragmentation), in addition to some technical factors (crop rotations) 
and other factors concerning governmental plan and agricultural policy 
(Hassan, 1991). With a cropping intensity of approximately 180 percent, the 
cropped area totals around 5.7 million hectares (13.6 million feddan). The 
estimated 3.5 million farmers cultivate an average 2 feddan (approximately 
0.84 hectare) each; almost half of them cultivate only I feddan (Nassar, 1996). 
About one third of Egypt's total cultivated area is devoted to perennial 
crops such as fruits and sugar cane, while the rest is double-cropped and 
divided evenly between winter and summer crops. The main crops are wheat 
and berseem (clover) in winter, and cotton, rice and maize in summer. 
Vegetable and fruit production has also been growing in importance. 
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Figure 2-9 shows that the most important crops in Egypt are ranked4 as 
follows; wheat, long berseem, rice, maize, cotton, sugarcane, tomatoes, short 
berseem, broad beans, potatoes, soybean, sesame, barley, groundnut, lentil, 
chickpea, and lupine. Five crops (wheat, long berseem, rice and maize cotton) 
compromised about 81 % of total crop value and 58% of the total planted area 
in the period 1986-2000. 
FIGURE 2-9: THE IMPORTANCE OF MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT AS A PERCENT OF 
TOTAL CROP VALUE IN THE PERIOD 1986-2000 
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Source: Calculated from data obtained from Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Statistics Unit, Several issues. 
2.3.2 : The Rotation System 
The major cropping seasons are the winter (November-May) and 
summer (May-October) seasons. Another, marginal, season is the Nile season 
or late summer season (August-October), named after the annual Nile flooding 
of the past, (Kotb et aI., 2000). The Egyptian agricultural year starts in October 
4 On the basis of crop output value and area planted 
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and continues until the following September. For example the cropping season 
for 2003 started from October 2002 and ended in September 2003. During each 
year, the land is cultivated twice, by a winter crop then followed by a summer 
crop. 
Crop rotation is defined as the sequence of crops planted during the 
cropping season of the year, as well as during a detennined number of 
succeeding years. There are various crop rotations followed in the Nile Valley 
and Delta areas depending on the soil type and crop choice. Rotations are 
commonly named by the main cash crop in the sequence and the proportion of 
the area it covers. The main reasons of adopting such a technique are: (1 )-an 
increase in the intensity of land use (2)- an increase in the amount of land 
planted to the proposed crop, say, cotton per unit of time (3)- preserving the 
fertility of land (for example, during its growing season, cotton stays in the 
land for about seven to nine months depleting the soil of nutrients. (4)-
preventing its solidity, for example rice needs irrigated water to be in the soil 
for the majority of its plantation period, so changing its location prevents the 
solidity of land. 
In general, there are two main rotation systems followed in Egypt, 
either a three or a two-year rotation. The more intensive is the use of land, the 
more likely it is that there will be a switch from a three to a two-year crop 
rotation. 
Although there are numerous, slightly differing descriptions of the 
rotations, the following gives a guide to how a t h r e e ~ y e a r r cotton rotation 






The Egyptian Agricultural Sector 
In winter --. Short berseem 
In summer --. Cotton 
In winter --. Wheat 
In summer --. Maize 
In winter --. Broad beans 
In summer --. Rice 
In the first year of rotation, the first block is planted with a winter 
fodder crop, say short berseem, and after two cuttings this is followed by 
cotton as a summer crop. During this time, the second block is devoted to 
wheat in winter, replaced by maize. The third block is planted by broad beans 
in winter, replaced by rice in summer. 
In the second year of rotation, what was planted in the first block is 
planted in the second block, and what was planted in the second block is 
planted in the third block, and what was planted in the third block is planted in 
the first block. 
In the third year of rotation, what was devoted in the second block is 
planted in the third block, and what was planted in the third block is devoted to 
the first block, while what was planted in the first block is planted in the 
second block. This is illustrated in Figure 2-10 below. 
FIGURE 2-10: A DIAGRAM FOR A THREE-YEAR ROTA nON SYSTEM WHERE 
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The second most prevalent rotation is a two-year rotation, which has 
the same way and methodology as a three-year rotation. The only difference is 
that its period is two years only. 
Apart from the period of rotation, the adopted rotation varies from 
region to region according to the crops grown and climatic, soil and 
geographical requirements. For example, in the northern Delta region, rice is 
the predominant summer crop followed by winter cereals and legumes. While 
in southern Delta and Middle Egypt, maize is the dominant summer crop 
followed by wheat and legumes in winter. As we move south to Upper Egypt, 
sugar cane replaces cotton as a cash crop. Based on this overall set-up of crop 
sequences, the major field and vegetable crops cultivated are cotton, maize, 
rice, sugar can, soybean, wheat, broad beans, tomatoes, potatoes, long and 
short season clover. The corresponding possible crop rotations are: wheat-
maize, wheat-rice, broad bean-maize, broad bean-rice, short berseem-cotton, 
long berseem-rice, long berseem-maize, potatoes-maize, tomatoes-maize, 
potatoes-soybean, long berseem-soybean, wheat-soybean, tomatoes-soybean, 
and sugar cane. 
2.3.3 : Cultivated Area, Yields and ProductionS. 
The annual growth in the arable land area has been very small in the 
last four decades6, so the changes that have occurred in the planted area of a 
certain crop mainly reflect the reallocations of land from one crop to another. 
Table 2-4 shows the trend in area devoted to production of the major field and 
S This part is aimed to give a general picture for the area, productivity and production pattern 
of major crops planted in the Egyptian agricultural sector. However, greater details about the 
impact of the reform era for the above mentioned crop output level and productivity will be 
discussed at the end of the next Chapter. 
6 The annual growth rate for arable land area during the period 1961-1999 is estimated at 
-0.005%. 
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TABLE 2-4: AREA, YIELD AND PRODUCTION AVERAGE S OF MAJOR CROPS IN 
EGYPT IN THE PERIOD 1980-2000 
1980-89 90-95 96-00 Change 0;' Change Crop I D m D-I m-I llII DIll 
I Wheat I Area 1.33 2.01 2.43 0.68 1.10 50.81 82.99 
Yield 1.65 2.34 2.64 0.69 0.99 41.89 59.95 
Production 2.21 4.69 6.41 2.48 4.21 112.64 190.73 
I Long berseem I Area 1.78 1.68 1.72 -0.10 -0.06 -5.49 -3.55 
Yield 24.52 25.80 26.94 1.28 2.42 5.22 9.89 
Procluction 43.61 43.42 46.38 -0.19 2.77 -0.43 6.36 
I Rice I Area 0.97 1.23 1.47 0.26 0.51 27.30 52.30 
Yield 2.45 3.23 3.63 0.78 1.18 31.85 48.27 
Production 2.37 3.99 5.36 1.63 2.99 68.66 126.24 
I Maize I Area 1.40 1.65 1.66 0.24 0.25 17.18 17.80 
Yield 2.05 2.67 3.19 0.62 1.14 30.12 55.65 
Procludion 2.89 4.40 5.28 1.51 2.39 52.21 82.74 
I Cotton I Area 1.06 0.82 0.83 -0.24 -0.24 -22.74 -22.21 
Yield 1.02 0.99 0.96 -0.03 -0.07 -3.20 -6.37 
Production 1.09 0.81 0.79 -0.28 -0.30 -25.85 -27.31 
I Sugar cane lAM 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.02 0.04 8.87 16.91 
Yield 37.79 44.43 48.03 6.64 10.24 17.58 27.11 
Produclion 9.77 12.51 14.49 2.73 4.72 27.96 48.28 
I Tomatoes I Area 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.01 -0.98 9.25 
Yield 8.68 12.79 16.40 4.11 7.72 47.38 89.03 
Production 1.32 1.88 2.69 0.56 1.37 42.15 103.48 
I Short berseem I Area 0.88 0.72 0.66 -0.16 -0.22 -18.17 -25.01 
Yield 9.38 10.63 11.85 1.24 2.47 13.22 26.30 
Production 8.27 7.65 7.82 -0.61 -0.45 -7.44 -5.42 
I Broad beans I Area 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.02 0.05 8.55 16.51 
Yield 1.02 1.08 1.25 0.06 0.23 5.81 23.03 
Production 0.29 0.33 0.42 0.04 0.13 13.40 42.95 
I Potatoes I Area 0.09 0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -6.39 -33.42 
Yield 8.04 7.67 8.22 -0.37 0.18 -4.63 2.28 
Production 0.77 0.68 0.52 -0.09 -0.25 -11.18 -32.82 
I Sol beans I Area 0.12 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -41.23 -75.31 
Yield 1.14 1.15 1.11 0.01 -0.02 0.70 -2.02 
PmcIudion 0.13 0.08 0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -41.17 -75.90 
Source: Calculated from tables A2-3, A2-4 and A2-5 
Area in million feddan, Yield in ton per feddan and Production in million ton. 
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vegetable crops. It also shows the development of yield (productivity) per 
feddan as well as the volume of production of these major crops during the 
period 1980-2000. This period is classified into three periods, the first (1980-
89) covers the pre-reform and the early stages of the reform era, while the post-
reform era is classified into two periods (the second 1990-95 and the third 
1996-2000) to capture the development of reform happened over time. 
Policy reform had a significant recuperating effect on the agricultural 
sector, but crops were not affected equally. Some grew, others declined, 
depending on the way which policy affected them. The areas of the major cash 
crops, wheat, rice and maize, increased significantly in the third period (1996-
2000 average) compared to the first period (1980-89 average), by about 83%, 
52% and 18% respectively. The shift in the cultivated areas of these crops that 
occurred during the reform period can be partly explained by the relatively 
high and increasing profitability and yields of those crops. For example, wheat 
and rice profitability increased by 226% and 86% in the 1990s. This reflects 
the correction of the previously overvalued exchange rate and the artificially 
low farm procurement prices that increased the rice-cultivated area in the 
1990s (Khedr et aI., 1996). 
Cotton acreage fell sharply by 22% in the same period, which can be 
explained by the downward trend in cotton yields as well as the uncertainty 
created by the world cotton price decline in 1991- 93. In this respect, Nassar 
(1996) stated that" In 1991, the official export price was reduced by 30%. This 
adjustment process culminated in a 1993-export price that was less than 500.16 
of the 1991 level. In 1992 and 1993 farm procurement prices were fully 14-
30% above border prices. The government, squeezed by these events, found 
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itself without sufficient funds to make an initial payment to farmers in 1993. 
After several months of delay, it made good its commitment to pay farmers a 
price that exceeded world prices by about 30%. Many farmers chose not to 
grow cotton because of its uncertainty." Consequently, the cotton area 
continued its decline further from 850,000 feddan in 1991 until it reached the 
bottom in 1995 to record 710,000 feddan. 
Besides cotton, other crops with decreasing area trends include short 
berseem, potatoes and soybean. The cotton and short berseem areas move 
together as farmers typically grow these crops consecutively on a given tract of 
land. Soybean is a relatively new crop to Egypt and its area constituted nearly 
50,000 feddan in the last decade. The dramatic fall in the soybean area by 
(75% in 1996-2000 compared with its level in 1980-89) is accounted for by 
changes in the policy environment. Farmers were subsidised to grow it in the 
beginning of the 1 980s, whereas in the nineties, after the elimination of 
subsidies, its controlled price, the lack of an efficient marketing system and the 
mandatory delivery of its production to government-owned mills through the 
Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (in order to insure its 
availability to public mills, while private sector mills have to import their 
needs of soybean for oil and soybean meal production) led farmers to not grow 
it and to shift to another profitable crop. 
Yields for all the above mentioned crops (except for cotton and 
soybean) recorded a considerable upward shift during the 1990s (see Table 2-
4). Tomato and wheat yields increased during the third period by 89% and 
59% respectively, at an annual growth rate in the period 1980-2000 of 5.4% 
and 3.8% and with an average yield per feddan of 2.0 and 11.7 ton 
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respectively. Statistical analysis reveals that annual average yield growth rates 
are ranked as follows: maize (3.2%), rice (2.8%), sugar cane (1.9%), short 
berseem (1.6%), broad beans (1.5%), long berseem (0.7%) and potatoes 
(0.4%). Cotton and soybean recorded negative growth rates of -0.8% and -
0.2% respectively. 
Table 2-4 also shows the trends in the volumes of production of major 
crops during the period 1980-2000. The figures indicate that, compared to the 
pre-reform era, production of most crops increased in the third period, albeit to 
different degrees. For some crops, production levels have increased owing to 
growth in both planted area and productivity. For example the wheat area 
increased by 83% and at the same time its productivity increased by 60%. The 
combination resulted an upward shift in total production by 190% between the 
third and first periods. In contrast, crops such as cotton, which recorded a fall 
in planted area and productivity by 22% and 6% respectively, experienced a 
downward shift in production of 27%. The area under long berseem fell by 
3.5%, but its productivity increased by 9% and consequently the fall in 
cropped area was compensated by the increase in productivity, and as a result 
its production increased by 6.3%. 
In sum, there are those crops that are considered winners from the 
reform (in terms of higher changes in production during the reform era), such 
as wheat (191 %), rice (126%), tomatoes (103%), maize (83%), sugar cane and 
broad beans (46%) and long berseem (6%). Other crops are losers, such as 
soybean (-76%), potatoes (-33%), cotton (-27%) and short berseem (-5%). 
Volumes of production of major crops during the period 1980-2000 
were estimated as a linear function over time to identify their trend of 
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TABLE 2-5: ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF LINEAR TREND MODELS FITTED TO 
VOLUMES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DURING THE PERIOD 1980-2000 
(QUANTITIES IN 000 TON) 
YI = 7780.95 + 354.42 X, R2 
Sugarcane SE (214.04) (17.05) 0.96 
t 36.35·· 20.79·· 
YI = 744.47 + 288.44 X, 
Wheat SE (249.31) (19.85) 0.92 
t 2.99·· 14.53·· 
YI = 2066.77 + 165.52 X, 
Maize SE (144.97) (11.55) 0.92 
t 14.26·· 14.34·· 
YI = 711.00 + 99.36 X, 
Tomatoes SE (100.07) (7.97) 0.89 
t 7.11·· 12.47·· 
YI = 1351.49 + 199.36X, 
Rice SE (230.25) (18.34) 0.86 
t 5.87·· 10.87·· 
YI = 167.23 - 6.77 Xi 
Soybean SE (10.50) (0.84) 0.78 
t 15.92·· - 8.10·· 
YI = 1252.32 - 28.67 X, 
Cotton SE (56.32) (4.49) 0.68 
t 22.23·· - 6.390 • 
Broad 
YI = 238.34 + 8.54 X, 
beans SE (29.97) (2.39) 0.40 
t 7.95·· 3.58·· 
Short 
VI = 8577.81 - 53.92 X, 
berseem SE (234.19) (18.65) 0.31 
t 36.63·· - 2.89·· 
Long 
VI = 42115.15 + 190.94 X, 
SE (1349.48) (107.47) 0.14 berseem 
t 31.21"· 1.78· 
VI = 800.31 - 10.67 X, 
Potatoes SE (94.58) (7.53) 0.10 
t 8.46·· -1.42 
• Slgnificant at 5%, •• Slgmficant at 1 %. 
't' tabulated at 19 degree of freedom at 5% = 1.72 and at 1 % = 2.53 
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production, as well as, to identify the annual rate of growth (increasing or 
decreasing) during the last two decades. Table 2-5 presents the results of the 
estimated parameters. The results indicate growth for wheat, maize, tomatoes 
rice and broad beans and decline for soybean, cotton, short berseem and long 
berseem. Comparing these coefficients with their standard errors indicates that 
all coefficients (except that for potatoes) are statistically significant from zero 
at the 1 % level ofsignificance7• 
The estimated growth rates of major crops revealed that wheat growth 
rate accounted the highest rate of 7.8% followed by tomato 5.9% and rice 
5.5%. However, this rate varied between 4.3% and 3.1 % for maize and sugar 
cane. The lowest positive growth rate was achieved by long berseem at 0.4%. 
Declining rates of production recorded 9.5% for soybean compared with 2.9 % 
to 2% for cotton and potatoes and 0.6% for short berseem. 
2.3.4 : Patterns of Costs of Production for Major Crops 
The production cost for growing a certain crop is a function of traded 
and non-traded input costs. By definition tradable inputs are inputs that are 
traded in the world market while non-tradable inputs are not. It is difficult for 
the analyst to split these two types of inputs empirically, simply because 
tradable inputs almost always have some non-tradable component. For 
example, tractors are tradable but once they are used on the farm the cost item 
"tractor" will have some non-tradable input component such as labour used in 
handling, transportation from port to warehouse, and maintenance. Then, 
except for pure non-tradable inputs such as land, labour, manure and animal 
7 Note however that since the data is 'non stationary', use of t distribution to evaluate statistical 
significance is inappropriate, and the outcomes should be treated as indicative, not definitive 
(see later). 
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work, all other inputs have to be divided into their tradable and non-tradable 
components (greater details concerning this issue and its calculation will be 
discussed in Chapter 5). 
Non-traded inputs comprise manure, animal work, irrigation water and 
other primary factors such as land, labour and machinery. Traded inputs are 
composed mainly of fertiliser, seeds and pesticides. The sum of their costs 
composes the crop's total production costs. For the whole period 1986-2000, 
primary factors accounts for about 63% of total domestic costs in Egypt. 
Table 2-6 shows the relative importance of agriCUltural input costs as a 
percentage of the crop's total cost. In general it reveals that the cost of inputs . 
such as land cost have increased for all crops, though by different amounts. For 
example the share of land rent in total cost for rice grew from 8.9% in 1986-90 
to 31.1 % in 1996-2000. This upward shift in land rent percentage is mainly in 
response to the land rent reform policy adjustments applied in the reform era. 
Also, fertiliser and pesticide ratio in total cost grew for all major crops (except 
for soybean)8. Fertiliser share in cost grew during the second period (1991-95) 
compared to the first (1986-90), then stagnated during the third period (1996-
2000). The growth in the fertiliser cost ratio is mainly due to land and planting 
requirements in response to; (1)- the deterioration of land fertility; (2)- to meet 
the needs of the high yield varieties introduced by Ministry of Agriculture and 
adopted by growers; and, (3)- to compensate for the fall in manure supplies, 
especially the nitrogenous component. 
8 As mentioned earlier in Section 2-3-3 and Table 2-4, soybean growers ignored its production 
in response to its low profitability. 
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TABLE 2- 6: AORICULlURAL INPUT COST AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL COSTS FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT IN TIlE PERIOD 1986-2000 
~ E R C E N T l l
Land Labour Machinery Fertiliser Seed Pesticides Manure Animal Work Water Others 
I Cotton 11986-90 13.0 52.5 11.2 5.3 0.8 2.0 6.1 1.0 0.0 7.6 
1991-95 22.1 38.1 11.1 9.0 2.2 1.8 4.7 0.3 0.0 7.6 
1996-2000 33.6 29.5 10.2 9.1 2.9 3.4 4.8 0.2 0.0 5.4 
1986-2000 21.3 38.9 10.8 7.6 1.7 2.3 5.2 0.4 0.0 6.8 I Rice 11986-90 8.9 39.5 26.5 5.3 7.1 1.0 2.1 3.4 0.0 5.5 
1991-95 17.7 26.0 23.2 7.4 11.3 2.6 1.0 2.1 0.0 7.2 
1996-2000 31.1 18.8 21.9 7.0 7.5 3.5 1.2 1.9 0.0 6.2 
1986-2000 17.0 26.8 23.8 6.4 8.4 2.1 1.3 2.4 0.0 6.2 I Maize 11986-90 10.4 44.1 16.6 10.2 3.4 0.2 7.7 1.3 0.0 5.2 
1991-95 17.4 30.0 16.0 15.6 5.3 0.8 6.1 0.5 0.0 6.4 
1996-2000 28.4 23.6 13.9 13.5 5.9 1.9 5.2 0.2 0.0 5.7 
1986-2000 17.3 31.5 15.4 12.9 4.7 0.7 6.3 0.5 0.0 5.7 I Soybean 11986-90 9.6 40.1 20.9 9.2 5.6 3.8 4.4 0.3 0.0 5.2 
1991-95 18.7 26.8 23.8 11.0 6.6 2.2 2.5 0.1 0.0 6.5 
1996-2000 31.9 23.6 20.5 9.9 5.4 0.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 5.5 
1986-2000 17.9 29.4 21.7 10.0 5.8 1.9 2.3 0.1 0.0 5.7 I Potatoes 11986-90 4.4 20.4 7.4 7.8 42.3 4.8 5.3 1.5 0.0 5.4 
1991-95 5.3 13.4 6.6 10.1 46.8 4.8 4.9 0.8 0.0 6.6 
1996-2000 12.4 13.4 6.7 10.8 38.9 4.7 4.5 0.7 0.0 6.4 
1986-2000 6.6 15.4 6.9 9.5 42.5 4.8 4.9 0.9 0.0 6.1 I Log berseem 11986-90 15.4 49.0 16.2 2.4 9.2 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 4.8 
1991-95 25.6 43.1 13.1 2.6 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 6.5 
1996-2000 36.4 33.5 12.8 3.6 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 6.5 
1986-2000 24.3 41.4 13.9 2.8 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 5.9 
2-26 
The Egyptian Agricultural Sector 
Continued 
Land Labour Machinery Fertiliser Seed Pesticides Manure Animal Work Water Others 
I Short Berseem 11986-90 15.2 44.2 17.4 0.0 15.4 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 4.3 
1991-95 27.4 41.1 13.9 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 3.2 
1996-2000 40.5 33.0 13.1 0.0 10.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 2.5 
1986-2000 25.6 39.1 14.7 0.0 11.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 3.3 I Wheat '1986-90 14.1 38.4 20.8 8.3 6.0 0.4 4.4 1.3 0.0 5.4 
1991-95 23.4 24.0 19.3 13.4 6.8 0.8 3.2 0.7 0.0 6.7 
1996-2000 36.3 18.3 17.8 10.5 5.2 1.3 2.9 0.3 0.0 6.0 
1986-2000 22.9 25.6 19.2 10.5 6.0 0.8 3.4 0.6 0.0 6.0 I Broad beans '1986-90 14.0 40.7 19.4 4.5 12.8 0.8 0.3 1.8 0.0 4.6 
1991-95 23.1 26.1 18.4 6.8 12.4 2.5 1.0 0.6 0.0 6.2 
1996-2000 372 19.1 16.9 5.9 8.3 3.9 1.3 0.2 0.0 5.5 
1986-2000 22.9 27.3 18.2 S.7 11.0 2.0 0.7 0.6 0.0 S.4 I Tomatoes '1986-90 4.9 43.0 13.9 8.0 6.9 8.6 7.5 0.6 0.0 5.5 
1991-95 10.7 32.1 12.1 13.4 7.9 9.5 5.0 0.1 0.0 7.3 
1996-2000 18.2 27.4 12.5 12.9 10.1 8.4 3.3 0.1 0.0 6.1 
1986-2000 9.8 33.6 12.8 11.2 8.2 8.8 5.0 0.2 0.0 6.2 
I S!!Bareane '1986-90 10.6 42.8 17.9 12.3 6.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 7.7 
1991-95 17.7 26.9 16.9 18.3 6.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 11.2 
1996-2000 28.2 21.2 18.9 17.0 4.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 8.9 
1986-2000 17.5 29.0 17.9 15.6 5.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 9.2 
Note: Water cost ratio recorded zero because there is no charge for water, while irrigation costs such as water pump and its labour operation are included in machinery costs. 
The Geometric Mean is used to calculate the average percent during the periods 1986-90,1991-95 and 1996-2000. 
Source: Calculated from data obtained from Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Statistics Unit, Several issue 
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On the other hand labour animal work, manure and (to some extent) 
machinery cost components shares in total costs have continuously fallen for 
all major crops during the three successive periods 1986-90, 1991-95 and 
1996-2000. For example, the share of labour in cotton production costs fell by 
23% in 1996-2000 compared with its 1986-90 level. Total labour costs fell 
22% for broad beans and sugar cane, 21 % for rice and maize, 20% for wheat, 
17% for soybean, 16% for tomatoes and long berseem, 11 % for short berseem 
and 7% for potatoes. The downward shift in labour and machinery share is 
presumably due to two reasons; first, growers were faced by higher costs of 
land rent, in response to which they did their best to reallocate their resources 
and reduce other cost factors to maintain a profit margin, and secondly, the 
newly adopted varieties needed a relatively lower land service and/or planting 
processes and consequently lower amount of labour and machinery usage. 
2.3.5 The Pattern of Farm Gate Prices for Major Agricultural Products. 
Prices are one of the most important signals in market operation. On the 
production side, prices playa central role in directing/determining the type and 
level of resource allocation, production level (quantity) and the flow of 
commodities in market channels (FAO, 1999). : In this respect, Taskok (1990, 
p.2) states 'Because prices are both costs and incomes, individuals respond to 
them in their roles as producers, intermediaries and consumers. Their 
responses to incentives induced by price policy inevitably shape the process 0/ 
economic development and the distribution o/incomes and welfare'. 
Agricultural price policy is a major instrument of government 
intervention. For example, the government of Egypt during the 1950s looked to 
agriculture to play a central, though supporting, role in the development 
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process and took the view that the surplus should be transferred to industry, the 
prime engine of growth. 
The mechanism used to extract and transfer the agricultural surplus was 
price policy. The government controlled most of the agricultural prices and 
there were regular government decrees announcing those prices. This price 
policy covered all tradable inputs and most agricultural outputs (Greater details 
are given in Chapter 3). 
Table 2-7 shows the development of product values at real prices 
(1986=100) during the period 1980-2000, as well as the annual rate of growth 
for eleven major crops in Egyptian agriculture during the reform period 1986-
2000. The analysis reveals that product values have significantly increased 
over time for all crops. Furthermore, real price levels increased in the 1990s for 
cotton, long berseem, wheat, by 297%, 264% and 230% respectively compared 
with their levels in the 1980s; this upward shift in domestic product prices is a 
direct result of the elimination of the controlled price policy in the reform era. 
Farm gate prices for fodder crops such as long and short berseem, 
which are in great demand as a major source for feeding animals, recorded the 
highest annual rate of growth during the period 1986-2000 of 11.8% and 
10.5%, followed by cotton (9.5%), rice (9.3%), sugar cane (8.7%), wheat 
(8.1 %), and around 7.5% for potatoes and broad beans, around 6.5% for maize 
and soybeans and 4.5% for tomatoes. 
2.3.6 Major Crops and Profitability 
Profitability is the key criterion for growers. It shows the 
competitiveness of each of the agricultural sectors, taking into account current 
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TABLE 2-7: REAL FARM GATE PRICES, ANNUAL GROWTH RATE AND TREND OF 
PRICES FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT DURING THE PERIOD 1980-2000. 
(1986=100) £EffoN 
a VI 1:: E! oeE! J J - a J a ~ ~ =:I ! i w .I • u i .=! 3J e ~ ~ ii • ~ ~ l ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ =I fIlJ ~ ~ ~ ~
1980 39 49 33 56 43 56 34 45 54 44 31 
81 41 59 40 43 51 61 41 55 57 53 49 
82 36 62 53 57 52 69 49 65 53 58 51 
83 49 67 53 76 55 69 58 77 74 68 60 
84 55 76 53 79 60 76 60 80 89 77 66 
85 76 100 86 89 69 76 67 88 89 91 89 
1980-85 49 69 53 67 55 68 52 68 69 65 58 
86 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
87 98 118 83 116 120 113 155 157 91 103 112 
88 106 148 104 148 121 133 129 135 133 127 125 
89 194 208 146 185 126 213 142 135 186 132 164 
90 211 270 152 195 151 213 171 170 196 168 190 
1986-90 142 169 117 149 124 ISS 139 140 141 126 138 
91 222 328 176 201 192 227 182 . 198 239 203 190 
92 225 334 192 202 208 224 203 227 270 170 191 
93 238 383 204 209 219 213 253 288 320 147 238 
94 238 335 245 218 219 233 253 288 396 130 266 
95 250 559 265 234 229 280 278 323 272 181 295 
1991-95 235 388 217 213 213 236 234 265 299 166 236 
96 285 529 284 245 243 280 321 389 286 191 295 
97 296 487 290 251 267 280 392 438 294 200 312 
98 303 361 293 264 272 280 417 485 278 199 328 
99 307 357 295 276 274 280 418 496 280 203 312 
2000 309 364 302 294 275 287 454 . 519 284 201 328 
1996-2000 300 420 293 266 266 281 400 465 285 199 315 
1986-2000 225 325 209 209 201 224 258 290 242 164 230 
Annual 
Growth 8.1 9.5 9.3 6.4 7.4 6.7 10.5 11.8 7.6 4.5 8.7 Rate -AI 
(1986-2000) 
P 25.3 148 4z.6 26.6 62.7 48.5 7.4 6.9 21.3 13.3 62.7 
tp 11.1" 4.3" 1'.2" 14.'" 16.5" 8.1" 16.1" 17.'" 4.2" 5.1" 16.9" 
Source: Calculated from Table Al-6 
**Significant at I % level, in relation to t distribution, but see previous footnote. 
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technologies, output values, input costs and policy transfers. Profits are 
defined as total revenues minus total costs. If profit is negative, growers are 
then earning a sub-normal rate of return and thus can be expected to exit from 
this activity/sector unless something changes to increase profits to at least 
normal level. Alternatively, positive profits are an indication of super-normal 
returns and should lead to future expansion of the sector. 
Table 2-8 shows the profitability per feddan for major crops during the 
period 1986-2000 in constant prices (1986=100). The figures reveal that 
profitability has increased at various rates during the second period (1990-94 
average) and the third period (1995-2000 average) compared with levels in 
1986-89 (average) for most major crops. For example, the profitability of 
cotton increased by 339% during the third period compared with its level in the 
first period, other increases being around 275% for rice, 218% for long and 
short berseem, 152% for tomatoes, 117% for sugar cane 'and around 84% for 
com and wheat and 15% for broad bean. 
Soybean showed successive falls in its profitability from 160 to 148 
and then to 48 £ElFeddan throughout the periods 1986-89, 1990-94 and 1995-
2000 respectively. This very low profitability might explain growers' 
reluctance to plant soybean, its average area falling by 68% throughout 1995-
200 compared with 1986-,89. 
The profitability of potatoes and cotton fell in the third period by 56% 
and 2% respectively compared with the second period, while in response, their 
planted areas fell by 17% for the first and increased by 1.2% for the second. 
The response of potatoes area to low profitability is simply because potatoes 
responded to market forces since there was no intervention from the 
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government; consequently efficient producers were still producing them 
despite their relatively low profitability. 
TABLE 2-8: DOMESTIC PROFITABILITY FOR MAJOR CROPS DURING 1986-2000 
P986=IOOl £E I Feddan 
Cl)a t: a i I ~ ~ 1 = = = fl ~ ~ ... ~ ~ ~ ~ ell i Year = ~ ~ e ~ ~ Col ~ ~ III = e ell ! e III .,CI1Il ; ~ ~ ~ I I I I "',8 ~ t t (Ilt ~ ~ J.l Col e e = U e .0 .0 E-c (Il ~ ~
1986 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1987 195 208 48 161 107 118 106 141 113 150 75 
1988 157 165 96 263 119 117 133 108 141 115 182 
1989 154 164 212 375 88 271 190 145 283 275 336 
1990 179 179 253 423 134 308 254 157 438 267 88 
1991 209 217 277 388 199 279 196 125 717 324 148 
1992 223 240 277 351 133 292 181 107 944 181 185 
1993 274 219 224 228 125 232 207 72 1071 -66 144 
1994 259 240 347 269 162 209 265 66 419 33 514 
1995 309 302 408 230 253 242 301 166 1185 27 139 
1996 406 414 467 350 279 329 299 202 1226 141 159 
1997 502 477 463 485 266 296 348 251 1147 138 179 
1998 529 582 394 316 249 251 297 111 147 -43 10 
1999 529 558 419 478 264 311 209 -16 223 16 47 
2000 605 637 418 505 255 321 270 138 271 7 30 
Average 
(I): 1986-89 152 159 114 225 104 151 132 123 159 160 173 
(2): 1990-94 229 219 276 332 151 264 221 105 718 148 216 
(3): 95-2000 480 495 428 394 261 292 287 142 700 48 94 
Source: Calculated from data obtained from Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Statistics Unit, Several issues. 
In the case of cotton, the government set floor prices to compensate for 
the fall in cotton's world price and continuously protected (subsidised) its 
output (discussed in greater details in Chapter 8). Fodder crops, including long 
and short season clover were the most profitable crops during the last period, 
presumably because of the high and increasing demand for their related 
industry (animal production). 
Table 2-9 shows the trend of private profitability for crop rotations. The 
results reveal that the profitability of most crop rotations improved during the 
reform era at various rates. The exception was broad beans, followed by 
potatoes or soybean, where profitability fell by 24% and 14% respectively 
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The Egyptian Agricultural Sector 
during the third period compared to the first; this is because the profitability of 
both potatoes and soybeans fell remarkably during the third period (see Table 
2-8). 
Summary and Conclusion 
Major changes have taken place in Egyptian agriculture over the reform 
era owing to radical reforms introduced successively since 1986. Reform 
policy changes will be detailed in Chapter 3, but the changes and trends 
identified here indicate the extent of government intervention that 
characterised the pre-reform era. 
The most noticeable changes are overall increases for most agricultural 
commodities in terms of production, yields, farm gate prices and private 
profitability. The most noticeable impact of the reforms is the massive 
expansion of production of wheat, rice and tomatoes by 191%, 126%, and 
103% respectively. In contrast, soybean, cotton and potatoes production 
volumes fell by 76%, 27% and 33% respectively. 
From the above descriptive analysis we can conclude that land area, 
yields and production for cereal crops such as wheat and rice showed a 
increasingly upward trend throughout the period 1980-2000, in particular 
during the reform era 1986-2000. 
There was a drop in Egypt's wheat and wheat flour imports, from 30% 
to 25% of total consumption, (despite the population growth rate of 2.8%) and 
a rise in rice exports from 3% to 15% of total production in the 1990s (see 
Tables 2-7 A and 2-7B). Cotton production, which is considered the most 
important exportable crop in Egypt and a major source of foreign currency, has 
showed a relatively low performance even in the reform era. This is reflected 
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in Egypt's textile exports, which fell from 64% to 28% of total exports during 
the 1990s, a case that needs more investigation. 
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Egyptian Agricultural Policy: A Historical Overview 
Chapter In: 
Egyptian Agricultural Policy: A Historical Overview 
3.1 : Introduction 
During the 1960s, 1970s and the-mid 1980s, Egyptian economic 
policies focused on diverting the surplus accumulated in the agriculture sector 
to finance and develop the manufacturing and services sectors. Improvement of 
the agriculture sector itself tended to be ignored. The policy goal was achieved 
through government intervention in the production, distribution and marketing 
of such strategic I crops as cotton, sugarcane, wheat, rice, broad beans, maize, 
sesame, lentils and soybeans. 
As Ott (1991) states, "Ownership of factors of production and 
organisation of enterprises changed dramatically under the free officers' 
regime2• In the agriculture sector, redistribution of ownership of land was 
accomplished by decrees, laws and regulations (Agrarian Reform Law of 
1952, with Amendments in 1959, 1961, 1963 and 1969). The land reform laws 
restricted the size of land holding and banned foreign ownership. Land leases 
and certificates of tenure were regulated and rents controlled. Production co-
operatives became compulsory for all private holdings in agriculture. 
Cooperatives provided inputs (seeds and fertilisers, pesticides and credits) and 
enforced crop rotations as well as marketing agriculture outputs. 
I These crops are considered strategic for the Egyptian economy as they: a- comprises more 
than 95% of the total cropped area. b- represent the main exportable (as in cotton, rice) and 
importable crops (as in wheat, sugar soybeans and maize). 
2 The free officers came to power after the1952 rebellion, when King Farouk was forced to 
leave the country and the country was transformed to a republic with Nasser as the frrst 
president of Egypt 
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Government intervention in the agriculture sector goes beyond 
production and marketing of crops to setting up prices and quotas. Essentially, 
for agricultural products a dual price system holds. Compulsory delivery for 
government or public sector enterprises at low fvced prices is set for the 
procurement of seed cotton, wheat, rice, beans, lentils, sesame, groundnuts 
and sugar cane. Procurement quotas varying between 10 and 100 percent are 
enforced" p.pI95-196. 
This severe intervention in the agricultural sector resulted in adverse 
effects on the production, prices, exports and imports of the Egyptian 
agricultural sector. By the mid-1980s the government had reassessed and 
reoriented its agricultural policy toward liberalising the agricultural sector to 
the extent that in 1986 most of the agricultural crops were liberalised (except 
sugarcane). 
In this chapter, section 2 gives an overview of the Egyptian setting. 
Three periods are of particular interest. In the first period (1939-52) the 
Egyptian economy was in general a private market-oriented economy. The 
private sector contributed 87% of total value added and 95% of total civilian 
employment. The public sector's role was confined mainly to the provision of 
basic services such as water, railways, highways and civil administration. 
However, the agriculture sector was affected by the ramifications of the 
Second World War, and as a response the government organised a large-scale 
system of compulsory deliveries for cereal crops and intervened in the 
cropping pattern. The second period (1952-71), where the Egyptian economy 
was transformed (under Nasser's regime) from a private competitive economy 
to a socialised and centrally controlled economy, involved the establishment of 
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a system of production controls upon fanners3, and co-operatives with 
controlled input and output prices. The third period, (1971-81) is characterised 
by the open door policy 'EL-Infitah', central elements of which were, first, the 
liberalisation of (many) imports and of the foreign exchange markets and, 
second, the provision of incentives and inducements to private domestic and 
foreign investment. These objectives were expressed in Law 43, promulgated 
in 1974. Nevertheless, government intervention continued on a large scale in 
all economic activities. Section 3 offers an insight into the poor performance of 
the Egyptian economy in 1986; a situation that indicated an economy in crisis 
in which there needed to be structural changes in policies. Section 4 discusses 
the economic reform policy adopted in 1986 and the principles of the 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) that 
followed. Section 5 gives an overall picture on the agricultural reform policies 
and their impact on major crops. Section 6 provides a preliminary statistical 
evaluation of reforms on production of major crops and the main tradable input 
used (fertiliser). Section 7 summarises and concludes. 
3.2 : Egyptian agricultural policy, 1931-1981 
3.2.1 : First period: [1939 - 1952) 
Prior to the Second World War Egyptian agricultural policy was 
characterised by the dominance of economic liberty in economic activities in 
general and the agricultural sector in particular (Ghoneim, 2000). There was an 
almost complete absence of direct intervention by the. government in the 
agricultural sector. In this period, privately owned firms with vertically 
3 These controls include area, price and marketing controls as will be discussed in detail later 
in this chapter. 
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integrated activities, such as milling, ginning, sugar refining and oils, were 
common. There was no government intervention in wheat marketing before 
World War II, producers being free to sell their output directly to traders, and 
no government restrictions on wheat-using activities such as flour and bread 
production. 
In Egypt, as in most colonial areas, World War II heralded a period of 
political, social and economic crisis. The response in Egypt, as elsewhere, was 
the introduction of increasing degrees of government intervention. For 
example, the need to feed the British troops, whose numbers rose from 50,000 
in Egypt and Sudan in 1939 to nearly 200,000 in 1942, led the government to 
decree a drastic shift from cotton to cereals production, which ignored the 
established crop rotation, as shown in Table 3-1. For example, by 1944 the 
cotton acreage had fallen to about 55% of its level in 1940, while areas of other 
competitive summer cereal crops (maize and rice), and winter cereal crops 
(wheat) had increased during the same period by 26% and 27% and 13% 
respectively. Barley, beans and sugar acreage had also increased, by 39%,8% 
and 19% respectively. 
In addition, the fall of France and Italy in the war and the growth of the 
'Axis Power' in the Mediterranean had resulted in a severe shortage of allied 
shipping capacity. This cut in Egypt's trade capacity severely hampered 
exports of cotton and imports of fertilisers. The increased use of farm manure 
and the maintenance of a clover crop4 could not compensate for the decline in 
fertiliser imports . 
.. Clover contributes a considerable amount of natural nitrogenous fertiliser as a result of being 
cropped. 
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Cotton Wheat Maize Sugar Rice Badey Beans 
Year cane 
1939 1625 1446 1548 547 263 385 72 
40 1685 1502 1527 509 256 369 76 
41 1644 1506 1540 448 268 359 78 
42 706 1576 1983 673 321 394 88 
43 713 1917 1951 642 419 381 88 
44 853 1651 1890 620 331 425 96 
45 982 1647 1879 630 359 392 96 
46 1212 1586 1653 632 245 381 92 
47 1254 1630 1608 776 237 382 94 
48 1441 1516 1551 786 220 398 91 
49 1692 1417 1494 703 168 424 85 
50 1975 1372 1451 700 117 356 81 
51 1980 1500 1660 490 120 320 90 
1952 1970 1402 1704 347 137 355 92 
Source: MmlStry of Agncultural and tand Reclamation, Agnculturai ECOoonuc Statistics, vanous ISsues. 
As a result of intensive cereal cultivation during this period, crop 
productivity declined markedly (see Table 3-2). Fertiliser imports had fallen 
from 0.52 million tons at the beginning of the war to about 0.15 million tons 
during the period 1941-43. In effect, crop productivity had fallen to different 
extents for both the main exportable crops (such as cotton) and other cereal, 
legume and sugar crops (such as wheat, maize, rice, barley, and sugar cane). 
Owing to the shortages of cereals that developed during the war (and 
which continued thereafter) the government intervened in the cereals market. 
There followed a prolonged period of legislation to organise a large-scale 
system of compulsory quota deliveries: in effect, the government nationalised 
the grain trade. This system lasted throughout the war period, and was 
supplemented by a set of laws and decrees that dictated a remarkable increase 
in the cereal acreage, and a correspondin,g reduction in the cotton area. 
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TABLE 3-2: FERTILISER IMPORTS AND CROP PRODUCTIVITY, 1940-52 
Fertilisers 
Year Imports 
(Ton) Cotton Wheat Maize Rice Bade Beans Su ar 
1939 524,993 0.24 0.92 0.99 1.64 0.91 0.79 34.26 
40 513,799 0.24 0.90 0.98 1.31 0.90 0.79 33.08 
41 155,240 0.22 0.80 0.84 1.28 0.86 0.77 30.33 
42 Na 0.27 0.75 0.73 1.40 0.82 0.77 28.41 
43 158,629 0.22 0.67 0.71 1.07 0.75 0.76 25. 13 
44 272,491 0.24 0.57 0.82 1.31 0.69 0.75 27.07 
45 260,125 0.24 0.72 0.90 1.38 0.73 0.79 27.54 
46 214,437 0.22 0.73 0.86 1.48 0.72 0.79 27.51 
47 457,755 0.23 0.64 0.87 1.65 0.72 0.68 28.82 
48 509,214 0.28 0.71 0.91 1.66 0.76 0.72 27.45 
49 621 ,148 0.23 0.82 0.84 1.66 0.82 0.76 26.58 
50 683,506 0.19 0.74 0.90 1.77 0.78 0.56 31.22 
51 720,211 0.20 0.81 0.84 1.25 0.83 0.72 31.22 
1952 753,991 0.23 0.78 0.87 1.46 0.86 0.70 36.90 
SOurce: MID1Stty of AgJlcuirurai and rana Reclamation, Agncuiturai ECOoonuc StatIStiCS, vanous Issues. 
The Principal Bank of Agricultural Credit was responsible for the 
distribution of fertilisers, and paid producers for their cereals according to the 
variety and quality. Financial penalties were levied on producers who did not 
deliver their quotas. In addition, the law prohibited transportation of wheat and 
flour among cities unless permitted by the Ministry of Supply. Such large-scale 
intervention in the agricultural sector was the point of departure for the 
succeeding governments, which increasingly intervened. 
3.2.2 : Second period [1952-1971] Agriculture under Nasser's Regime. 
On the 23rd of July 1952, the Free Officers under the leadership of 
Mohammed Nagieb, with the aid of some army units, led a successful rebellion 
against King Farouk. In effect, Farouk was expelled to Italy on the 26th of July 
1952 and the Free Officers announced the transfonnation to a republic. Shortly 
afterwards, the Free Officers elected Gamal Abdel-Nasser to hold the 
presidency. 
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Economic development was one of the main objectives of Nasser's 
regime, more so in fact than any other since Mohammad Ali's period of 
prosperity in 1820. The slogan of this development was based on two main 
concepts, 'AI-Ke/aa wa AI- Adle', meaning 'Efficiency and Justice'. 
Since World War II Egypt, as with many developing countries, has 
adopted a pro-industrial development strategy, as advocated by many in both 
the Western World and the Soviet Union. As a consequence the agriculture 
sector became marginalised. As Richards (1982) puts it, "in listening to the 
Western or to Soviet advice, the message squeeze agriculture was the same" 
p.176. 
The government looked to agriculture to play a central role in its 
development strategy, principally as a source of funds for development 
programmes that were intended to be beneficial to industry, the intended prime 
engine of growth. The mechanism used to transfer this surplus was (a) a 
system of agricultural co-operatives and (b) a system of crop price controls and 
area restrictions, as will be discussed below. However, later on it became 
increasingly clear that a weak agriculture could not support a strong industry. 
3.2.2.1 : Outlines o/Nasser's Agricultural Policy. 
3.2.2.1.1 : The Agrarian Reform Law 
The 'Agrarian Reform Law', established in 1952, was the first 
instrument to be instituted, the aim being to achieve justice for the landless 
peasants. In short, the law redistributed all agricultural land held by individuals 
above two hundred feddan per owner or (three hundred per family) among the 
landless peasants. Recipients of land received between three and five feddan 
per family as a result of redistribution. The Law also pegged all agricultural 
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land rents at seven times the basic agricultural land tax, as assessed in 1949. It 
also stipulated that leases had to be in writing and run for a minimum of three 
years. 
This legislation also achieved another two (unannounced) principal 
goals for the 'Free Officers': first; it eliminated the power of the regime's 
principal opponents, the nobles and large landowning elite; second, it created 
the basis of support for the new regime among the small peasants and the poor 
urban classes. 
In attempts to broaden the base of land ownership, this law was 
amended twice to reduce the ceiling on agricultural land ownership, to one 
hundred feddan in 1961 and then to fifty feddan in 1969. 












Less Than 5 
Source: CAMPS 





More Than 50 
Furthermore the continuous and rapid increase in the population growth 
rate in Egypt combined with Islamic rules of inheritance meant that the 
Agrarian Reform Act and its amendments compounded not only the 
fragmentation of the ownership of the agricultural land area but also the 
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production structure. It is clear from Figure 3-1 that the dominance of small-
scale farming in Egyptian agriculture (i.e. farms less than five feddan) sharply 
increased following introduction of the Act, which applies to 96% of the total 
number of farmers, 39% of them holding one feddan or less. 
The Act created considerable production problems, because although 
the 334,727 families that benefited from it as recipients of the redistribution 
were experienced in farming, they tended to have poor access to credit and 
little experience of modem farm management practices. However, the 
advantage was that the small-scale farms were able to absorb most of the 
labour force in the agricultural sector. 
Although the legislation had beneficial effects for labour it effectively 
ossified the land market. The wealthy were not able to purchase any land, as 
they already possessed the maximum, whereas small farmers did not have the 
finance to purchase. In effect, the land market ceased to operate. 
Another component of the Agrarian Reform Law was the creation of 
agricultural co-operatives. The agricultural co-operatives were charged with: 
(1) Determining the crop rotation to be followed by each zone. 
(2) Supplying and controlling subsidised means of production, such as 
fertilisers, seeds, pesticides and low cost machinery. 
Co-operatives issued a ''farm holding card" to every farmer, stating his 
land holdings and specifying the rotation to be followed. By the mid-1960s, a 
quota of fertilisers was allocated according to the farmer's holding and the 
rotation recorded on the card. However, the co-operatives encouraged fertiliser 
use as an important component in achieving the goal of "vertical extension" 
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(productivity) and high yields. Figure 3-2 shows that consumption of both 
fertilisers and pesticides increased remarkably during this period. 




.1953-58 01959-64 .1965-71 
Source: Calculated from Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, Statistical 
Yearbook, Egypt, several issues 
The co-operatives were also required to: 
(3) Maintain the irrigation and drainage systems that were made available to 
farmers. 
(4) Playa key role in crop marketing, where the aim of government in pricing 
and marketing the agricultural output was to transfer the surplus formed by the 
agricultural sector to the industrial sector. This intervention was in the form of 
the compulsory delivery of crop quota volume at prices below their market 
prices. These quotas applied to either a specific proportion of the crop or to 
part of the yield. For example, the compulsory quotas for some crops were as 
shown in Table 3-3. 
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100% of the cultivated output 
100% of the cultivated output 
100% of the cultivated output 
100% of the cultivated output(c) 
1.5 ton I feddan 
1-3 ardab(b)1 feddan 
6-8 toni feddan 
Maize(d) 2 ardabl feddan 
(a) The wheat quota was cancelled from 1976 to 1984 then reapplied from 1985 at 2 
Ardab/feddan .. 
(b) The ardab is an Egyptian volume unit used for grains; 1 ardab = 150 Kg. 
( c) Except what is needed for seeding (in the range of 300 Kg) 
(d) This quota was applied in 1986 in case the farmer grows more than one feddan. 
Source: complied from Ghounem, 2000 p.22 
The land-holding reform policy reallocated the land to those who could 
not take full advantage of it (due to their lack of credit and business expertise), 
which then encouraged the government to widen the establishment of the 
agricultural co-operatives. These co-operatives in effect seized the decision-
making role, stipulating the crops to be grown and the inputs to be used. They 
then marketed the harvested crops at fixed prices. 
The increasing number of small size farms encouraged the government 
to establish the agricultural co-operatives, with all beneficiaries from the Land 
Refonn Act being required to become members; by 1963 the co-operatives had 
been extended to include all the agricultural land area. This expansion was 
mainly due to (a) the government's aim to control agricultural sector inputs 
and outputs, and consequently its surplus, in order to secure the resources 
needed for industrialisation, and (b) being a core step towards Nasser's target 
of a socialist economy. 
In sum, subsidising input prices and allocating them on a quantitative 
basis, together with controlling output prices and areas for specific crops, such 
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as cotton, sugar cane, rice and wheat, while leaving fruit, vegetables and 
fodder crops uncontrolled, had negatively affected the efficiency of resource 
allocation as well as the incentive structure. On the other hand, the advantage 
that the cooperatives gave was the increased supply of cheap fertilizers and 
pesticides to farmers, which consequently had positive effects on crop 
productivity. 
3.2.2.1.2 : Area and Price Controls 
In the early 1960s area and price controls played a central role in 
Egyptian agricultural policy. Price policies were designed to (a) transfer the 
agricultural surplus in the fonn of foreign exchange reSUlting from agricultural 
exports to finance the long run strategy of industrialization, (b) supply urban 
citizens with low cost food in order to ensure high levels of political stability 
and support in cities, and (c) to avoid food price inflation. 
To achieve these goals, the government sought to control the 
production, marketing and distribution of crops by controlling both physical 
inputs and the marketing channels through which they passed. Strategic crops 
were purchased from peasants at prices less than their world prices, either for 
resale in the international market to gain the much needed foreign exchange or 
to provide urban consumers with cheap food. 
Although policy makers did their best to achieve these goals, it is clear 
from Figure 3-3 that the cultivated areas of some controlled-price crops, such 
as cotton and wheat, fell against such higher value uncontrolled-prices crops as 
berseem (clover) and vegetables. For example, whereas the berseem and 
vegetables areas grew by 20% and 173%, the cotton and wheat areas fell by 
19% and 4% respectively in 1965-70 compared to 1950-54. 
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FIG 3-3: CUL TIVA TED AREA FOR SOME MAJOR FIELD AND SUMMER VEGETABLE 
CROPS DURING THE PERIOD 1950-70 
(000 Feddan) 





195(}.54 1955-64 1965-/U 
I [) Bersetm • Cottoo m \\mrt m s. Vegetables I 
Source: Calculated from Richards (1982) 
As noted earlier, the co-operatives sought to control both agricultural 
output and the means of agricultural production. Of the price-controlled inputs, 
fertilisers and pesticides were by far the most important. However, these 
policies of price controls on both agricultural inputs and outputs had led to the 
insulation of the agricultural sector from world prices. These distortions were 
widespread and complex: not only were farmers receiving prices for their 
output less than world prices, but throughout this period they paid 87% more 
than world prices for fertilisers in 1966. However, from 1973 onwards farmers 
paid only 40% of fertilisers' world prices. 
It is not surpnsmg that such pnce controls policies caused a 
misallocation of resources, and many anomalies became commonplace. 
Production of animal food became more expensive and profitable than that for 
human consumption. For example, the price of one ton of wheat straw was 
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twice that of flour. Also, tIthe price of one kentar of cotton used for upholstery 
ranges between £E 60 to 70 (third class of raw cotton), while the price of the 
best raw cotton at the farm level does not exceed £E 50. The price of 
cottonseed is lower than that of the same weight of cotton seed cake" (Hassan, 
1991, p.3-6). 
3.2.2.1.3 : Investment policies 
Clearly, there were many outcomes from the government's intervention 
during this period. Despite the manifest distortions in agriculture associated 
with the policy, public sector investment in the agricultural sector grew during 
the period. For example it increased from an annual average of £E 28 million 
in 1950-52 to £E 60 million in 1956. The share of agriculture, irrigation and 
drainage investment in total gross fixed investment rose from 10.9% in 1955-
56 to 20.2% in 1968-69. Moreover, agriculture's share in public sector 
investment was estimated to have been as high as 25% in the-mid 1960s. 
Investment policies in the agricultural sector focused on the expansion 
of infrastructure and crop productivity, and four major objectives were 
established. 
(1) The construction of the Aswan High Dam, whose costs accounted for 
roughly one third of all capital formation during this period. The main stated 
aims of its construction were: (a) avoiding the threat of floods and droughts 
(for example, it has been estimated that in 1972 and the early 1980s, if the dam 
had not been built, the lack of summer water would have meant the loss of 
40% of summer crops such as cotton and rice (Richards, 1982»; (b) allowing 
reclamation of new lands (for example, the increased water supply allowed the 
conversion of 800,000 feddan in the Upper Egypt basin to perennial 
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cultivation); (c) increasing the area planted and consequently agricultural 
output for example, the rice area increased by nearly 500,000 feddan and 
sugarcane by 85,000 feddan, and in general the total cropped area increased 
from 9,412,000 feddan in 1950-54 to 10,855,000 feddan in 1970-74; (d) 
allowing a shift in the planting and cropping dates. For example, shifting the 
planting date of maize from July/August to May/June allowed more favourable 
sunlight and heat conditions for its growth, and consequently its yield rose by 
40% between 1960-64 and 1965-70. (2) Enlargement of the domestic capacity 
for the production of fertiliser, such that 62% of the consumed nitrogen 
fertiliser was produced domestically in 1966 (domestic production of nitrogen 
fertiliser increased nearly ten-fold between 1952 and 1966). (3) Improving and 
breeding new crop varieties. (4) Land reclamation - as mentioned earlier, the 
government reclaimed 912,000 feddan during this periods. (5) The 
mechanisation of agriculture - domestic tractor production developed rapidly in 
the mid-1960s. 
In sum, Egypt was transformed into a state-controlled economy during 
this period. All large-scale production, infrastructure, finance, imports and 
exports were either government-administered or run by state-owned 
enterprises. Government intervention in agriCUlture not only limited the size of 
individual land holdings, reducing efficiency, but also taxed the sector heavily, 
using it as a resource base for industrialisation. The large-scale and widespread 
establishment of co-operatives, along with a system of price controls, allowed 
the government to 'siphon off' a sizeable amount of agricultural income for 
financing its industrialisation plan. 
'In fact 309,000 feddan only bad reached marginal productivity. 
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However, it is clear that the expansion of fertiliser and pesticides use 
(as shown in Fig 3-2), and improved seeds (for some crops at least) led to 
substantial increase in yields. Fig 3-4 shows that yields for the main exportable 
and food crops (as cotton, wheat maize and rice) had increased over the period 
1952-71 to varying degrees. The, maize yield had increased in the third period 
1967-71 by 68% than the first period 1952-56, followed by 45%, 24% and 
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3.2.3 : Third period [1971-81) the setting in Sadat's period. 
Colonel Sadat, the vice-president, took over the presidency following 
the sudden death of Nasser in September 1970. After the 1973 war, the 
Egyptian economy was severely burdened by the war bill accompanied by high 
inflation and external debt rates. In addition, it also inherited the bureaucratic 
structure of co-operatives and price policies. As a result Sadat sought a change 
in the economy through its liberalisation. On the 19th of April 1974 Sadat 
announced the birth of a new economic policy 'El-Infitah " or the 'open door 
policy'. This was intended to pull the economy back from a socialist, materials-
balance-planning scheme and remove a number of administrative controls on 
the economy after a period of severe recession. He justified the "Infitah" on the 
following grounds: (1) the failure of Nasser's socialist experience; (2) the 
availability of Arab capital from the oil-producing countries; and (3) the 
international context of detente. 
From an economic standpoint, the two essential purposes of "the open 
door policy" were, first to attract export-oriented foreign enterprises by the 
establishment of duty-free zones, and second, to attract foreign capital through 
a liberal investment policy (Korany et al" 1991). However, the ultimate goal of 
the policy was principally, to achieve two aims. First, to set a stage for the 
development of the Egyptian economy through joint ventures and projects 
bringing together Egyptian labour, Arab capital and Western technology and 
management enterprises. Second to encourage foreign capital flows to help the 
economy to recover and to finance the increasing trade deficit. The policy also 
included other objectives, such as modest refonns of pricing and subsidy 
policies and of legislation affecting the supervision and control of public 
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companies. The gross domestic product growth had been less than two percent 
for most of the years between 1969-73, and given the high rates of population 
growth, the economy had actually been shrinking in per capita terms. 
There is no doubt that regional, global and political views had changed 
in this period. Sadat believed that it would be impossible to achieve stable, 
long-run economic development without securing peace and settlements with 
border neighbours, and that the key to achieving that was through co-operation 
with the United States of America (USA) and the West in general. In 1977 
Sadat announced that 'the Egyptian socialism experiment in the 1960s was a 






FIG 3-5: FOREIGN AID RECEIVED DURlNG (1961-80) 
(Million of U.S Dollars) 
1}----------1 . USA OWorld f------------I 
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Source: OECD (1960-97), Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing 
Countries, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
After the 1973 war and the establishment of good relations with the 
West and explorations of oil in the Gulf countries, other sources of Egyptian 
national income became available. For example, the growth in foreign aid, 
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(especially from the USA), in the middle of this period, was a significant new 
source of revenues, shown in Figure 3-5. 
Also, there were massive remittances from those Egyptians who were 
now working in the Arab and Gulf oil countries. These replaced cotton as the 
most important source of foreign exchange earnings. In addition to petroleum 
exports, there was growth in receipts from tourism, and Suez Canal tolls also 
became important sources of revenue. 
The real challenge for agriculture in this period was the development of 
the capability to supply the increasing growth in demand. The high population 
growth rate6 of about 2.8% per annum, and the rapid migration from rural to 
. urban areas (where rural migrants sought cheap subsidised food, better jobs 
and lifestyle) both raised the local demand for agricultural outputs, especially 
wheat and rice. 
Furthermore, the demands for high-income products (such as meat and 
fruits and vegetables) increased due to urban growth. Exacerbating the 
situation was the inherited system of price controls for certain crops and the 
bureaucracy of co-operatives that led to an expansion in non-price controlled 
crops (such as berseem) while slowing the growth in area planted of wheat and 
rice. 
In effect, price policies continued to penalise cotton, rice and wheat 
growers, so farmers shifted to other (uncontrolled) crops wherever possible. 
Consequently, areas for crops such as berseem (as an intermediate input in 
meat production) and fruits and vegetables had increased markedly, as shown 
in Figure 3-6. For example, cotton and rice acreage had continuously fallen 
6 The total population increased from 33 million in 1970 to about 40 million in 1980. 
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during this decade, by -3.1% and -l.2% respectively, while (uncontrolled) 
crops as fruits and vegetables and berseem (clover) achieved positive annual 




FIG 3-6: AREAS OF CROPS DURING THE PERIOD 1970-80 
(Feddan) 
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Source: Table A2-2 for the period 1980-2000 and Gouniem (2000) for the period 1970-79. 
Public and private sector investments in the agricultural sector were 
relatively low. The share of investment in agriculture had fallen drastically 
from 25% of total public sector investment in 1965 to only 7% in 1975, while 
private investment was as low as £E 2 -3 million, accounting for only 4% of 
gross fixed investment. Moreover, most private sector investment was in fruit 
and vegetable production, presumably due to the distortionary price polices. 
In the late 1960s the government tackled one of the most important 
problems that had emerged in the agricultural sector: the lack of an adequate 
drainage system. This had led to soil salinity and the formation of hard pan. 
When the World Bank carried out a survey for the Egyptian agricultural soil 
classification in 1973, it reported that 49% should be classified as medium to 
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poor soil, 45% good and only 6% excellent. In response, the government 
increased spending on drainage from 9% of total agricultural investment in 
1969 to 29% in 1975. Subsequently the government approved two 
comprehensive projects, the first covering 950,000 feddan in the Delta area and 
the second 300,000 feddan in Upper Egypt, to install with tile drains. 
In sum, this period was characterised by the following: 
(1) A mix of government intervention in economic activity and 
liberalisation in internal and external trade. In fact, The Act of 
11811975 was established to promote that aim. It stated that 
imports were to be opened to the public and private sector, except 
for 18 commodities that could only be imported by the public 
sector for subsequent distribution to consumers. Subsequently, 
imports of these 18 commodities increased reliance on imports and 
ignorance of their domestic production, consequently the food gap 
between domestic production and consumption increased to $1.9 
billion in 1980 compared with $184 million in 1970. 
(2) Subsidising agricultural inputs and credits loans for agriCUltural 
producers in addition to the continuing subsidising of commodities 
important to consumers with low-income levels. Food subsidy 
expenditure reached 2.2 billion £E in 1981182 compared to 108 
million £E in 1973 and the list of subsidised commodities was 
enlarged to include wheat, white flour, maize, oils and edibles'. 
(3) The inconsistency between the pricing policy for agriCUltural 
output and its costs of production, in addition to the decline in 
, See (Gunter, 2002; Ahmed, 2002; Lofgren 2001) 
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returns to land, capital and labour, had resulted in immigration 
from the agricultural sector. 
(4) Encouraging domestic and foreign investment by establishing Act 
43/1974 had promoted increases in both domestic and foreign 
(particularly Arab) capital for direct investment in land 
reclamation, animal production, transportation, industrialisation, 
energy and tourism sectors, in addition to importing new 
technologies. 
(5) Encouraging animal and poultry production by subsidising its 
inputs and means of production in addition to non-intervention in 
its marketing or pricing. In contrast, apart from fodder, vegetable 
and fruit crops, there was severe intervention in plant production 
especially for the main crops, and in their marketing and pricing. 
3.3 : The Pre-Reform Period (1981-86): An Economy in Crisis. 
After Sadat's assassination in October 1981, General Mubarak, the vice 
president, took over the presidency. The perfonnance of the Egyptian economy 
was poor at that time. At the macroeconomic level all economic indicators 
implied that the economy was in crisis. Real growth in gross domestic product 
(GOP) for 1986-87 was 2.5%, compared with an average of 7% during the 
period 1982-85. 
The current account deficit was equal to 4.7% of GOP over the period 
of the first half of the 1970s, but it increased dramatically to reach 12.2% of 
GOP in 1987. The public sector deficit averaged 2% of GOP over the period 
1981-85, but in 1986 the deficit-GOP ratio stood at 23%. 
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The inflation rate (consumer price index, CPI) increased from an 
average of 13.3% over the period 1981-85 to 30% in 1987. The growth rate of 
exports declined sharply from 13.5% in 1981-82 to 3.23% in 1986-87. The 
terms of trade also worsened, from an index value of 64 in 1987 compared 
with 100 in 1980. 
External debt reached US$ 40 billion in 1987, the debt:GDP ratio being 
122%. Moreover, debt service in 1987 was equal to 5.3% of GDP and 21.5% 
of the value of exports. 
In 1973, the oil sector contributed less than 4% ofGDP, while in 1980-
81 it constituted 18% of GDP and 67% of the total value of exports in 1985. 
During the 1980s there was a significant fall in the world market price of oil, 
causing a significant weakening of the Egyptian economy and highlighting 
Egypt's budget and trade deficit problems. By 1986-87 oil revenues had fallen 
to half their 1985 value, a loss of £E 2.1 billion. Tourism sector revenues had 
fallen to less than £E 800 million in 1986-87, compared with £E 1.2 billion in 
1984-85. 
Moreover, domestic sources of hard currencies seem also to have dried 
up, the remittances of about four million Egyptian working abroad having 
declined substantially. In 1983/84 remittances reached US$3.9 billion; 
however in 1984/85 they dropped by 3.7% and in 1985/86 they fell more than 
33%. By 1986/87 remittances amounted to less than US$600 million. 
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The complexity of the adopted multi-tiered exchange rate system, with 
four different rates in operation8, where the official exchange rate had stood at 
£E 0.7 = US$ 1 since 1979, also gave the image of an economy in decline. 
In sum, all indicators pointed clearly to the need to reform the Egyptian 
economy. The retarded and weak performance of the Egyptian economy, plus 
the massive international debt and its service, left the leadership no option 
other than to seek comprehensive structural reforms. On the macro l e v e ~ ~ the 
first place to start the reassessments and reform regime was the state-owned 
enterprises as they absorbed about 45% of GDP and supplied about 83% of 
total exports. 
3.4 : The need for an economic reform policy. 
3.4.1 : Introduction 
As discussed above, over the decades since the promulgation of the 
Agrarian Reform Act (No 178 of 1952) the output and efficiency of the 
agricultural sector increasingly deteriorated as a consequence of adopting 
policies based on control of prices, production, distribution and the cash crop 
markets, exacerbated by the overvalued exchange rates. This severe 
government intervention had resulted in an extremely distorted economy, 
which in tum resulted in its slow rate of growth. The situation left no 
alternatives for the government of Egypt other than to adopt a comprehensive 
reform policy. 
In response to the poor performance of the economy, Egypt adopted a 
comprehensive Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme 
I There were: (a) an official fixed rate of the Central Bank (b) a premium rate set periodically 
by the authorities (c) a barter agreement rate and (d) a negotiable free exchange rate in the free 
market. 
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(ERSAP) in 1986. The programme was accomplished with the aid of the policy 
unit of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
was funded by the Agricultural Production and Credit Project (APCP). 
3.4.2 : Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ERSAP). 
In contrast to the pre reform period, significant policy changes were 
achieved in the early beginnings of the 1990s. Egypt made an agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in May 1991 after nearly three years of 
negotiations9 • 
The aim of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ERSAP) was to give more opportunities to the private sector to 
play an effective role in the economy, lessen reliance on the public sector and 
develop a stronger market economy. The programme focused on three policy 
areas: stabilisation, structural adjustment and social policies. Figure 3-7 shows 
the ERSAP main components in which we outline each of these components 
briefly, and after doing that we turn to focus on the agricultural sector. The 
main components are the Jollowing: (a) macroeconomic reforms, (b) public 
enterprise refonn, (c) domestic price liberaiisation, (d) foreign trade 
liberalisation, (e) private sector reform and (f) the Social Fund for 
Development. 
9 The Egyptian government started to implement IMF recommendations for reform in areas of 
pricing and subsidies, the foreign exchange rate system, interest rates, the money supply and 
the budget deficit. 
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FIGURE 3-7: THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC REFORM AND STRUCTURAL ADruSTMENT PROGRAMME 
ERSAP Main Elements 
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3.4.2.1 Macroeconomic Reform 
Owing to Abdel-Khalek, 2001 10 and Lofgren, 1993, the macroeconomic 
reform was to achieve sustainable economic growth and at the' same time 
initiating the country's ability to service its foreign debt. This is the 
stabilisation foundation of the ERSAP. It consists of fiscal policy, interest rates 
and the exchange rate regime. 
3.4.2.1.1 The Government Budget Deficit and the Money Supply: 
Egypt has implemented a remarkable achievement in deficit cut. The 
target was to cut the ratio of the overall budget deficit to GDP from an 
estimated high of 22 percent in 1990/91 to about 1.5 percent by 1995/96. 
Previously, the deficit had been primarily financed by increases in the money 
supply, now the treasury-bill auctions provided non-inflationary financing. The 
reduction in deficit was to a large extent due to price increases, particularly 
energy prices and the greater reliance on indirect taxation such as the 
introduction of general sales tax in May 1991, escalation of stamp tax, etc. 
Moreover, in June 1991, the government dictated high restrictions on the 
money supply by forcing each bank to limit its total loan portfolio to the 
February level. 
3.4.2.1.2 Interest Rates: 
During the pre-refonn period, interest rates were allowed to fluctuate 
within a predetennined range. But in 1991, the banks became free to set 
virtually all deposits and lending rates. The ERSAP included removing all 
interest rate ceilings, imposing specific domestic credit ceilings that favour the 
private sector, eliminating any direct credit line between the Central Bank of 
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Egypt (CBE) and the government and developing a market for treasury bills. 
Moreover, interest rates were liberalized and weekly treasury bill were started 
in January 1991; the resulting interest rates provided an anchor for the market-
based interest rates used by the banks. As a result, nominal interest rates 
increased to nearly 20 percent whereas real rates changed from negative levels 
to somewhere close to zero. 
3.4.2.1.3 The Foreign Exchange System: 
On October 8, 1991 the government merged three foreign exchange 
rates for the U.S dollar into one largely determined rate. Moreover, the 
Egyptian pound was depreciated by 10 percent against the dollar. Also, it was 
the first time to see legal private moneychangers (greater details are discussed 
in Chapter 5). 
3.4.2.2 Public E n t e r p r i ~ e e Reform 
Refonning public enterprises (PEs) is considered one of the main 
targets for ERSAP. A new public investment law (Law 203 for 1991) replacing 
the previous one (Law 97 for 1983) was launched that gave freedom to public 
enterprises and to create a new regulatory environment common to both public 
and private sectors. The new law allowed privatisation of PEs, as well as asset 
sales, divestiture and management contracts with private management teams. 
In addition, the PEs and the private sector, under the new law, are operating 
with the same rules i.e. their managers have the complete freedom to decide 
and choose on investment, product mix, pricing and staffing. Also, National 
Investment Bank (NIB) funds are not allowed any more to finance PEs' new 
investment. Instead, they can mobilize their resources from retained earnings, 
10 We relied heavily on this study in presenting this section. As it is considered one of the few 
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loans from the banking system or placement on the capital market. However, a 
comparison between the new and old public enterprise laws is discussed in 
greater details in Table A3-2. 
3.4.2.3 Domestic Price Liberalisation 
3.4.2.3.1 Industrial Products: 
The ESARP agenda for industrial products included a gradual decontrol 
of ex-factory prices of industrial products produced by the public sector, 
considering import liberalisation and competitiveness of the domestic market. 
Except for small numbers of basic foodstuffs, the prices of almost all-industrial 
products would be liberalised by June 1995. 
3.4.2.3.2 Energy Prices: 
The ERSAP scheduled a gradual increase in domestic petroleum and 
natural gas prices to be close to their parity prices by 1995 at the prevailing 
exchange rate. So that, by May of each year for the period 1992-95 inclusive, 
the weighted average of the domestic petroleum prices as a percentage of its 
parity was to be increased 11 percentage points. Also the price of natural gas 
would rise in parallel with that of fuel oil prices. Electricity prices would be 
increased as a proportion of and towards eventual equality with, the long run 
marginal cost by June 1995. This proportion was estimated by 10 percentage 
points every year during 1992-95 to reach 100 percent (from 59 percent in May 
1991) 
3.4.2.3.3 Agricultural Prices: 
In this category the ESARP included the removal of area and price 
controls and the gradual elimination of input subsidy. However, greater details 
studies tbat dealing with the ESRAP. 
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concerning the ESARP and the agricultural sector are discussed in the next 
section. 
3.4.2.4 Foreign Trade Liberalisation 
The government of Egypt has taken serious steps in encouraging 
investment and foreign trade. The ESARP included: (1) reducing the list of 
products protected by import bans to be less than 30% from nearly 40% of 
industrial domestic output; (2) altering the tariff structure so that the minimum 
tariff rate would be initially 10% and the maximum 80%; (3) removing the 
discretionary allocation of foreign exchange by the banking system; (4) the 
gradual elimination of non-tariff barriers other than import suspensions and 
import bans, beginning with a 50% fall in import NTPs before the formal start 
of ESARP. 
3.4.2.5 Private Sector 
The ultimate objective of the ESRAP for the private sector is to create 
an environment for all types of business enterprises. The reform programme 
was keen to eliminate the discrimination against the private sector in obtaing 
licences, purchasing inputs and energy and credits. Thus, by May 1991 the 
government shortened the 'negative list' of areas that private investment were 
banned and promised a direct approval to investments in those areas that did 
not appear on the list. Moreover, investment-licensing requirements for 
enterprises are operating under Law 159 (the majority domestically owned 
firms) had been effectively dropped-aside from a negative list to be reduced 
further. In addition, a registration process with a definite and short time limit 
replaced all production and product-mix licensing requirements. Also, 
liberalisation of investment, production and pricing was extended to other 
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private sector finns (those subject to Law 45 or Law 230 - mostly joint 
ventures and foreign owned). 
3.4.2.6 The Social Fund/or Development 
The Social Fund for Development (SDF) was initially conceived as a 
temporary measure of four years life to provide a short-tenn and temporary 
compensation to target groups that will be negatively affected by the above 
. elements and or the Gulf crisis. For example, financial resources of $600 
million U.S dollars were approved by the Egyptian government, UNDP, and 
other bilateral and multilateral donors to the (SDF). 
3.4.3 : Agriculture and (ERSAP) 
McKinnon (1996) argues that Egypt began its liberalising refonns in 
the 'right' place - in agriculture, where payoffs can come quickly. The 
programme was designed to be gradually accomplished in two stages as 
follows: 
3.4.3.1 : Thefirst stage (1987-89) 
According to Khedr et aI., (1996), the first stage of the refonn 
programme (1987-89) covered reassessment and refonn in (1) price and 
marketing controls. (2) obligatory quota deliveries for ten crops (3) reduction 
of input subsidies, mainly for fertilisers (4) giving the opportunity for private 
investment to play an effective role. In effect, the markets for major crops were 
freed, and farm gate prices for fertiliser were increased by 75%. Input 
marketing was gradually released from the control of the Principal Bank for 
Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) to the private sector. Also, for 
the first time, citrus exports were opened to the private sector as well. 
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3.4.3.2 : The second stage (1990-94) 
The second stage was concerned with: (I) increasing cotton 
procurement prices II to 66% of the world price, (2) removal of quota deliveries 
on rice, (3) elimination of all input subsidies, (4) reducing the role of the 
PBDAC in input marketing, (5) rationing and restricting subsidized credits, (6) 
improving the institutional structure and operations of the PBDAC, (7) 
reforming the structure of seed marketing and production. 
3.5 : Agricultural Polices, Reforms and Their Impact on Major Field 
Crops, Input Subsidy, Exchange Rate and Land Tenancy. 
Drawing on Fletcher (1996), a detailed summary of agricultural policy 
changes before and after the adoption of ERSAP is given in table A2-1 that 
covers five sectors in depth, emphasising the pattern and sequence of reforms. 
The highlighted sectors are: eight minor crops (broad beans, lentils, sesame, 
ground nuts, onions, garlic, soybeans and potatoes), four main crops (wheat, 
maize, rice and cotton), input prices, distribution and subsidies, exchange rate 
and trade policies and the land tenancy system. 
Impacts of governmental polices in the pre and post reform era can be 
summarised as follows: 
~ ~ First, crop area, quota, and price restrictions for the eight minor crops were 
removed by 1987. Instead of being affected by various degrees of controls 
in the pre reform period, for example, intergovernmental transport was 
restricted the case that would have had some impact on geographical price 
patterns and efficiency of distribution by areas. Also, the artificially 
II Liberalisation of cotton was considered a main goal in 1992 and it was completely freed in 
1994. 
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overvalued official exchange rate during the 1980s at which crops were 
imported led to a reduction of domestic costs of their imports. The case that 
gave the government a margin to subsidise bread prices and yellow com 
prices to feed mills, thereby their domestic prices were depressed, 
consequently shifting resources away from these crops. 
~ ~ Second, the controlled marketing, processing and imports of inputs, the 
growing consumer subsidy and the applied trade policies for wheat and 
maize in the pre-reform period 1980-85 drove a wedge between their 
domestic and world prices. As a result, land area cropped by wheat and 
maize had fallen during this period by 140 and 36 thousand feddan 
respectively. Moreover, wheat and maize yields stagnated at 1.5 and 2 
tonlfeddan during the period 1983-86 (see table A2-3) as farmers reduced 
their purchased inputs in response to their low domestic prices, and lacked 
incentives to adopt new technologies that were available. As a result of 
adopting a new policy regime and creating a favourable policy 
development in the post reform era (such as the removal of fixed 
procurement prices, area and quota controls, devaluation of exchange rate 
and concurrent reduction in subsidy on imported com and wheat), the land 
areas devoted for wheat and maize grew by 684 and 149 thousand feddan 
respectively during the period 1986-2000 compared to 1980-85 (see Table 
A2-2); yields grew by 53% for wheat and 36% for maize during 1986-2000 
(see table A2-3). 
~ ~ Third, the rice area was still controlled in the post-refonn era to the extent 
that there was strong political pressure to reduce it by 30% in 1987 and 
13% more in 1988 due to anti-salination of land and its high needs of 
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irrigation water. Furthennore, price and marketing controls were removed 
in 1991. Despite the penalties and government controls, the rice area 
climbed steeply during the period 1990-2000 with an annual growth rate of 
0.04%. In other words, it grew by about 38% of its average area during 
1980-1989. This shift in area was most probably because of rice becoming 
more profitable for farmers to grow; rice profitability during the period 
1990-2000 was 44% higher than cotton (the most competitive seasonal 
crop). Also, rice yields grew considerably from an average 2.4 TonlFeddan 
in the pre-reform period 1980-85 to 3.2 TonlFeddan during the post-reform 
years 1986-2000. Moreover, the high consumer subsidy was removed in 
April 1993, while the domestic market controls on private trade were 
removed in 1991-92. 
~ ~ Fourth, pre-reform policies such as area controls, compulsory delivery of 
all output at predetermined prices less than 50% of the border price 
equivalent, applying strict cropping pattern controls by region and variety, 
prohibiting private sector from ginning and trading cotton (domestically 
and internationally) continued until 1991. Area controls were removed in 
1992, and finally marketing of cotton was liberalised in 1994. Cotton 
procurement prices increased in 1990-94 to about 130% above the average 
price in 1986-89. Also, cotton yields grew to 1.13 TonlFeddan in 1992 and 
1.22 TonlFeddan in 1994 compared with an average 0.90 TonIFeddan 
during 1986-91. Consequently, the profitability of the short berseem and 
cotton rotation exceeded that of wheat and rice and wheat and maize (the 
most competitive) by 9% and 23% respectively in 1992, and then increased 
by 49% and 83% respectively in 1993. As a result the maize acreage fell by 
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3% in 1993 (see table A2-2). An increase in the cotton acreage might have 
been expected, but such shifts did not happen, and the cropped area of 
. cotton continued its falling trend, decreasing by 22% during the period 
1990-95 relative to 1980-89, and falling by a further 3.6% in 1996-2000 
compared to 1990-95. This can presumably be explained by the growers' 
response to the uncertainty created by the world cotton price falls in 1992, 
1993, 1996 and 1997. For example, compared to 1991 levels, world cotton 
prices fell by 16% and 12% in 1992 and 1993, while farm procurement 
prices were 3-17 percent above world prices in 1992-97. The government, 
squeezed by these events, found itself without sufficient funds to make an 
initial payment to farmers in 1993. After several months of delay, it 
compensated cotton growers, paying them prices that exceeded world 
prices by 17%. Consequently, small farmers chose not to grow cotton, 
owing in large part to the uncertainty caused by the government, so the 
area declined by 1.3% and 4.7% in 1992 and 1993 and then declined 
further by 9.8% in 1994. Only the more efficient fanners, who had lower 
costs, continued to plant cotton. The cotton area continued its fall, reaching 
623,000 feddan in 2000 compared with 1.2 million feddan in 1980. 
~ ~ Fifth, input subsidies were high in the pre-reform period; for example, the 
fertiliser subsidy averaged 50%, and the pest control subsidy was 100% for 
some crops (e.g. cotton). These farm inputs were distributed and controlled 
by the PBDAC. By 1992 and 1994 the fertiliser and pest control subsidies 
were removed. Figure 3-8 shows the gradual removal of farm input 
subsidies for fertilisers, seed and fuel; the level of subsidy grew during the 
1980s, and then began to fall in 1990, with 100% elimination in 1993. 
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FIG 3-8: TOTAL AGRICULTURAL INPUT SUBSIDY FOR FERTILISER, SEED AND 
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Source: Shousha (1997). 
Indirect subsidies kept the exchange rate artificially low for imported 
agricultural inputs, but the exchange rate gradually grew closer to market rate 
3.35£EIUS$. In 1987, farmers faced the subsidised exchange rate of 0.7 
£EIUS$. Direct subsidies reduced the farmer cost for inputs such as fertiliser, 
seeds and herbicides by lowering the interest rate for loans below the 
commercial rate. For example, in 1987, growers needing a loan for the 
purchase of fertiliser received a subsidised interest rate of 3.5%, while the 
commercial interest rate was 16% (Shousha, 1997). Exchange rate and land 
rent liberalisation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
In sum, unifying and liberalising the exchange rate regime in 1990 
toward market rates, the removal of compulsory delivery quota for all 
agricultural products (except for sugar cane), increasing farm gate prices, 
liberalising cotton, wheat and maize markets, and liberalising land rents in 
1998 have resulted a liberal market situation for all major crops in Egyptian 
agriculture. 
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3.6 A Preliminary Statistical Evaluation of Policy Reform 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Before we analyse the results of the PAM in detail, it is useful to 
evaluate whether it is possible to detect the impact of policy reform in each of 
the sectors. 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2 (Table 2-4), the pattern of and 
changes to production over the period 1980-2000 appears to correspond to the 
timing of policy reform implying that they may reasonably be attributed to the 
policy reform itself. Policy reforms (discussed earlier, see Table A3-l) are 
expected to increase production in commodities that had been suppressed by 
the original policy and lower production of those that were subsidised. For 
example, wheat and rice production levels have dramatically increased by 
191% and 126% in the post-reform period compared with their levels in the 
pre-reform period; cotton and soybeans production levels fell by 27% and 75% 
respectively (see Table 2-4). These patterns are also apparent in Table 3-4 and 
Figure 3-9, which show annual growth rates of major crops. The results reveal 
that the annual growth rate for most agricultural products (those that were 
directly targeted by price and structural policy reforms) are higher in the post-
reform period. For example, annual growth rates of rice, cotton, maize and 
wheat are 3.9, 3.8, 1.6 and 1.6 percentage points higher following the reforms, 
whereas for potatoes and soybeans they are 12.2 and 15.4 percentage points 
lower. 
Furthermore, policy reform may have had a sufficiently strong impact 
to reverse previous trends of production in the post-reform era. This is the case 
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for potatoes, long berseem and to all intents and purposes cotton and short 
berseem. 
In the following section, statistical techniques are used to quantify the 
effect on production of these policy changes. 
TABLE 3-4: ANNuAL GROWTH RATE IN PRODUCTION IN THE PRE AND POST 
REFORM PERIODS FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT. 
Annual Growth Rate % 
CROP Pre reform Post reform Difference period- period (2)-(1) 
(1) (2) 
Rice 1.6 5.5 3.9 
Cotton -4.0 -0.2 3.8 
Long berseem -0.001 1.874 1.875 
Maize 1.6 3.2 1.6 
Wheat 4.5 6.1 1.6 
Short berseem -1.5 -0.1 1.4 
Sugarcane 3.2 2.9 -0.3 
Tomatoes 7.8 6.5 -1.3 
Broad beans 6.6 3.4 -3.3 
Potatoes 6.4 -5.8 -12.2 
Soybeans -1.8 -17.1 -15.4 
*Note that the pre reform period for maize and wheat is (1980-87) as they were liberalised in 
1987. Whereas for cotton it is (1980-94) as cotton liberalised in 1994. Otherwise it is assumed 
to be (1980-90) for all other crops. 
3.6.2 : Methodology 
In order to detect the impact of the reform policy on the production of 
the main agricultural products it is necessary to model production. In this 
section we simply attempt to describe production patterns. As can be seen from 
Figure 3-9, many of the production series appear to be trending over time. For 
example, crops such as wheat, maize and rice seem to have a rising trend over 
time, while crops as cotton and soybean have a falling trend over time. 
However, where policy has impacted on production, a change in either the 
magnitude or possibly even the sign of the trend coefficient may be expected. 
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The aim here is to provide statistical evidence of structural change and 
quantify the impact of policy reforms, rather than develop economic models of 
crop production. 
FIG 3-9: PRODUCTION TREND OF SOME MAJOR CROPS IN THE PERIOD 1980-2000 
(1980=100) Million Tons 
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Source: Calculated from Table A2-S. 
We assume that production of a crop Yt may be described by a simple 
exponential trend model Y/ = aef3JT ePt where the average rate of growth is given 
by P" T is a time trend and PI is a random variable of zero mean and constant 
variance. Applying logs will yield In Yt = In a. + Pt T + Jl t (where In 
a. = Po) simply, 
(3.1) 
Consequently we can recover the underlying growth rate by regressing the log 
of the variable on the time trend (T). 
Policy reform may be conjectured to affect either Po or Pt. These 
changes may be detected via incorporation a dummy variable on production of 
3-40 
Egyptian Agricultural Policy: A Historical Overview 
agricultural products in order to obtain some statistical support for the 
structural change hypothesis between pre and post reform eras. 
In the following section we attempt to elaborate on whether changes in 
production can be detected following policy reform by using a very simple 
statistical model to see if there has been any structural changes or not. The 
dummy variable is a simple approach, but it is indicative and, unlike other 
approaches, tractable with available data. 
The dummy variable approach can be used to model the change in 
production over time, in other words, a discrete shift implying that the 
intercept parameter differs in pre and post reform while the other coefficient 
remain unchanged. Alternatively, we might hypothesis that in the post-reform 
era the reform policies led to an increase in the rate of crop production growth 
or decline. In this case, we would expect the slope coefficient to differ in the 
two periods. The third and final possibility of distinguishing whether there was 
structural changes in the post reform era is to let both the intercept and the 
slope coefficients change. 
Four different models have been estimated for each crop by using 
MicroFIT.4 and production data reported in Table A 4 ~ 2 . . The first model 
estimates the parameter of the time trend to obtain the average annual rate of 
growth. 
We may be interested in testing the hypothesis that both of the 
coefficients changed between pre and post reform periods, only the intercept 
coefficients changed, or only the intercept and the coefficient of the time trend 
changed. The second model introduces a dummy variable D that takes the 
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value one for the post-reform period and zero elsewhere to measure the shift of 
production over time. Hence, the regression equation we fit will be: 
(3.2) 
The third model incorporates a dummy variable on the trend, DTI2, to 
measure the change in the slope. This can be written as 
(3.3) 
The fourth model allows a change in both the intercept and slope 
coefficients. Hence, we specify a general model of the form, 
Where, 
Po = In a 
PI = coefficient of the time trend (T) 
(3.4) 
P 1 = measures the shift in the production trend through a change of intercept 
P 3 = measures the shift in the production trend through a change of the slope. 
Equations (3.1) to (3.4) were estimated for eleven major agricultural 
commodities; wheat, cotton, rice, maize, soybean, potatoes, broad beans, 
tomatoes, long and short berseem and sugar cane, over the period 1980-2000. 
The dummy variable, D, was costructed for each crop such that 
{ 
0 for pre - reform period . . 
D vanes from one crop to another dependmg on 
1 for post - reform period 
the time that the commodity was liberalised. For example, wheat and maize 
were liberalised in 1987, but cotton was liberalised in 1994, and therefore the 
pre-reform period for wheat and maize was the period 1980-87 while for 
cotton it was 1980-94. Note also that for rice the pre-reform period was 1980-
91 and for all other crops the pre-reform period is1980-90. 
12 DT,= DIT 
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Evidence in favour of a policy refonn effect is indicated by the 
coefficients P2 and P3' Pre-refonn production is described by Po and PI; 
post-refonn by (Po + P2) and/or (PI + P3)' While the coefficients themselves 
will indicate the direction and size of the policy effect, we need to evaluate 
their statistical significance. 
Structural change (strictly speaking, 'parameter non-constancy') is 
initially evaluated using a standard Chow test. The Chow test and its 
supporting t tests are calculated for all the above mentioned commodities to 
test for structural change. The test compares the residual sum of squares from 
the unrestricted model (which allows all coefficients to vary between before 
and after refonn era) and the restricted model (which does not). The Chow test 
is simply an F test: 
F = [( RSSr - RSSuYm] 
RSSu/ 
!(n-k) 
- F (M. N - ~ ~ IF HOISTRUE (3.5) 
where: RSSu and RSSr are the residual sum of squares in the unrestricted and 
restricted regressions, m is the number of restrictions and k is the number of 
parameters in the unrestricted regression. Our null hypothesis Ho is of no 
structural change i.e. the coefficients on the dummies are jointly zero; if this is 
true the RSS from both models will be similar. If a structural change has 
occurred then Ho will be rejected because the RSS from the two models differs 
substantially. 
The Chow test is backed-up by standard t tests on the coefficients of 
P2 and P3' so to evaluate whether the policy is best approximated by a change 
in intercept or slope or both. 
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Although t tests of B2 and B3 in Equation (3.4) may be used to 
detennine how structural change is best approximated (intercept or slope) in 
the model, multicollinearity may often affect the standard errors of the 
parameters. Hence, restricted versions of Equation (3.4) are also estimated in 
which B2 and B3 are evaluated individually. The R2 of each restricted model 
can then be used to see which restricted model best describes the structural 
change. 
3.6.2.1 " Testing 
3.6.2.1.1 : Testing data in levels 
Results are reported in Table 3-5. According to the Chow test (at the 
10% nominal significant level), there is evidence of structural change in both 
slope and intercept coefficients in production in rice, maize, wheat, broad bean, 
cotton, soybean, long berseem and potatoes between the pre and post reform 
eras. There is no such evidence for short berseem, tomatoes and sugar cane. 
Results from the t tests indicate that both the intercept and slope were 
simultaneously affected in the case of soybean, potatoes and long berseem, 
while either a slope or an intercept dummy alone captures the structural change 
for rice, maize, broad and wheat. Crops such as sugar cane, tomatoes and short 
berseem did not show any significant effect on production trends for the 
reforms. 
Figure 3-10 shows a plot of the actual and fitted values of some of the 
production models. It illustrates the results of these models estimated in Table 
3-5. For example, the sign and magnitude of the slope and intercept 
coefficients for potato production was significantly affected by reform, 
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TABLE 3-5: STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN PRODUCTION FOR MAJOR 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS DURING 1980-2000 (USING LEVEL DA TA) 
Re2ressor 
RZ Chow Crop Po PI P2 P3 Test 
7.50 0.06 0.87 [0.0001 [O.OOQ] - -
7.70 0.02 -0.14 0.04 0.94 [0.000] [0.075] [0.4121 [0.009] 12.53 Rice 
7.60 0.03 0.32 [0.000] 
[0.0001 [0.000] [0.0031 - 0.92 
7.69 0.02 0.03 0.94 [0.000] [0.036] - [0.0001 
7.75 0.04 0.89 [0.0001 [0.0001 - -
7.89 0.002 -0.009 0.03 0.95 [0.000] [0.872] [0.9201 [0.009] 11.55 Maize 
7.77 0.03 0.21 [0.001] 
[0.0001 [0.000] [0.0051 - 0.92 
7.89 0.002 0.03 0.95 [0.0001 JO.802] - [0.0001 
5.40 -0.09 0.76 [0.0001 10.000] - -
4.95 -0.02 1.67 
-0.15 0.88 [0.000] [0.469] [0.0031 [0.001] 9.30 Soybeans 
5.35 -0.08 -0.17 [0.002] 
[0.0001 10.004] [0.5841 - 0.76 
5.14 -0.04 
-0.04 0.80 [0.0001 [0.1661 - [0.0561 
6.70 -0.02 0.l4 [0.0001 rO.0871 - -
6.24 0.06 1.00 
-0.12 0.58 [0.000] [0.011] [0.0421 [0.002] 8.75 Potatoes 
6.56 0.Q1 -0.45 [0.002] 
[0.000] rO.598] [0.1041 - 0.26 
6.36 0.04 
-0.05 0.46 [0.0001 rO.0511 - [0.005] ,. 
7.29 0.08 0.92 [0.000] [0.000] - -
7.45 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.95 [0.000] [0.118] LO.860] [0.099] 4.94 Wheat 
7.32 0.06 0.27 [0.020] 
[0.000] [0.0001 [0.0231 - 0.94 
7.46 0.03 0.04 0.95 [0.0001 [0.081] - [0.0051 
5.50 0.02 0.42 [0.0001 [0.001] - -
5.30 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.5 Broad [0.000] [0.001] [0.954] [0.198] 4.13 
beans 5.37 0.05 -0.37 0.61 . [0.034] [0.0001 [0.000] [0.0231 -













































Po is the constant term. 
PI is the time trend. 
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Rel!ressor Chow 
PI P2 P3 
R2 
Test 
-0.03 0.66 [0.0001 - -
-0.04 -0.53 0.04 0.71 [0.000] [0.0921 [0.036] 3.68 
-0.04 0.13 0.70 [0.047] [0.0001 rO.229] -
-0.04 0.008 0.70 
ro.0001 - [0.1661 
0.004 0.13 
ro. 1 001 
-0.78E-5 -0.28 0.02 0.35 [0.999] rO.0281 [0.046] 2.88 
0.008 -0.05 [0.083] 
[0.1061 fO.3471 0.17 
0.004 0.65E-4 0.13 fO.5221 - [0.9881 
0.06 0.88 fO.OOOl - -
0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.90 [0.000] [0.887] [0.501] 1.68 
0.07 -0.19 0.90 [0.216] fO .0001 [0.1021 -
0.08 -0.01 0.90 [0.000] - fO .0761 
0.07 0.30 fO.0091 
-0.01 -0.13 0.01 0.40 [0.023] [0.2921 [0.148] 1.33 
-0.009 0.03 [0.290] 
[0.0691 [0.567] 0.32 
-0.01 0.005 0.35 [0.Q351 - fO.24 11 
0.03 0.95 [0.0001 - -
0.03 0.03 -0.003 0.95 [0.000] [0.671] [0.646] 0.10 
0.03 0.001 [0.897] 
fO.0001 fO .975] - 0.95 
0.03 -0.0005 0.95 [0.0001 - [0.855] 
Pl is the Dummy for measuring the shift of the production over time, i.e.; the intercept. 
P 3 is the Dummy for measuring the change in parameters slope over time. 
Note that maize and wheat were liberalised in 1987 whereas rice in 1991 and cotton in 1994 
(see Table A3-1). For wheat and maize the post-reform period started from 1988, for rice 1992 
and for cotton 1995. Otherwise it is assumed to start in 1990. 
3-46 
Egyptian Agricultural Policy: A Historical Overview 
FIG 3-10: ACTUAL AND FITIED VALUES OF REFORMS ON BOTH THE INTERCEPT 
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where the slope during the post-refonn era is estimated to be -0.06 compared 
with 0.06 in the pre-refonn era, and the intercept has significantly changed by 
16%. The result is confinned by the decline in its annual growth rates from 
6.4% to -5.8% during the post-refonn period as well as the gradual fall in its 
acreage. 
Another example is wheat, where the results indicate that there is a 
significant effect of refonns on its growth, has shifted from 3% to 7% in the 
post-refonn. The sugar cane which its result showed no significant effect of 
policy refonn, a result which is consistent With previous expectation simply 
because sugar cane is still controlled by government and has not been targeted 
by policy refonns till now. 
3.6.2.1.2 : Testing data in first differences 
Plosser and Schwert (1987) argued that with most economic time series 
it is always best to work with differenced data rather than data in levels. The 
reason is that the errors in the levels equation will have variances increasing 
over time and consequently the properties of the least squares estimators (OL8) 
as well as the tests of significance are invalid. 
Granger and Newbold (1976) showed using artificially generated data 
where y, x and the error u are each generated independently so that there is no 
relationship between y and x, that the correlation between Yt and Yt-] and Xt and 
Xt-l are very high and Ut and Ut-! are very high. Although there is no relationship 
between Y and x the regression of y on x gives a high R! but a low OW 
Statistic. When the regression is run in first differences, the R2 is close to zero 
and the OW statistic is close to 2, thus demonstrating that there is indeed no 
relationship between y and x and that the R! obtained earlier (level analysis) is 
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spurious. Thus regression in first differences might often reveal the true nature 
of the relationship between y and x. On the other hand, suppose that the level 
equation is correctly specified. Then all differencing will do is produce a 
moving average error and, at worst, ignoring it will give inefficient (but 
unbiased) estimates. Estimating the first difference equation by least squares 
gives us consistent estimates. Therefore it is better to use differencing and 
regressions in first differences, rather than regressions in levels with time as an 
extra explanatory variable (Maddala, 2001). 
For instance suppose that we have the model defined above. 
Y,= /30 + /31 Ii + /32 D, + /33 DT, + U, (3.6) 
where u, are independent with mean zero and common variance a 2. If we 
difference equation (3.6), we get 
(y,- Y'-l)=( /30 - /30)+ /31 (T,-T,-l)+ /32 (D,- D'-l) + /33 (DIi - DT,-l) + (U,-U'_l) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
which can be written as, 
A Y, = Yl + Y2 D; + Y3 DT/ + v, (3.9) 
Where the constant term has disappeared simply because (/30 - /30)=0, D; =(D, 
- D'-l) is an impulse dummy, being one in the first year of r e f o ~ ~ zero 
otherwise, whereas Dr,- =(DT, - DT'_l) = D, is as defined above (1 during 
reform period, zero elsewhere). The error v, = Au, = Ut - U,-l is a moving 
average, and, hence not serially independent. D; and D; are dummies that 
measure the effect of the reforms on the intercept and slope of the model 
describing the change in production respectively. Hence, in (3.9) Yl represents 
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the pre-refonn rate of growth in production, Y2 the impulse shift in growth 
upon refonn and Y3 a pennanent change in growth rate following refonn. 
Moreover, note that we can obtain estimates of the pre-refonn trend 
(PI)' the change in intercept (i.e. pz) and the change in the trend (PJ) either 
from the levels or from the difference fonn (as YI' Y2 and Y3). Although 
PI = YI , P2 = Y2 and P3 = Y3 the coefficients are estimated using different 
transfonnation of the data. Given that the levels data are characterised by some 
fonn of trending behaviour, it will look quite different to the data in 
differenced fonn. However, while the parameters are theoretically the same, 
their standard errors are not and hence statistical significance of the parameters 
may be quite different from that obtained using the data in levels. Since the 
levels data is trending, this will tend to over-state the statistical significance of 
any relationship using levels data. In essence, estimation of the parameters 
using differenced data is likely to lead to fewer statistically significant 
coefficients. Table 3-6 shows the parameter's coefficients estimated by 
regressions in the first differences model. 
As expected (due the limited number of observations (21) used in the 
analysis) the results do not appear to be as strong as those in levels. Although 
the estimated coefficients for YI' Y2 and Y3are similar in signs and magnitude 
to a large extent to those estimated using level data, none of the coefficients are 
significant in the differenced data approach. For example, the estimated 
coefficients for broad beans in levels, PI and P2' are 0.05 and -0.37 
respectively and they are "statistically significant" at the 5% level, whereas 
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TABLE 3-6: STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN PRODUCTION FOR MAJOR 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS DURING 1980-2000 (USING FIRST DIFFERENCES) 
Regressor 
R2 Crop 
Yl Y2 Y3 
0.03 -0.37 0.03 0.03 [0.455] 10.562] [0.517] 
Rice 0.04 0.04 0.005 [0.105] 10.759] -
0.04 0.004 0,01 [0.1441 - [0.6691 
0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.09 [0.709] [ 0 . 8 4 ~ ~ [0.614] 
Maize 0.03 0.02 0.07 [0.201] [0.2401 -
0.02 0.01 0.09 [0.434] - 10.20'!l 
0.01 2.87 -0.23 0.14 [0.892] 10.11 !J [0.132] 
Soybean -0.09 0.21 0.02 [0.223] [0.535] -
-0.09 0.009 0.006 [0.2541 - 1 1 . 7 4 ~ ~
0.04 1.54 -1.42 0.07 [0.621] [0.306] [0.270] 
Potatoes -0.02 0.09 0.006 [0.705] [0.746] -
-0.01 -0.01 0,01 [0.819] - [0.596] 
0.06 -0.15 0.01 0.004 [0.316] [0.813] [0.843] 
Wheat 0.07 -0.03 0.002 [0.058] [0.851 ] -
0.07 -0.002 0.97E-3 
rO.0831 - 1 1 . 8 9 ~ ~
0.07 0.30 -0.06 0.15 [0.296] [0.780J [0.548] 
Broad beans 0.04 -0.34 0.14 [0.368] [0.107] -
0.06 
-0.03 0.15 [0.2441 - 1 1 . 0 8 ~ ~~ ~
-0.05 -1.40 0.09 0.05 [0.276] 10 ... 4'li [0.350] 
Cotton -0.03 -0.03 0.001 [0.470] [0.8681 -
-0.03 -0.534E-3 O.l2E-3 [0.465] - 1 1 . 9 6 ~ ~
0.05 -0.20 0.01 0.03 [0.728] [0.49U [0.535] 
Long berseem 0.01 -0.02 0.01 [0.663] -[0.283] 
0.01 -0.001 0.005 [0.298] - 10.759] 
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.. - r) r2 r3 
0.05 -0.09 0.008 
[0.149] [0.885] [0.878] 
, 
0.06 0.004 Tomatoes [0.034] [0.973] -
0.06 0.66E-3 
-[0.044] [0.950] 
-0.1 -0.06 0.006 
[0.626] rO.897] [0.889] 




0.02 -0.08 0.009 
[0.117] [0.733] [0.668] 
Sugar cane 0.02 0.02 [0.01 3] [0.6701 -
0.03 0.001 
-[0.022] rO.6151 
[3 J is the time trend. 
[32 is the Dummy for measuring the shift of production over time, i.e.; the intercept. 
[33 is the Dummy for measuring the change in parameters slope over time. 
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FIG 3-11: ACTUAL AND FITIED V ALUES (IN DIFFERENCES) OF REFORMS ON 
BOTH THE INTERCEPT AND/OR SLOPE OF PRODUCTION FOR SOME MAJOR 
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when the difference model is used to estimate those parameters, they are 
estimated at 0.04 and -0.34 respectively, but are not statistically significant at 
either at 5% or 10%. Therefore, the results indicate that there is not enough 
evidence to detect the presence of structural changes in production between the 
pre-and post-reform eras for any of the crops at conventional levels of 
confidence using the differenced data. The exercise of estimation in both levels 
and first differences is instructive since it highlights the effect that trending 
data has on significance levels. 
Figure 3-11 shows actual and fitted values for rice, wheat, broad beans 
and potatoes, the same crops that previously presented in Figure 3-10, but now 
in differences. The graphs show that the estimated coefficients of the 
regressors PI' P2 and lor PJ are very close in magnitude and similar in signs 
to those plotted in Figure 3-10, but note again that these coefficients can not be 
distinguished from zero at conventional levels of significance. Although it 
would be desirable to compute a Chow test in first differences (as we have 
done in levels) in the interest of completeness we merely report the statistical 
significance of the individual coefficients. As can be seen from Table 3-6, 
none-of the coefficients are statistically significant. 
A similar analysis was performed on consumption of some of the most 
important agricultural tradable inputs, nitrogenous, phosphate and potash 
fertilisers. The analysis was carried using data of first differences for each kind 
of fertiliser, following the same concept as Equations (3.6) to (3.9) except that 
ACt = (Ct - C t-l) is the difference between fertiliser consumption Ci in year I 
and year 1-1. Hence, it could be modelled as: 
(3.10) 
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where 0\ is the time trend, O2 is the dummy for measuring the intercept shift of 
the fertiliser consumption between the two eras and 03 is the dummy for 
measuring the change in average growth rate between the two periods. 
Table 3-7 reports the results. It indicates that none of the estimated coefficients 
of parameters for nitrogenous, phosphate or potash consumption after the 
reform period is statistically significant from zero at conventional levels of 
confidence. The result supports our previous results obtained in Table 3-6, in 
that there is not enough evidence to detect the presence of structural changes in 
fertiliser consumption between the pre-and post-reform eras at conventional 
levels of confidence using the differenced data. 
TABLE 3-7: STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN FERTILISER CONSUMPTION DURINF THE 
PERIOD 1961-2000 (USING FIRST DIFFERENCES) 
Regressor 
~ ~Fertilizer 0\ O2 03 
0.04 0.43 -0.01 0.03 [0.015] [0.7451 [0.797] 
Nitrogenous 0.04 0.09 0.02 [0.009] [0.3431 -
0.04 0.003 0.02 [0.0101 - [0.355] 
0.02 -0.71 0.02 0.003 [0.419) [0.7591 [0.753] 
Phosphate 0.03 0.02 0.284E-3 [0.292] [0.9191 -
0.03 0.64E-3 0.428E-3 [0.2991 - [0.900] 
0.09 0.83 -0.03 0.003 [0.132) [0.8501 [0.835] 
Potash 0.08 -0.08 0.001 [0.112] [0.7961 -
0.08 -0.003 0.002 [0.1121 - [0.7841 
.. Note that any kind of governmental subSIdy on fertilisers was elurunated ill 1992, thus refonn 
period of fertiliser is the period from 1993 til12000 
3-55 
Egyptian Agricultural Policy; A Historical Overview 
3.6.3 Discussion 
It is obvious that the levels results concur with· what was discussed 
earlier in Section 3-5, Table 3-4 and Figure 3-9. For example, the Chow test (at 
5%) indicated a significant structural change in crops that had been directly 
targeted by reforms such as rice, maize, wheat, broad beans and cotton or 
indirectly affected as soybeans and potatoes. Results using levels data with the 
aid of dummy variables also showed a significant effect on production during 
the post reform era, through the significant effect of the dummy on the 
intercept and/or the slope (see Section 3-6-3-1). 
It is observed that some economists rely heavily on parameters and 
coefficients estimated using levels data in their specification for modeling the 
impact of new policy reforms on agricultural production. For example, 
Ghounem (2000) evaluated the impacts of Egyptian reform policies using the 
dummy variables on production, area, and costs depending only on levels data. 
As our analysis demonstrates, we should be very cautious in relying only on 
levels data in giving policy advice or evaluation simply because statistical 
significance offers a very different picture depending on whether the 
regressions are conducted in levels or first differences. Table 3-8 compares the 
results obtained for estimating the coefficients for PI' P2 and P3 
(equivalently Yl' Y2 and Y3) using both approaches that are reported in Tables 
3-5 and 3-6, we find a totally different picture in terms of significance and R2 
values, but there are some coefficients that are similar in size and sign. In other 
words, we may find that the magnitude of regressors in both approaches are 
similar, but the significance of the estimated coefficients as well as the If 
values in the first differences approach has dramatically fallen, as is the case 
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for the major crops reported in Table 3-8. For example, the estimated values 
beans are very close in magnitude and similar in sign. Those estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant in levels whereas they are not after first 
differencing. Moreover, the value of R2 has fallen dramatically from 61 % and 
TABLE 3-8: A COMPARISON BETWEEN COEFFICIENT'S MAGNITUDE AND SIGNS 
FOR SOME MAJOR CROPS ESTIMATED IN LEVELS AND FIRST DIFFERENCES. 
Reeressor 
Crop /3, /32 /33 R'J 
Levels 0.05 -0.37 - 0.61 [0.000] [0.023] 
First differences 0.04 -0.34 - 0.14 [0.368] rD. 1071 Broad beans 
Levels 0.07 -0.03 
[0.000] - [0.005] 0.57 
First differences 0.06 -0.03 0.15 
rO.2441 - rO.0891 
Levels 0.03 0.32 - 0.92 [0.000] [0.003] 
First differences 0.04 0.04 - 0.005 [0.105] rO.7591 Rice 
Levels 0.02 0.03 
[0.036] - [0.000] 0.94 
First differences 0.04 0.004 0.01 
rD. 1441 - rO.6691 
Levels 0.03 0.21 - 0.92 [0.000] [0.005] 
First differences 0.03 0.02 - 0.07 [0.201] [0.2401 Maize Levels 0.002 0.03 
[0.802] - [0.000] 0.95 
First differences 0.02 0.01 0.09 
rO.4341 - ro.2041 
Source: Tables 3-6 and 3-7. 
57% between /3, &/31 and /3, & /33 respectively in level data to 14% and 
15% in first-differences data. Since first differencing of production data will 
automatically reduce R2, this drop in R2 observed here is unsurprising. More 
importantly, the comparison of results from the data in levels and first 
differenced form offers a cautionary reminder when conducting statistical 
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inference using trending data. Specifically, trends in the data bias the tests for 
structural change in favour of detecting such change. The (equivalent) test 
using first-differenced data detects the same changes (in tenns of sign and in 
some cases magnitude of the structural change) but can not assure the analyst 
of such changes with the conventional degrees of confidence. Hence, whilst 
"inconvenient", given the sample size used and simplicity of the models, this 
should not be a surprising outcome. 
Overall however, although the results are subject to the above caveat, 
they are indicative that refonn had the following effects on production levels: 
(1) Crops that had been directly targeted by refonns such as rice maize and 
wheat, had shown a positive upward shift, while in the case of cotton and 
broad bean there was a dramatic fall. (2) Soybean, potatoes, tomatoes, long and 
short berseem were indirectly affected negatively by refonns. (3) Sugar cane 
was not affected by refonns. 
3.7 : Summary and conclusion. 
This chapter reviewed the main features and characteristics of Egyptian 
agricultural policies since 1939 until the reforms in the mid-1980s and beyond 
to 2000, where government intervention was a theme for the successive 
governments. A system of compUlsory deliveries for cereal crops and controls 
over cropping patterns characterised the fonnation of government intervention 
during the Second World War. Agricultural polices during Nasser's regime 
showed high levels of intervention that negatively affected the agricultural 
sector, especially after the promulgation of the Agrarian Refonn Act (No. 178 
of 1952), where a system of controls was established, where the co-operatives 
controlled input and output prices, and where a high proportion of agricultural 
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production was channelled through official agencies. These policies continued 
until the first half of the 1970s. However, the Egyptian economy was affected 
by several events that created major changes in its socio-economic structure. 
Government responded with the 'open door policy', and new sources of 
national income became important, such as the remittances of Egyptians 
working in the Arab and Gulf oil countries, petroleum exports and receipts 
from tourism and Suez Canal tolls. 
Furthermore, owing to the adoption of the Agrarian Reform Act and 
other similar policies, the performance of the Egyptian economy had been so 
poor that it left no alternative other than comprehensive reform in 1986. Major 
changes took place in the agricultural sector over the reform era. For example, 
quotas, area controls and subsidies were gradually eliminated over a wide array 
of commercially important crops\3. 
As a precursor to the analysis of the reforms a simple analysis has been 
undertaken to investigate the effect of reforms on production of crops. 
Structural changes in production have been examined for the period 1980-2000 
using levels and differenced data. The results for levels data indicate a 
'statistically significant' structural change in production in favour of the 
reform period for most crops. However, while the differenced data indicates 
the same changes (in terms of sign and in some cases magnitude of the 
structural change) they are not statistically significant at conventional degrees 
of confidence. In other words, we can not be assured that the coefficients 
obtained in levels are really statistically significant and that the significance 
13 Greater detail on policy changes affecting the exchange rate and the agricultural land 
tenancy system is given in Chapter 5, while the impact of the adopted reform polices on the 
efficiency of the use of agricultural resources is the subject of Chapter 6. 
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attached to the estimates is perhaps spurious. This does not mean that there is 
no evidence of a policy effect, it is just that we are unable to attach the 
confidence normally required for such effects. 
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The PAM Methodology 
Chapter IV: The Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) Model: 
Methodology, and Applications. 
4.1 : Introduction: 
The policy analysis matrix approach allows applied economists to 
analyse policies in tenns of their impact on commodity systems -
representative chains of fanning, marketing, and processing activities - that 
together produce a marketable product. The PAM is a compromise between the 
desire for a theoretical model to describe the economy in exacting detail and 
the need for insightful policy analysis that operates within the inevitable 
constraints of time and data availability (pearson et aI, 1995). 
The theoretical basis of the PAM is a simple partial equilibrium model 
of international trade and the matrix focuses attention on the identification of 
efficient patterns of production and prices. 
In the empirical application of the PAM, emphasis is placed on budgets 
for costs and returns, which are chosen to represent commodity systems for 
different regions, types of farms, and technologies. 
Developed by Monke and Pearson (1989), the policy analysis matrix 
approach is a simple accounting framework from which policy-effect and 
comparative-advantage measures can be computed simultaneously. The PAM 
is based on two accounting identities: the first defines profitability as the 
difference between total (or per unit) sales revenue and cost of production, and 
the other assesses the effects of distortionary policies and market failure. 
According to Monke and Pearson (19891 p. 17), the PAM as a policy 
analysis tool is relevant to three areas of economic analysis: (1) The impact of 
policies on competitiveness and farm level profits. Farm budget data for the 
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agricultural system involve both sales revenue and input costs, and so allow the 
identification of actual profits received by farmers. The PAM thus indicates 
which crops are currently competitive and how their profits might change if 
price policy changes. (2) The impact of investment policy on economic 
efficiency and comparative advantage. The PAM indicates the crops that 
possess (under current policies & agro-climatic zone) a comparative 
advantage, and how new public investments might change the current 
efficiency. (3) The effects of agricultural research policy on steering the 
processes of technological changes in desirable directions. New investments 
that decrease social costs will also increase social profits and as a result, 
efficiency will improve. 
In this chapter, section 2 gives an overview of PAM entries and 
manipUlation strategy. Section 3 describes a number of economic indicators 
that are estimated in the PAM. Six indicators are of particular interest: (1) the 
Private Cost Ratio (PCR); (2) The Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRC); (3) 
The Nominal Protection Coefficients on tradable outputs (NPCO) and on 
tradable inputs (NPCO; (4) The Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC); (5) 
The Profitability Coefficient (PC); (6) The Subsidy Ratio to Producers (SRP); 
Net Private Profitability (NPP), Net Social Profitability (NSP); and Social Cost 
Benefit (SCB). Section 4 illustrates The PAM tables (Input-Output table, 
Private Prices table, Private Budget table, Social Prices .table, Social Budget 
table and finally the PAM table). Section 5 discusses in detail a numerical 
example of PAM manipulation. Section 6 gives a brief overview of the various 
applications of P AMs by academics, practitioners and world organisations. 
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Section 7 discusses the strengths and weakness of the PAM approach and the 
ways to overcome these limitations. Section 8 summarises and concludes. 
4.2 : PAM Methodology 
The policy analysis matrix uses the terms private/social pnces, 
I " 
profitability, and cost in the context that, for any tradable product (or input), 
there is a private price (in the local market) and a world price (in the 
international market). The latter price is often called the "social" price. Social 
values of prices, profitability, and cost are the values that would prevail in the 
absence of any policy distortions. Therefore, "social profitability" is measured 
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nD = (A)-[(B)+(C)] 
(H) 
(Profit based all social 
prices) 
nS = (E)-[(F)+(G)] 
(L) 
L = D - H = (I - J - K) 
p = price of output Q = quantity of output. D = indicates domestic or private prices 
Pi = price of tradable input i qi = quantity of tradable inputs , s = indicates social or world prices 
Wj = price of Domestic input j, Ij = quantity of domestic factors, n = profit 
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not in terms of welfare, but in terms of international prices. However, using 
world prices may not necessarily provide appropriate reference for social 
valuation if international prices themselves are distorted by other countries 
policies. Agricultural policies of the industrial countries (e.g. export subsidies) 
tend to depress world prices of some agricultural products. However, these 
distorted world prices may persist for some period and have to be treated as 
given by the importers and exporters of other countries. 
The first row refers to private profitability, which indicates the 
competitiveness of the agricultural system under the current technology, output 
values, input costs and policy performance. It is formed from results obtained 
from a private budget table, i.e., private revenue (A), cost of tradable inputs 
(B), and costs of domestic factors (C). These variables are used to measure 
private profitability (D), where private profitability (D) equals actual market 
revenue (A) minus actual costs [(B)+(C)]. Net private profitability (D) is 
defined as gross returns at market prices (A) less the tradable input cost (B) 
and the cost of domestic factors (C). 
The second row indicates the comparative advantage or efficiency of 
the agricultural commodity system. It is formed of results obtained from a 
social budget table, i.e., social revenue (E), social costs of tradable inputs (F), 
and social costs of domestic factor (G)). These are used to measure social 
profitability (H), i.e., social profitability (H) is equal to social market revenue 
(E) minus social costs [(F) + (G)]. 
Domestic factors of production (labour, land and capital) do not have 
world prices because these domestic factors are not traded. So the social 
valuation of these factors is obtained by estimation of the net income forgone if 
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the factor were allocated to its best alternative. For example, if there are two 
competitive crops, say X & Y, and one hectare of land is planted to crop X, so 
that crop Y can not be grown in that crop season, the social opportunity cost of 
land for the X crop is the net income lost because land can not produce crop Y. 
The other factors of production (capital & labour) used to produce X can not 
simultaneously be used in any other activity. The net income foregone from 
not producing Y is their net social opportunity cost. 
The third row of the model measures policy-induced transfers that 
come into play due to policy-induced market failures or distortions. The 
divergence between the revenues at private and social prices (I=A-E) is the 
output transfer; a positive value implies that producers receive a subsidy due to 
existing policies as they receive a higher price than the world price for the 
commodity. The input transfer (J= B-F) measures the difference between input 
costs at private and social prices; a negative value implies that producers are 
receiving a subsidy, and a positive value implies a tax (i.e., farmers are paying 
more than they should). The extent of the factor transfer is measured by K=C-
G. The net transfer from policy distortions or market failures not corrected by 
efficient policies is measured by L=D-H. If 1>0 (i.e., NPP>NSP), there are net 
transfers to producers from the government, i.e. a subsidy; L<O implies a tax 
on producers. 
Any divergence between observed or private (actual market) prices 
and social (world) prices may be explained by the existence of distorting 
government policies (such as the predetermiried prices of commodities and 
inputs) and/or by the existence of market failures (such as marketing 
imperfections, monopolies or monopsonies). Any of these failures of markets 
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to work efficiently can cause inefficient price signals (Monke and Person, 
1989). 
The presence of such sources of divergence will cause private prices to 
differ from social prices. The magnitudes of I, J, K and L help to distinguish if 
there are distorted markets for these commodities or not. If these measures are 
different from zero, then the commodities concerned are facing an inefficient 
policy. 
Other traditional measures of effects of government policies such as 
nominal and effective protection coefficients, and of comparative advantage or 
efficiency, such as the domestic resource cost (ORC), can also be derived from 
the PAM as will be discussed below. 
4.3 :PAM Economic Indicators: 
The previous table shows the economic indicators that may be 
calculated by the PAM approach. It also embodies the rule for calculating each 
indicator. 
4.3.1 : Private Cost Ratio (PCR): 
peR = C / (A-B) 
where: 
c: cost of domestic factors based on private prices 
A: revenue based on private prices 
B: costs of tradable inputs based on private prices 
The Private Cost Ratio is defined as the ratio of the domestic factor cost 
[C] to the difference between the value of output and the tradables cost valued 
at private prices [value added (A-B)]. It thus shows the ability of the 
production system to cover the cost of the domestic factors and still remain 
competitive. 
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If the PCR is greater than one then the value of domestic cost is higher 
than the difference between the value of output and the cost of tradable inputs, 
implying that the sector is not profitable, and is more likely to contract in the 
future. If the PCR for a sector is less than one then the cost of domestic factors 
is less than the difference between total revenues and costs of tradable 
component valued at domestic or private prices. This indicates that the sector is 
profitable at prevailing domestic prices or, in other words, it has a competitive 
advantage domestically. So processors in the sector try to minimise their PCR 
by minimising factor and tradable input costs (i.e. using better technology, 
better management, less labour and so on) in order to maximise their profits. 
This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
4.3.2 : Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRC): 
The DRC as a policy tool seeks to answer some important questions. 
What domestic outputs have international competitiveness given the current 
domestic resource endowment, production, and cost structures, and the given 
set of trade opportunities? What pattern of resource allocation is suggested by 
international competitiveness and static efficiency concerns? Given the 
expected evolution in domestic resource endowment, production, and cost 
structures, and given the expected developments in international markets, what 
domestic outputs are likely to be internationally competitive, in other words, 
efficient savers of foreign exchange? The domestic resource cost DRC is 
calculated in the PAM as: 
DRC= G / (E-F) 
where: 
G: cost of domestic factors based on social prices 
E: revenue based on social prices 
F: costs of tradable inputs based on social prices 
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The Domestic Resource Cost is defined as the ratio of the domestic 
factor cost [G] to the difference between the value of output and the tradable 
inputs cost valued at social (world) prices [value added (E-F)]. If a product has 
a DRC equal to one then it takes a dollar's worth of resources to produce 
output that could be purchased internationally for one dollar. On the other 
hand, a comparative advantage is achieved in activities that have a DRC less 
than one. The lower the ratio, the greater the comparative advantage. For 
example, if the DRC for a crop = 0.2, then for every $ 0.20 of the cost of 
producing this crop the country saves $1.00 of imports or gains $1.00 in extra 
export revenue. In contrast, activities with a DRC greater than one are at a 
comparative disadvantage. 
4.3.2.1 : Modelling of the DRC coefficient. 
The Domestic Resource Cost compares the opportunity costl of 
domestic production to the value added it generates. Both the numerator and 
denominator components of the DRC may be measured differently depending 
on whether the Corden or Balassa method of disaggregating value added is 
I The sum of the costs of using land, labour and capital; hence the total costs of domestic 
resources directly and indirectly applied and of non-traded inputs in the production of the 
food. 
According to Taskok (1990), estimation of value added may rely on: 
A- simple Carden method in which, value added = value of output - cost of traded 
intennediary inputs. 
B- simple Balassa method in which, direct value added = value of output - (cost of traded + 
non-traded intermediary inputs). 
C- sophisticated Corden method in which, value added = value of output - (cost of direct 
traded inputs + traded components of non-traded intermediary inputs). 
D- sophisticated Balassa method for domestic prices in which, direct value added = value of 
output - (cost of direct traded + non-traded intermediary inputs + tariff I subsidy on traded 
components). 
E- sophisticated Balassa method for border prices in which, direct value added = value of 
output - (cost of direct traded + non-traded intermediary inputs - tariff I subsidy on traded 
components). 
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DRC = Opportunity cost of domestic resources used 
Value added at border prices 
However, DRC may either calculated as3 
where 
a jj ,Ito k =Coefficients of traded inputs. 
The PAM Methodology 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
a jj , k + 1 to n =Coefficients for domestic resources and non-traded intermediary inputs. 
Vj = Shadow price of domestic resource or non-traded input. 
pjb = Border price of traded input. 
Pjb = Border price of traded output. 




Pjf = Foreign price of output (i) 
p{ = Foreign price of input G> 
According to Hassan (1991, Ch. 6, p.5), the following method of 
estimating the Domestic Resource Cost was used by Bruno (1967 and 1972) 
and Krueger (1972) 
3 Both numerator and denominator in equation (4.3) are in border price values, while the 
denominator in equation (4.4) is in foreign currency. (Equation (4.3) is the more widely used) 
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DRC = (4.4) 
where 
v ij = The amount of primary factor (i) used in producing a unit of 0). 
Sj = The social opportunity cost or shadow price of factor (i) 
dl1i = The amount of non-traded intermediate input (h) used in the production of 0), 
Valued at shadow price. 
v fj = The amount of foreign owned factors of production used in production of (j). 
mij = Primary factors used in production of (j). 
If = The share of income repatriated by foreign owned factors of production. 
The numerator in equation (4.4) is the social opportunity cost of 
domestic resources employed directly and indirectly in producing a unit of j, 
while the denominator is the international value added at border prices in 
activity j adjusted for returns to foreign owned factors. This is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 6. 
4.3.3 : Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC): 
4.3.3.1 : Nominal Protection CoeffiCient on Tradable Outputs (NPCO): 
where: 
A: revenue based on private prices 
E: revenue based on social prices 
NPCO=AIE 
The Nominal Protection coefficient of a commodity is defined as the 
ratio of the gross domestic price to its equivalent world price. The NPC 
indicates whether the gross price of the domestic good is higher or lower at a 
point oftime or over a given period of time than the gross world; it summarises 
the pattern of incentives or disincentives for a range of domestic goods, and 
how that has changed over time. In a sector where there are no intennediate 
inputs the NPC measures the protection given to producers by tariffs, non tariff 
barriers etc. 
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If the NPCO equals one, consumers, intennediaries and producers are 
facing domestic prices that are equal to world prices Le., there is no divergence 
in the output price. A NPCO greater than one indicates that producers of this 
commodity are protected by governmental policy, in which case there is 
positive protection for domestic producers and intermediaries because they 
receive a higher price after intervention than they would in the absence of 
interventions; it is also negative protection for consumers, because they pay a 
higher price under such an intervention than they would without it. For an NPC 
less than one, the reverse structure of protection is in force Le., it means that 
price-affecting policies tax producers and subsidise consumers. 
Whatever numerical value of the NPC, it is an indicator of relative 
incentives among crops, and may be used to measure changes in relative 
incentives across years. In general the greater the divergence of the NPC from 
one, the greater the effect of policy on the price structure and the incentives to 
producers and consumers. This is discussed in greater detail is in Chapter 7. 
4.3.3.2 : Nominal Protection Coefficient on Tradable Inputs (NPCI): 
NPCI=BIF 
where: 
B: costs of tradable inputs based on private prices 
F: costs of tradable inputs based on social prices 
The nominal protection coefficient for a tradable input (NPCI) is 
defined as the ratio of the domestic value of that input to its equivalent social 
price. It indicates whether growers are being subsidised or taxed in purchasing 
their tradable inputs. Unlike the NPCO, a NPCI less than one implies that 
growers are being protected in that they are paying less for ,their tradable inputs 
than they would in the absence of intervention; Le. it indicates a case of 
subsidised inputs. In contrast, if the NPCI is greater than one then it indicates 
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that growers are taxed on their purchases of tradable inputs. If it is one then 
growers are neither taxed nor subsidised in receiving tradable inputs. See 
chapter 7 for greater detail. 
4.3.4 : Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC): 
where: 
A: revenue based on private prices 
E: revenue based on social prices 
EPC = (A-B)/(E - F) 
B: costs of tradable inputs based on private prices 
F: costs of tradable inputs based on social prices 
The EPC is defined as the ratio of value added at private prices to value 
added at social prices. The Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) is a more 
comprehensive indicator of incentives than the NPCO or NPCI economic 
indicators as it measures the aggregate degree of policy transfers from product 
market, output and tradable input policies. In other words, it reflects the overall 
subsidies or taxes on the prices of tradable inputs and outputs. 
If the EPC is greater than one there is a positive incentive to produce the 
commodity under consideration i.e., a subsidy. Conversely, an EPC less than 
one means discrimination against the commodity i.e., a tax. 
The negative EPC indicates that the value added m the sector 
concerned is actually lower than under free trade conditions. In other words, 
the value of resources used in producing this product (when valued at world 
prices) exceeds the price that farmers receive for the product itself in the 
domestic market. The measurement of negative effective protection is one way 
to highlight the fallacy that policy makers often introduce interventions on the 
assumption that they impact only on those sectors to which they are directed. 
Where negative effective protection is recorded, it signals quite clearly that the 
activity/industry in question is actually being penalised by the protective 
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structure and illustrates just how costly an 'unplanned' protective regime can 
be. Incentives in this case draw resources into activities to produce 
commodities at a very high cost (Greenaway and Milner, 1993). 
The EPC is applied in particular to production at farm level, processing 
and marketing, as it takes into consideration output prices and costs of traded 
inputs simultaneously. However, both the Nominal Protection Coefficient and 
the Effective Protection Coefficient are incomplete indicators of incentives, 
because they ignore the transfer effects of factor market policies. 
The formula for the EPC can be written as: 
EPC = value added at domestic prices 
value added at border prices 
or 
where 
pjd = Domestic price of output (i). 
a .. = Units of input G) per unit of output (i). 
\I 
P ~ ~ = Domestic price of input G). 
J 
Pjb = pt x ER , or border price of output equals foreign price x exchange rate. 
pjb = Pjf x ER , or border price of input equals foreign price x exchange rate. 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
For intervention affecting output and related traded inputs, the EPC 
indicates whether the domestic good (i) receives positive or negative 
protection. Moreover, if the EPC is calculated over a period of time it shows 
the pattern of the changes in protection, as well as potential incentives I 
disincentives. Also it illustrates whether the pattern is conducive to efficient 
resource use or not. 
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4.3.4.1 : Modelling the Basic Effective Protection Concept4 
Most policy analysts in the areas of international trade and economic 
development use the following equation to explain the effective rate of 
protection; see Balassa (1965,1968,1971,1982), Corden (1966,1971,1985), 
Greenaway (1986, 1987, 1988a, 1988b), Lewis (1968), Lutz (1980), Pearson 
(1975), Schweinberger (1975), Siggel (1986), Wipf(1971), Yeats (1976). 
V A ~ ~ -rVAV: V A ~ ~
EPR. = J J = J -1 = EPC. -1 
J rVAV: rVAV: J 
(4.7) 
J J 
The components of value added, either in domestic or world market 
prices, vary from one analyst to another. These variations are due to the way of 
treating of subsidies, taxes, nominal tariffs, the exchange rate and non-traded 
inputs. 
For Corden's original formula for the effective rate of protection for the 




V A ~ ~J 
EPR j 
P ~ ~J 
P ~ ~J 
= Value added per unit ofj in activity j in the absence of tariffs 
= Value added per unit of j in activity j made possible by the tariff Structure 
= Effective protective rate for activity j, in other words, the proportional increase in 
the effective price due to tariffs 
= Nominal price of a unit of j at free trade prices in domestic currency 
= Nominal price of a unit of j at domestic prices 
= The (fixed) number of units of intermediate input i used in the production of one 
unitofj. 
= The share of intennediate input i in the cost of j in the absence of 
tariff 
= The nominal tariff rate of j 
= The nominal tariff rate of i 
Therefore 
4 This section relies heavily on Hassan (1991 ). 
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VAj =Pt - 2:aijPt 
j 
where by definition 
a .. P.W 




VAt =pjd - 2:aijpjd 
j 
=Pt(I+Tj )-2:aijPt(l+Tj ) 
i 
= P . " ' ( I + T . ) - P . " ' ~ ~A .. (I+T.) J J J ~ ~ IJ I 
j 









Practically, it may not be able to observe either world prices or input 
cost shares at those prices (Aij) directly. However, equation (4.15) can be 
rewritten in terms of domestic input cost shares. Noting that, 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
equation (4.14) can be rewritten as 
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(4.18) 
By letting the domestic input cost share be, 
(4.19) 
equation (4.18) can be rewritten as 
(4.20) 
or as, 
1- ~ ~ A ~ . .
EPR.= ~ ~ v -1 
J _1 __ ~ ~ A. _1_ 
1+T. ~ ~ ij 1+T. 
J I 
(4.21) 
Bruno (1972), Krueger (1984), Lewis (1968), Pearson (1975) and 
Siggel (1986) used the fonnula in equation (4.15). Equation (4.21) is the fonn 
used by Greenaway (1988a and 1988b) and Greenaway and Milner (1986 and 
1987). 
4.3.5 : Profitability Coefficient (PC): 
PC = (A- B-C)/(E-F-G)=(DIH) 
or 
PC = private profitability / social profitability 
where 
A: revenue based on private prices 
E: revenue based on social prices 
B: costs of tradable inputs based on private prices 
F: costs of tradable inputs based on social prices 
c: costs of domestic factors based on private prices 
G: costs of domestic factors based on social prices 
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The Profitability Coefficient is the ratio of private to social profits; i.e. 
it measures the incentive effects of all policies considered together. Thus it 
serves as a proxy for the net policy transfer. Although the PC coefficient is 
theoretically more comprehensive than the EPC because it accounts for both 
the tradable and non-tradable cost components, it is an incomplete indicator in 
the case where it has a negative value. It dose not indicate clearly the source of 
this negative value, i.e. whether it is due to a negative value in social or private 
profit, unless the analyst refers back to the original calculations. If the PC is 
greater than one then policy transfers have permitted domestic producers to 
receive a greater profit on their activities given intervention than they would in 
the absence of intervention. A PC equal to one implies that the incentive is 
"neutral"; that is, domestic producers are receiving the same profit as they 
would have achieved at world prices (i.e. profits valued at private and social 
prices are equal). If the PC is negative, the economic indicator becomes 
useless, as it does not indicate the source of this negative value. However, the 
SRP is an alternative economic indicator that sends the same message (greater 
detail is given in Chapter 8). 
4.3.6 : Subsidy Ratio to Producers (SRP): 
SRP = (D- H)/E 
or 
SPR = (private profitability - social profitability) / social revenue 
where: 
D: profits based on private prices 
E: revenue based on social prices 
H: profits based on social prices 
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The Subsidy Ratio to Producers5 is the ratio of the difference between 
private and social profits to the social revenue. It indicates the proportion of 
revenues valued in world prices that would be required if a subsidy or tax were 
substituted for the entire set of commodity and macro economic policies. In 
other words, it quantifies the level of transfers from divergences as a 
proportion of the undistorted value of the system's revenue. A positive 
(negative) value ofSRP implies a producer subsidy (tax). The smaller the SRP, 
the less distorted the agricultural system (see chapter 8 for greater detail). 
4.3.7 : Net Private Profitability (NPP), Net Social Profitability (NSP) and 
Social Cost Benefit (SCD). 
There are other alternative economic indicators to the PCR and the 
DRC that could be derived from the PAM to measure private profitability 
(such as net private profitability (NPP», social profitability (such as net social 
profitability (NSP» and social competitiveness (social cost benefit (SCB». 
The NPP and peR might be considered alternative measures as their way of 
calculation is simply an alternative presentation or transformation of the same 
elements or data involved. Similarly, the DRC and the SCB could be 
considered alternatives measurements. However, Fang and Beghin (2000); 
Masters and Winter Nelson (1995) argue that the SCB might be not biased to 
activities that rely heavily on domestic factors and avoid the errors in 
disaggregating traded and non-traded components. However, the study 
employed both analysis tools to confirm the results obtained (greater detail is 
discussed in chapter 6). 
5SPR is an efficient indicator of incentive, as it allows comparisons of the extent to which all 
policy subsidised agricultural sector Moreover, it can be also classified into components 
transfer to clarify the effect of output, input, and factor policies solely. 
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NPP = private revenue - private tradable costs - private domestic cost 
where: 
A: revenue based on private prices 
B: costs of tradable inputs based on private prices 
C: cost of domestic factors based on private prices 
Net private profitability (NPP) is a direct measure of the incentives to 
fanners to produce a commodity, and reflects the competitiveness of that 
commodity at the observed market prices. A positive NPP implies that the 
commodity system is privately or domestically profitable, given input and 
output prices, technology level, current government policy and existing market 
distortions. 
4.3.7.2 Net Social Profitability 
NSP= E-F-G 
or 
NSP = social revenue - social tradable costs - social domestic cost 
where: 
E: revenue based on social prices 
F: costs of tradable inputs based on social prices 
G: cost of domestic factors based on social prices 
Social profits (H) are an efficiency measure because inputs (F&G) and 
outputs (E) are valued in prices that reflect scarcity values or social 
opportunity costs. Internally traded inputs (F) and outputs (E) are valued at 
world prices - FOB export prices for exportables and elf import prices for 
imported goods and services. In other words, net social profitability (NSP) 
measures revenues valued at social prices less the value of tradable and 
domestic resources both valued at their respective social prices. If NSP is 
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positive (negative), then the sector may be considered economically efficient 
(inefficient), with the value of output at world prices being greater (less) than 
the sum of tradable inputs plus domestic factor costs (Hassan, 1991). 
4.3.7.3 Social Cost Benefit (SCB) 
SCB = (F+G)IE 
or 
SCB = (social tradable cost + social domestic cost) social revenue 
where: 
F: costs of tradable inputs based on social prices 
G: cost of domestic factors based on social prices 
E: revenue based on social prices 
The SCB is defined as traded and non-traded costs divided by total 
revenue both valued at social prices and in PAM notations as (F+G)IE. The 
lower values of SCB indicate stronger competitiveness and vice versa. 
4.4 : PAM manipulation tables 
The Policy Analysis Matrix is an accounting framework that consists of six 
tables; in other words, to complete the entries of the PAM we have to construct 
these six tables, which are identified as follows: 
4.4.1 : Input/output technical coefficients (110) table. 
The Input-Output table (as used in the PAM) contains on the input side the 
coefficients of inputs and factors used for cropping an area of one feddan. For 
example, to grow one feddan of soybean the farmer needs 350 kg and 150 kg 
of nitrogenous and phosphate fertiliser, 40 kg of seeds, and so on. On the 
output side it contains the coefficient of the obtained outputs for main and by-
products. (see Table 4-2). 
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4.4.2 : Private Prices (PP) table. 
For any product (or input), there is a private value at which we observe 
goods and services actually being exchanged in the local market, reflecting 
actual market prices received or paid by farmers, merchants, or processors in 
agricultural system, and it is those which we have used in constructing our 
budgets (for example, the price of soybean, the cost of fuel, the going wage 
rate, etc.) These are also called market or financial prices. In other words, 
observed market prices are used to represent the private values. The observed 
prices of inputs and outputs are tabulated in the corresponding entries in Table 
4-2. 
4.4.3 : Private Budget (PB) table. 
The private budget table is obtained by mUltiplying the input/output 
technical coefficient table by the corresponding values in the private prices 
table. The results obtained in the private budget table are used to complete the 
first row in the policy analysis matrix, For example, it allows us to calculate 
the private revenues, tradable and non-tradable private costs6 and consequently 
private profits (see the shaded cells in Table 4-2). 
4.4.4 : Social Prices (SP) table. 
As noted earlier, social prices, profitability, costs, etc are also required. 
For any tradable product (or input), there is a private price (in the local market) 
and an international price, the latter price often being called the "social" price'. 
6 The basis of differentiating between traded and non-traded inputs is discussed in Chapter 5. 
7 The core point in PAM estimation is the accurate estimation of the equivalent world prices 
for inputs and outputs. Chapter 5 gives full detail for social valuation for PAM required 
entries. 
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TABLE 4-2: INPUT-OUTPUT, PRIVATE PRICES AND PRIVATE BUDGET ESTIMATION FOR SOYBEAN PAM IN 1986 
PllDeut IOu!J!Dt Table Unit 1986 ~ 2 l l Private Prices Table Unit 1986 ~ 3 l l Private BudKet Table Unit 1986 T R ~ % l ' ' I N T R ~ o / . l l l TRY NTRY 
Tradable IDputs Tradable Inputs Tradable Inputs £E/Fed 57.29 57.29 0.00 
1-Fertilisers Nitrogen KglFed 350.00 I-Fertilisers Nitrogen £EIKg 0.07 I-Fertilisers Nitrogen £E/Fed 23.10 1.00 0.00 23.10 0.00 
Phosphate KgfFed 150.00 Phosphate £E/Kg 0.04 Phosphate fE/Fed 6.30 1.00 0.00 6.30 0.00 
Potassium KglFed 0.00 Potassium £E/Fed 0.00 Potassium £E/Fed 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2-Insecticide Unit 1.00 2-1 nsecticUle £E/Kg 10.71 2-1nsecticide £E/Fed 10.71 1.00 0.00 10.71 0.00 
3-See4 On Farm KglFed 0.00 3-Seed OnFann £E/Kg 0.00 3-Seed On Farm £E/Fed 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Off Farm KglFed 40.00 OffFann £E/Kg 0.43 Off Farm £E/Fed 17.18 1.00 0.00 17.18 0.00 
Domestic Fac:ton Domestic: Facton Domestic: Facton £E/Fed 282.13 18.30 263.83 
I-lAbour I-lAbour I-lAbour 
Miln DaylFed 32.00 Miln £E/Day 4.30 Miln £E/Fed 137.60 0.00 1.00 0.00 137.60 
Boy DaylFed 12.00 Boy £E/Day 2.15 Boy fE/Fed 25.80 0.00 1.00 0.00 25.80 
2-Macltinery lAnd Prep. HrsIFed 4.10 2-M1zchinery lAndPrep. £E/fIr 3.80 2-Macltinery Land Prep. £E/Fed 15.58 0.30 0.70 4.67 10.91 
irrigation HrsIFed 19.01 irrigation £E/fIr 1.00 irrigation £E/Fed 19.01 0.21 0.79 3.99 15.02 
Pest Control HrsIFed 0.85 Pest Control £E/fIr 2.00 Pest Control £E/Fed 1.70 0.50 0.50 0.85 0.85 
Harvest&Thresh HrsIFed 2.75 Harvest &Thresh £E/fIr 4.30 Harvest&Thresh £E/Fed 11.83 0.53 0.47 6.27 5.56 
Transportation HrsIFed 2.10 Transportation £E/fIr 4.00 Transportation £E/Fed 8.40 0.30 0.70 2.52 5.88 
Compiler HrsIFed 0.00 Compiler £ElfIr 0.00 Compiler £E/Fed 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 
3-Manure Ld/Fed 100.01 3-Manure £E/Ld 0.16 3-Mllnure £E/Fed 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 15.60 
4-Water lOOOM3 2.50 4-Water £E/M3 0.00 4-Water £E/Fed 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.00 
5-Animal Work Cow DaylFed 0.17 5-Animal Work Cow £E/Day 3.85 5-Animal Work Cow £E/Fed 0.65 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.65 
Can DaYlFed 0.00 Can £E/Day 0.00 Can £E/Fed 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Camel DaylFed 0.00 Camel £E/Day 0.00 Camel £E/Fed 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
6-OtJrers £E/Fed 6-Others £E/Fed 17.60 6-Others £E/Fed 17.60 0.00 1.00 0.00 17.60 
7-lAnd Fed 1.00 7-lAnd £E/Fed 28.36 7-lAnd £E/Fed 28.36 0.00 1.00 0.00 28.36 
Yield Yield Yield 456.00 
Main Product TonlFed 1.22 Main Produc:t £E/Ton 375.00 Main Product £E/Fed 456.00 
B;t Produc:t TonIFed 0.00 B;t Product £E/Ton 0.00 By Product £E/Fed 
(1) Table 1 numerates input-output coefficients for soybean production in 1986. (2) Table 2 numerates domestic or observed prices for soybean-input costs and output prices in 1986. 
0.00 
(3) Table 3, colunm (3) is derived as follows: Table 1 column (3) X Table 2 cohmm (3). (4) Table 3, column (3) is desegregated into column 6 (Tradable Value) and colunm 7 (Non-Tradable Value) according to the ratios shown in colunms 4 and 5 
• In onkr to estimate the PAM entry cells B and C, it is essential to separate the costs of inputs and factors into their tradable and non-tradable (domestic) components. To do this step the study relied on the assumption that costs of fertilisers, 
pesticides and seeds are 100"10 tradable, while for labour, manure and animal work are 1 00"10 non-tradable. For the tradable and non-tradable proportion costs of machinery, the study relied on its own estimate for land preparation and irrigation, while 
formacbinery cost items and water the study adopted the proportions used by other studies such as Yao (1997a) and FAO (1999). 
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Social prices are the prices which would prevail in the absence of any policy 
distortions (such as taxes and subsidies) or market failures (such as 
monopolies). They reflect the value to society as a whole rather than to private 
individuals, and are the values used in economic analysis. Such prices 
sometimes called shadow prices, efficiency values or opportunity costs (see 
Table 4-3). 
4.4.5 Social Budget (SB) table. 
The same procedure is used as in the private budget table, but here we use 
social values. The Social Budget table is calculated by mUltiplying the 
input/output technical coefficient table by the appropriate social prices. The 
result of the social budget is entered the second row in the policy analysis 
matrix, and allows us to calculate the social revenues, tradable and non-
tradable social costs and consequently social revenues (see the shaded cells in 
Table 4-3). 
4.4.6 PAM table. 
Input - Output, Private Prices, Private Budget, Social Prices and Social 
Budget tables are formed in linked spreadsheets to obtain the result for any 
change in any of these tables simultaneously. There are however yet more 
tables or models used in estimating social price tables (as will be discussed in 
Chapter 5). 
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TABLE 4-3: INPUT -OUTPUT, SOCIAL PRICES AND SOCIAL BUDGET ESTIMATION FOR SOYBEAN PAM IN 1986 
~ 4 l I n e u t t /Ou!Eut Table Unit 1986 !5l Social Prices Table Unit 1986 I ~ ~ Social Budset Table I Unit 1986 I TR!'Yel I NTR!'Ye21 TRV I NTRV 
Tradable Inputs Tradable Inputs Tradable Inputs fE / Fed 95.79 95.79 0.00 
I-Fertilisers Nitrogen KglFed 350.00 I-Fertilisers Nitrogen £E/Kg 0.07 I-Fertilisers Nitrogen £E / Fed 24.60 1.00 0.00 24.60 0.00 
Phosphate KglFed 150.00 Phosphate fE/Kg 0.12 Phosphate £E / Fed 17.40 1.00 0.00 17.40 0.00 
Potassium KglFed 0 .00 Potassium £E / Fed 0.12 Potassium fE / Fed 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2-lnsecticide Unit 1.00 2-lnsectidth £E / Kg 20.66 2-lnsectidde £E / Fed 20.66 1.00 0.00 20.66 0.00 
J-Seed On Farm KglFed 0.00 J-Seed On Farm £E / Kg 3-Sud On Farm £E / Fed 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OfT Farm Kg/Fed 40.00 Off Farm £E / Kg 0.83 OfT Farm £E / Fed 33.13 1.00 0.00 33.13 0.00 
Domestic: FactOR Domestic FactOR Domestic Factors £E / Fed 396.52 34.98 361.54 
I-lAbour I-lAbour I-lAbour 
MIlII DaylFed 32.00 Mall £E / Day 4.30 MIlII £E / Fed 137.60 0.00 1.00 0.00 137.60 
Boy DaylFed 12.00 Boy £E / Day 2.15 Boy £E / Fed 25.80 0.00 1.00 0.00 25.80 
l-Machillery lAnd Prep. HrsIFed 4 .10 2-Machillery ulIIdPrep. £E/Rr 4.84 2-Machinery lAnd Prep. £E / Fed 19.83 0.30 0.70 5.95 13.88 
irrigation HrsIFed 19.01 irrigation fE / Rr 1.66 irrigation £E / Fed 31.48 0.21 0.79 6.61 24.87 
Pest Control HrsIFed 0.85 Pest Control £E / Rr 3.86 Pest Control £E / Fed 3.28 0.50 0.50 1.64 1.64 
Harvest&Thresh HrsIFed 2.75 Harvest &Thresh £E / Rr 8.29 Harvest &Thresh £E / Fed 22.81 0.53 0.47 12.09 10.72 
Transponation HrsIFed 2.10 Transponation £E/Rr 4.84 Transponation £E / Fed 10.16 0.30 0.70 3.05 7.11 
Compiler HrsIFed 0.00 Compiler £E/Rr 0.00 Compiler £E / Fed 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 
3-Mllllure Ld / Fed 100.01 3-MJzllure £E / Ld 0.1 6 3-Mllllure fE / Fed 15.60 0.00 1.00 0.00 15.60 
4-Wllter IOOOMJ 2.50 4-Wllter £E/MJ 11.30 ~ - W l l t e r r £E/Fed 28.24 0.20 0.80 5.65 22.59 
S-Allimlll Work Cow DaylFed 0.17 5-Animlll Work Cow fE / Day 3.85 5-AIlimIll Work Cow £E / Fed 0.65 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.65 
Cart DaylFed 0.00 Cart £E / Day 0.00 Cart £E / Fed 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Camel DaylFed 0.00 Camel £E / Day 0.00 Camel £E / Fed 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
~ h e r s s £ElFed 6-OtJIers fE / Fed 17.60 6-OtJIers fE/Fed 17.60 0.00 1.00 0.00 17.60 
7-lAlld Fed 1.00 7-Ltznd fE / Fed 83.48 7-lAlld £E / Fed 83.48 0.00 1.00 0.00 83.48 
Yield Yield Yield 398.39 
Main Product TonlFed 1.22 Main Product £E / Ton 327.62 Main Product £E / Fed 398.39 
B:l:Prodact TonlFed 0.00 B:l:Product £E / Ton 0.00 B:l:Produd £E / Fed 0.00 
(1) Table 4 numerates input-output coefficients for soybean production in 1986. 
(2) Table 5 numerates social or world prices for soybean-input costs and output prices in 1986. 
(3) Table 6, column (3) is derived as follows: Table 4 column (3) x Table 5 column (3). 
(4) Table 6, column (3) is desegregated into column 6 (Tradable Value) and column 7 (Non-Tradable Value) according to the ratios shown in columns 4 and 5. 
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4.5 : A Numerical Example 
After collecting or computing entries for the first and second rows, the 
final step is to assemble this information inside the matrix. Table 4-4 shows the 
policy analysis matrix for soybean in 1986. 
The first thing we notice is that, with a private profit of 116 £ElFed, 
this commodity is profitable. However, we also see from cell H that it lacks 
comparative advantage, and as such imposes a net drain on the economy. For 
every feddan planted of soybeans, the country loses 95 £E. 
TABLE 4-4: THE SOYBEAN PAM IN 1986 
Soybean PAM Revenues Costs Profits Tradable Non Tradable 
Privatel Domestic Prices (A) (B) (C) (0) 456 76 264 116 
Social I World Prices (E) (F) (G) (H) 398 131 362 -95 
Divergence (I) (J) (K) (L) 58 -55 -98 111 
This sector is unlikely· to survive without receiving policy-induced 
transfers. The soybean price is 456 £E, which is greater than the world price of 
398 £E, suggesting that the government has raised the price to domestic 
growers. We see from the profit divergence in cell L, that there is an overall 
net subsidy of 211 £E for every feddan planted with soybean. In other words, 
there is a flow from the economy as a whole into this commodity sector as a 
result of policy. 
Further analysis could be carried out using the PAM including what 
economists call "comparative static" or "partial budgeting" analysis. This 
involves asking "what if' questions and simulating certain changes in policies 
that impact upon the parameters used, and therefore on profitability and 
comparative advantage (Sellen, 2002). Simulation can be applied by adjusting 
the parameters. For example, if cheaper imports were allowed to enter, private 
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revenue would drop to 398 £E (where A=E), and private profits would then fall 
to 58 £E. This would have a significant consequence for the industry as the net 
private profit of planting soybean would fall by 50%. Further analysis could be 
easily done by eliminating subsidy on tradable inputs such as fertiliser, 
removing the tax on fuel, liberalising land rent market, etc. However, the 
PAM can also give an insight into the producing sector by estimating 
indicators of efficiency and protection as will be discussed in the following 
section 
Constructing the PAM requires a massive effort and time to meet its 
data requirements. The most important part is the evaluation of social prices 
for a credible exchange rate, tradable and non-tradable inputs and output. All 
these issues will be discussed in Chapter S. 
4.6 : Applications of the PAM: 
Since its development the Policy Analysis Matrix has been widely used 
by academics, practitioners and international organisations such as the United 
Nations, Agricultural Policy Support Services (e.g. Ibrahim, 1993 and FAO, 
1999) and the World Bank (e.g. Sellon, 2001), and in a wide range of 
applications across developing and transition economies (e.g. Bozik et aI., 
2000 and Michalek, 1995). 
The PAM was also used in Indonesia (Nelson and Panggabean, 1991), 
Tunisia (Abdelkafi, 1998) and more recently in South Africa (Krabbe et aI., 
2000 and Joubert, 2000) to investigate commercial sugar production. For 
Thailand and Jamaica, Farell (1990) evaluated the economic impact of an 
export diversification programme Jamaica and Yao (1997a, 1997b, 1997c and 
1999) has applied the PAM to investigate both rice production and the Thai 
agricultural diversification policy in 1994-96. In North West Asia, Al-Habbab 
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et aI., (1996) used the PAM to measure the comparative advantage of using the 
new cropping pattern technologies in producing tomato crops in the Jordan 
valley, while Kubrursi (2001) studied the potential of the Lebanese agricultural 
sectors. In China, Fang et aI., (2000) used the PAM in estimating the 
comparative advantage of the agricultural sector. 
Two separate studies for Ethiopia (Winter-Nelson, 1997 and Ayele, 
1999) also applied the PAM. The first investigated the effects of rural taxation 
policy during 1981-89 on household sales and purchases of agricultural 
products as well as of direct taxes, while the second studied the profitability 
and the consequent economic returns from adopting the VertisolS innovation 
for both fann and household levels. 
The PAM has increasingly been applied by analysts to commodity 
systems, such as dairies (Staal et aI., 1994, for Kenya; Finan, 1991 for 
Portugal), the food market sector (in Tanzania, Mbiha, 1993 and Sudan, 
Gumaa et aI., 1994), on maize production technologies in Cameroon (Adesina 
et aI., 1998), on fanns producing a range of commodities or crops (El Gendy, 
1999, Omran, 1997 and Ghounem, 2000), investment, as in Cupo (1994), on 
evaluating cattle and wildlife ranch profits in Zimbabwe (Kreuter, 1994). The 
PAM had also been reviewed by many economists such as Ellis (1996), 
Lofchie (1996), Thorbecke (1990). 
Unlike the majority of the studies, where the PAM is restricted to a 
single year, there is a more recent set of studies that have constructed the PAM 
over a period of years in Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia, such as Ivanova et aI., 
(2000), Czyzewski et a1. (2000) and Bozik et a1. (2000). 
8 Vertisols are fertile soils that support the majority of livestock and human population in 
Ethiopia. 
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There are other practitioners who tried to extend the PAM. For 
example, Morrison and Balcombe (2002) provided an indicative example as to 
how policy analysis can be conducted more systematically using existing 
secondary data in association with bootstrapping techniques. Kydd et aI., 
(1997) extended the PAM to incorporate the environmental costs and benefits 
of resource use. 
Constructing the PAM tables (in which private prices are compiled and 
social prices are estimated for inputs and outputs) requires the practitioner to 
be very cautious and careful in the way that the estimates are obtained. For 
example, one of the studies that used the PAM approach (Mangisoni, 2000) 
referred the obtained negative DRC results for maize (-0.30) and beans (-0.28) 
(the sectors under investigation) to the negative value obtained from social 
valuation of their domestic costs. The case that is completely nonsense simply 
because in practice there is not any domestic or social valuation for any type of 
costs with negative value. However, the issue of estimating the equivalent 
social (world) prices for tradable and non-tradable inputs and outputs will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
4.7 : PAM strengths and weakness 
The policy analysis matrix as a quantitative tool for policy advice has, 
as many other models, its strengths and weaknesses or limitations. The most 
common advantages are: (1) it makes it possible to detect the net effect of 
policy applied; (2) it is very suitable for production and efficiency analysis; (3) 
it allows the analyst to compute important coefficients related to the level of 
protection as well as comparative advantage; (4) the PAM results can be used 
between different types of firms, regions, and products; (5) it provides a 
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valuable framework to measure the efficiency of agricultural systems and sub 
sectors in particularly. 
The PAM is able to identify, in an approximate fashion, which of a 
country's existing portfolio of commodity systems is likely to be negatively or 
positively affected by policy reforms in terms of income and viability for the 
individuals in the system. 
Its weakness lies in three main points. First, it is a static partial 
equilibrium analysis model. This means that it does not allow for dynamic feed 
back in the system, e.g. it does not model increased productivity over time. Nor 
does the comparative advantage analysis integrate feedback in a general 
equilibrium sense, e.g. it does not capture the effect of increased production in 
one sector on the demand for land, and thus on rent levels. Second, the use of 
world prices as main set of reference prices. In some instances the international 
prices themselves are the result of market intervention in the trading country. 
For example, the international price of cotton may be biased downward due to 
farm support or export subsidy policies in the originating market. But on the 
other hand, international prices are taken as "references" for tradable inputs, 
goods and services because they reflect their alternative value to the local 
economy. If local consumers and producers could pay prices that excluded all 
effects of local market interventions, quantitative restrictions local taxes or 
trade duties, licensing requirements, overvalued currencies, then they would 
pay the local equivalent of international prices, adjusted for transport and 
market margins (see Taskok, 1989 and Salinger, 2001). 
Results of simulations are dependent on estimated parameters, which 
are usually based on data for one year or a few years. This implies that we can 
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not estimate standard errors for the parameters. To overcome this limitation a 
sensitivity analysis can be applied as in Yao (1997b), Omran (1997) and EI-
Guendy et aI., (1999). That is, changing the values of certain parameters and 
observing how that affects the calculated indicators. 
Concerning the assumption that world prices can be used as reference 
prices, as mentioned earlier because world prices represent the government's 
choice to allow consumers and producers to export, import, or even produce 
domestic goods and services. In addition, world prices are the prices that the 
country under concern has to face however, it is either impossible to measure 
how much the international prices (reference prices) are distorted or to detect 
the value of governments non-efficiency. 
4.8 : Summary and Conclusions 
In a context in which the framework of economic policy is changing 
radically, the policy analysis matrix (PAM) provided a relatively 
straightforward logical framework for policy analysis, one from which a range 
of ''policy indicators" may be estimated. Three sets of indicators are of most 
interest to policy analysts, first; measures of private and social comparative 
advantage (pCR and DRC); second, measures of protection (NPCO, NPCI and 
EPC); and third, measures of net transfers (pC and SRP). 
In this chapter, we have demonstrated the theoretical methodology of 
the PAM along with a detailed illustration for PAM tables (Input-Output table, 
Private Prices table, Private Budget table, Social Prices table, Social Budget 
table and finally the PAM table) that allows the analyst to obtain the PAM's 
first and second rows entries. Furthermore, a numerical example for soybean in 
1986 is derived to show the reader how the PAM works. Also, the advantage 
and critics of using the PAM are addressed. 
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Social Valuation for Inputs and Outputs 
Chapter V: Estimation of Social Prices for Traded and Non-
Traded Inputs & Outputs 
5.1 : Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, the term social price is used by PAM analysts. As 
for any tradable product (or input), there is a private price (in the local market) 
and an international price. The latter price is often called the "social" price 
because it is the price that the country concerned has to face in the 
international market, beyond the control of domestic policies. Therefore, the 
term social profitability is not in terms of welfare but in terms of international 
prices (Yao, 1997a). 
The estimation of social prices for both factor inputs and commodities 
is one of the most important and difficult tasks in PAM construction. To 
proceed with this issue, we classify inputs and outputs into traded and non-
traded items. Chart 5-1 illustrates tradable and non-tradable production input 
costs for agricultural products. Tradable inputs mainly include fertiliser 
(nitrogenous, phosphates and potash), machinery (tractors, tubewells, 
harvesters and combines), pesticides and seeds, while, non-tradable factor 
inputs include manure, animal work, water, labour and land. 
Tradable summer crop outputs in this study are cotton, maize, sugar 
cane, rice, soybean and niH potato. Winter outputs are wheat, broad bean, 
tomato and long and short berseem 1• 
I Berseem is the Egyptian clover: long berseem grows for the entire winter season, while short 
berseem grows for only part of the winter season. 
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CHART 5-1: THE STRUCTURE OF CROP PRODUCTION COSTS NEEDED FOR THE 
P AM MANIPULATION 
Crop Production Costs 
I 
I I 
Tradable Input Costs Domestic Factor Costs 
- Fertiliser r- Labour 
- Machinery used in: 
--l Potassium 
~ ~ Nitrogen 
-
Land preparation 
"-i Phosphates H Planting 
- Insecticide ~ ~ Irrigation 
""- Seeds 





.... Animal Work 
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According to the above classification, the second step to calculate the 
social prices for traded/non-traded inputs and commodities correctly, where 
world prices are used for traded inputs and commodities, whereas the 
opportunity cost approach is used for non-traded inputs and factors. 
In order to compare prices precisely on an equal basis it is necessary 
that two important points have been satisfied; first, the commodities under 
consideration are comparable. In most cases, some deductions or additions for 
prices recorded on domestic and world markets are required to refer valuations 
at a specific location and in a specific form. Consequently, a precise account 
for transport, handling and marketing costs is required. Also, adequate 
allowance must be made to compensate for any differences in quality. Second, 
it is also important that the commodities are compared at the same location, 
and to satisfy this condition2 we have to work back from world prices to obtain 
a price that is comparable to farm gate prices. These reference prices are called 
export or import parity prices (border prices adjusted for domestic transport 
and marketing costs to the point of production or consumption) (Byerlee and 
Morris, 1993). Consequently, it is important that a free market or shadow 
exchange rate is used to convert world prices of traded commodities and inputs 
into local currency. 
In this Chapter, section 2 clarifies the theoretical procedure of 
estimating export and import parity world prices (reference prices) of tradable 
inputs and commodities at the farm gate level. Section 3 gives an overview of 
the different strategies and ways of estimating the shadow exchange rate (SER) 
to convert the world price of inputs and outputs into domestic currency units in 
2 We can either work back from world prices or work forward from farm prices. 
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order to achieve a correct import or export parity price. Three main alternative 
ways of evaluating the SER are of particular interest: the first way is where the 
premium on foreign exchange is key; the second way, where the standard 
conversion factor is key; and the third where the real exchange rate is adjusted 
for foreign currency inflation. This section also gives an overview of the 
Egyptian foreign exchange market, in which three periods are discussed. The 
first period is before the liberalisation of foreign exchange in May 1987, where 
the interbank foreign exchange market was organised into two pools; the 
second period, from May 1987 until February 1991, was characterised by the 
continuous devaluation of the central bank pool exchange rate from £E 0.7 to 
the U.S dollar to £E 3 by the end of 1990; and the third period runs from 
February 1991 to the present day, where a single free exchange market exists 
for the Egyptian pound. Moreover, a detailed empirical estimation of the 
Egyptian shadow exchange rate is carried out in this section. Sections 4 
discusses in detail an empirical valuation of social prices of cotton and wheat 
at the farm gate level (as examples for the main Egyptian exportable and 
importable crops respectively). Section 5 describes the valuation of social 
prices for traded input factors such as fertilisers and seeds. Section 6 discusses 
the methods used in estimating the opportunity cost of non-traded main 
agriCUltural inputs such as land, labour, irrigation water, animal work and 
manure. In addition, this section highlights the particular policies that affected 
land rent before and after the 1986 agricultural reform policy regime. The 
social valuation of machinery including tractors and water pumps is discussed 
in detail in section 7. 
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5.2 : Social valuation of tradable inputs/commodities 
In this study we will evaluate prices at domestic fann gate level. Data 
on these however are unavailable and must be estimated (see, for example, 
Scanizzo and Bruce, 1980; Gittinger, 1982). Charts 5-2 and 5-3 illustrate the 
way of estimating the world prices of tradable factor inputs or commodities at 
the fann gate level. Chart 5-2 is used in the case of exported commodities or 
inputs, while chart 5-3 is used for imported ones. 
To obtain the reference price for exported products (Le. the export 
parity price), the process is to subtract (i) costs incurred in shipping from 
Alexandria3 to the foreign port of destination, (ii) the costs of shipping from 
the milVginlfactory to Alexandria and (iii) the cost of transport from the farm 
gate to the milVginlfactory. For import parity price, the procedure is to import 
the commodity to Alexandria by adding all the required costs to import the 
commodity from world market at port of destination to Alexandria then to 
milVfactory/gin and then to the farm gate level. 
Before proceeding with the scheme, it is necessary for the practitioner 
to be cautious in estimating the appropriate exchange rate to convert the world 
price of inputs and outputs into domestic currency units in order to obtain a 
correct import or export parity price. The exchange rate must not undervalue or 
overvalue the domestic currency; otherwise it will overstate or understate the 
value of the commodity being considered in the domestic economy. 
Once the proper exchange rate is determined, the analyst may use it to 
value the prices of imports and exports so that domestic prices for various 
commodities can be compared with their equivalents in the world markets. 
3 Alexandria is considered one of the main ports in Egypt. 
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CHART 5-2: ESTIMATION OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE 
W orId Price at Port of Destination 
- I + 
Quality Factor 
= 
Adjusted W orId Price 
Freight & Insurance 




Border Price at Alexandria Port 
Transport from Port & Market Margins 
= 
Price at Mill / Factory / Gin 
Processing Margins and Transport From Farm 




-I World Price at Farm Gate I . 
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CHART 5-3: ESTIMATION OF IMpORT PARITY PRICE 
World Price (FOB) 
+ I 
Quality Adjustment 
Adjusted World Price 
+ 
Freight & Insurance & Trans. Costs 
World Price at Port, Alexandria 
* 
Exchange Rate 
Border Price at Port, Alexandria 
+ 
Transport & Market Margins 
Price at Mill/ Factory/ Gin 
(if needed before domestic sale) 
Processing Margins & Transport to Farm 
= I Price before Mill / Factory/ Gin I 
* 
Conversion Allowance 
I World Price at Fann Gate I 
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5.3 : Valuation of the Shadow Exchange Rate (SER). 
5.3.1 : Introduction 
As argued above, the official exchange rate can not be used simply 
because it might undervalue or overvalue the domestic currency due to 
government intervention, and consequently might overstate or understate the 
value of the commodity being considered to the domestic economy. So, there 
is a strong need to estimate an appropriate exchange rate that reflects the real 
value of the domestic currency, in other words, the shadow exchange rate. 
Once an appropriate exchange rate is determined, the analyst may use it 
to value the prices of imports and exports so that domestic prices for various 
commodities can be compared with their equivalents in the world markets. 
The issue then focuses on what is the appropriate exchange rate? In 
addition, the following issues are also pertinent: (1) what rate is to be used in 
converting world prices into domestic currency for social valuation? (2) Given 
that there are a nwnber of possible ways to estimate the shadow exchange rate 
which is most appropriate; that is, which best reflects the opportunity cost of 
foreign exchange? 
5.3.2 : The foreign exchange rate 
The exchange rate here is defined as the nwnber of units of domestic currency 
per unit of foreign currency. The willingness of local conswners to obtain 
foreign currency (in order to buy imports or invest abroad), and the desire of 
local export suppliers, as well as foreign investors, to convert their foreign 
currency into local currency, are the main reasons for the presence of the 
exchange rate market. 
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5.3.3 : Exchange rate strategies. 
There are three main alternative types of exchange rate strategy, 
classified according to the degree of governmental intervention in the 
exchange rate market. 
5.3.3.1 : Floating or freely fluctuating 
There is where the market-determined price fluctuates in line with 
changes in demand or supply of foreign exchange. Under such a regime, 
changes in the exchange rate play a key role in adjustments in the levels of 
exports, imports, and international capital movements. Where this system 
operates freely, there is no need to estimate a shadow exchange rate. 
5.3.3.2 : The fIXed exchange rate4 
The fixed exchange rate is the second type of exchange rate regime, in 
which there is a high degree of governmental intervention where the nominal 
value of exchange rate is determined. Typically, the local currency is tied or 
(pegged) to either one foreign currencY; usually the one in which most of 
country's foreign exchange transactions take place or to a basket of currencies 
according to the importance of the embodied foreign currencies in the 
country's international transactions. This type of exchange rate policy may lead 
to an over/under valued exchange rate due to the structural imbalance that may 
occur in the case where the country does not readjust it to correspond to 
sustained changes in the balance of demand and supply for foreign exchange. 
In other word, it should be re-evaluated in order not to insulate the economy 
from market forces. 
.. This type of regime is adopted in most developing countries and centrally planned 
economies. 
5 The U.S dollar is the currency that is often chosen as the reference point for fixed rate 
regimes; it is also weighted heavily in most currency baskets. 
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When the exchange rate overvalues domestic currency, exporters 
receive in domestic currency less than they would have received at a higher 
benchmark rate, and importers pay less in domestic currency than they would 
have paid at the same higher benchmark rate. In other word, overvaluation of 
the exchange rate acts as an implicit tax on exports and an implicit subsidy on 
imports (Taskok, 1990). 
5.3.3.3 : The crawling-peg or the adjustable-peg 
The crawling-peg or the adjustable-peg regime is the third type of 
exchange rate policy. This type is a mixture of the first and second type 
regimes, in that it combines the policy and anti-fluctuation controls embodied 
in the second and the market clearing adjustments of the first. In other words, 
the crawling-peg regime is a system in which the government announces a 
schedule of weekly or monthly changes in the rate to follow the expected 
movements in the exchange rate market that would have obtained if the rate 
had been allowed to float, but maintains the announced rate in the interim 
period. 
If the country's foreign exchange market is distorted (for example by 
governmental policies), then the official exchange rate (OER) may not fully 
reflect the opportunity cost of foreign exchange, and thus the obtained border 
price will not be free of the distortions induced by the country's foreign 
exchange market. If this is so, a shadow exchange rate (SER) should be used 
instead. Hence, where the exchange rate strategies of a fixed rate or a crawling 
peg are adopted, a shadow exchange rate must be calculated. 
The policy analyst must select the exchange rate that best reflects the 
opportunity cost of foreign exchange use in valuing imports and exports prices, 
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so that various commodities can be properly compared with their equivalents 
in the world markets. 
5.3.4 : Alternative ways of SER estimation. 
A theoretical approach, along with some of the practical and applied 
calculations, are discussed by Bacha and Taylor (1971), Little and Mirrlees 
(1974), Squire and Vander Tak (1975), Gittinger (1982), Taskok (1990), 
Ibrahiem (1993), Idris (1993) and Omran (1997). 
There are two main ways to estimate the SER, the first of which can be 
applied using two different formulae (one is the reciprocal of the other), so that 
they are quite similar in their estimated values. Both use data on the value of 
imports, the value of exports, import duties (customs duties, import charges), 
export duties and taxes. The second way accounts for inflation. Both 
approaches are discussed in greater detail, along with an empirical example, in 
the following section. 
5.3.4.1 : Theftrst way: 
5.3.4.1.1 : First Formula (Foreign Exchange Premium). 
The first step in estimating the shadow exchange rate is to calculate the 
foreign exchange premium. According to Gittenger (1982), <The need to 
determine the foreign exchange premium arises because in many countries, as 
a result of national trade polices (including tariffs on imported goods and 
subsidies on exports), people pay a premium on traded goods. This premium is 
not adequately reflected when the prices of traded goods are converted to the 
domestic currency equivalent at the official exchange rate '. In other words, the 
premium measures the additional amount that traded goods users are willing to 
pay in order to have one more unit of these traded good. 
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The premium on the exchange rate can be calculated as follows 
(Omran, 1997): 
Premium on Exchange Rate = 
Proportion legal x (X) + Proportion informal x (Y) 
x = (Value of imports +Value of exports + Import duties + Export duties) 
(Value of imports + Value of exports) 
Informal market rate y=--------




But because the proportion of informal trade can not be detected, the 
assumption must be made that the informal proportion equals zero and the 
legal proportion equals one, i.e. that there is no smuggling to avoid custom 
duties. Then the premium on exchange rate will be: 
Premium on foreign exchange ($) = 
Value of (imports + exports) + Import duties+Export duties (5.4) 
Value of (imports + exports) 
By applying the premium to traded goods, we are able to compare the 
values of traded and non-traded goods by the gauge of opportunity cost or 
willingness to pay. 
The second step is to calculate the SER using the following formula6, 
Shadow Exchange Rate = (1 +Premium on foreign exchange) x OER (5.5) 
5.3.4.1.2 : Second Formula (Standard Conversion Factor). 
The second formula allows the estimation of the SER using the 
Standard Conversion Factor (SCF) approach (Squire et.al, 1975; Taskok, 
1990). The SCF is defined as the ratio of the official exchange rate to the 
shadow exchange rate, thus: 
6 This fonnula bas been used by various World Bank projects and the UNIDO Guidelines 
(1972a). 
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The SCF is then calculated by using this estimated premium, or alternatively 
using the following fonnula{FAO, 1993 and 1999): 
(5.9) 
where 
M = CIF value of imports x = FOB value of exports 
T M = Average tax rate on imports T x = Average tax rate on exports 
5.3.4.2 : The Second Way: 
The second way to calculate the shadow exchange rate is to adjust the 
real exchange rate for inflation; the foreign currency may lose or gain some 
purchasing power during the same period and therefore, its cost has to be 
adjusted accordingly. This adjustment can be calculated by three alternative 
formulae; the first, according to lbrahiem (1993), takes the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) as the measure of inflation, and thus the first step of the 
calculation is: 






= Official exchange rate 
= Consumer price index of world 
= Domestic consumer price index 
= Year (t) 
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The second formula, used in many studies, such as Balassa (1990), 
Cottani et al. (1990), and Edwards (1988 and 1990), employs the U.S price 
index (WPIUS) as a proxy for the foreign currency price index and the 
domestic as the proxy for the domestic price index (CPID). Thus, 




The third formula, used by Ghei and Steven (1999), takes the U.S 
producer price index (PPIUS) as a proxy for the foreign currency price index 
and CPID as the proxy for the domestic price index. 
Then, 
(PPIUS) 
Real Exchange Rate = OER x t 
t t CPID 
t 
(5.12) 
The above formula computes the real cost of one unit of foreign exchange by 
allowing for domestic and external inflation. 
In most countries foreign trade is taxed, and in many countries import 
and export taxes are important sources of governmental revenues. Foreign 
trade taxation is also an important instrument for adjusting the exchange rate. 
For example, an import tax makes imports more expensive and thus exchange 
rate increases. The overall taxation policy on foreign trade results in an 
effective exchange rate that is different from the nominal and real exchange 
rate (lbrahiem, 1993). This difference, which can be considered as a premium 
attached by the government to foreign currencies, can be estimated using the 
formula presented in equation (5.4) Then, 
The Real Effective Exchange Rate = Real exchange rate x Premium on 
exchange rate. (5.13) 
However, all of the above ways of estimating the shadow exchange rate 
are alternatives, and the analyst has to choose which approach to follow, taking 
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into account the availability and accuracy of the data needed for such 
calculations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)7, Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (F AO)8 and the United Nations statistics9 are the main sources of 
data for this estimation. 
5.3.5 : The Egyptian Foreign Exchange Market: An overview 
5.3.5.1 : Introduction 
The foreign exchange market in Egypt has been subjected to different degrees 
of governmental influence since its liberalisation on October 8, 1991. These 
stages can be classified into three main periods; the first before the start of the 
economic reform policy and the liberalisation of the exchange market in May 
1987, the second between May 1987 and February 1991, and the third after 
February 1991 (Mongardini, 1998). The following discussion portrays the 
main policies and features of these important stages in the Egyptian foreign 
exchange market. 
5.3.5.2 : First period: Before liberalisation of May 1987. 
The interbank foreign exchange market was organised into two pools before 
May 1987. The first pool, known as the Central Bank pool, was concerned 
with exports of cotton, rice, Suez Canal dues and petroleum, and with imports 
of essential foodstuffs such as wheat, wheat flour, edible oils, tea, and sugar. It 
also handled insecticides and fertilisers and most public sector capital 
transactions. The second pool, known as the commercial bank pool, was 
concerned with the proceeds of worker remittances, tourism and non-central 
7 Such as, The Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, The International Financial 
Statistics Yearbook and The Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook. 
8 Such as, Trade Yeubook. 
9 Such as, The National Accounts Studies of the ESCW A Region. 
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bank pool exports, in addition to providing the foreign exchange for any public 
sectors payments not covered by the Central Bank pool. Both rates were 
heavily influenced by government intervention and did not reflect market 
forces. 
Central bank pool transactions were mainly at the official exchange rate 
of £E 0.7 per U.S dollar, but certain aid programmes and bilateral agreement 
transactions were treated at other rates. For transactions in the non-bank free 
market lO exchange rates were negotiated by the parties to the transactions. 
5.3.5.3 : Second period: From May 1987 till February 1991 
A new bank foreign exchange market was introduced on May 11 1987, 
run by a committee so as to reflect supply and demand conditions, where all 
authorised commercial banks, two travel agencies and a limited number of 
private sector fIrms were allowed to operate. On the supply side, the new bank 
market relied for resources mainly on workers remittances, the sale of foreign 
bank notes and travellers' cheques, tourist expenditure, as well as private and 
specified public sector export earnings. On the payment side, it was allowed to 
save foreign exchange for all private imports and specified public sector 
transactions, all other transactions being financed by either the central bank 
pool or the own exchange accounts market. 
The central bank pool rate was devalued a number of times during this 
period. For example, on August 15, 1989, the rate was increased from £E 0.7 
to £E 1.1 to the U.S dollar. On July 1, 1990 the central bank pool rate was 
10 This market was formally illegal but officially tolerated in which it shared sources of 
exchange supply along with the commercial bank pool through worker remittances and 
tourism. Also, this market satisfied the demand of the private sector for foreign exchange. 
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changed again to £E 2.0 to the U.S dollar and by the end of 1990 reached £E 
3.0 to the U.S dollar. 
5.3.5.4 : Third period: post February 1991 
The multiple exchange rate system that operated ceased on February 
27, 1991, and was replaced by a temporary dual exchange system that 
embodied a primary market and a secondary (free) market. This dual system 
was intended to operate for one year, whereafter it was to be unified. The 
unification process happened on October 8, 1991 and since then a single free 
exchange market has operated for the Egyptian pound (£E). 
5.3.6 : Empirical estimation of the Egyptian SER11 
Although the above ways to estimate the SER have been used, we shall 
rely on either the first way of estimation 12, using either the exchange rate 
premium or the standard conversion factor approaches. We are thus implicitly 
assuming that the inflation rates in Egypt and the world are the same. The 
second way is not suitable for the prospective analysis, simply because any 
change (concerning the base year of CPIW, PPIUS, WPIUS and CPID) will 
change the value of the estimated REER. In other words, there will be more 
than one value of RER for the same year according to the chosen base year. 
Unless we assume that CPIW IPPIUSIWPIUS and CPID equals to one, in 
which case under this assumption the final result of the two ways of estimation 
will be the same. 
II The study will rely on the secondary exchange rate that was estimated by the IMF as proxy 
for the SER for the period 1986-1990. This study's own estimate will be for the period 1991-
2000. 
12 The first and the second fommla for estimation are the same final results of the estimated 
SER as they have the same basis but differ in their way of calculation. 
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The International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IPS), National 
Account Studies for the ESCW A group and the Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook (GFS) are the main sources of data used for the SER estimation. 
Tables A5-1 and A5-2 describe the estimated values of the shadow 
exchange rate during the period (1991-2000), the first table using the premium 
approach and the second table adopting the standard conversion factor 
approach. However, all of these approaches yield the same estimated values. 
Table A5-3 shows that, under the assumption of being the world and 
domestic consumer price indices being equal, the final results for the estimated 
SER does not differ from the result reported in tables A5-1 and A5-2. 
Tables A5-4 and A5-5 show that the analysis of the same set of data 
using two different base years for the world 13 and domestic consumer price 
indices (1992 and 1995) yields different results for the estimated SER. 
In conclusion, as long as the ratio between the world consumer price 
index and the domestic consumer price index become closer to unity, the 
symmetrical result of the estimated shadow exchange rate among the ways of 
estimation illustrated above. 
Figure 5-1 shows the differences between the official exchange rate and 
estimated values of the shadow exchange rate considering the various ways of 
the above-illustrated regimes. It shows that the first and second approaches and 
the case where world and domestic inflation are assumed to be the same (CPI 
U.S = CPID), yields the same estimates of the estimated SER, while different 
estimates resulted when using different base years for CPl. 
13 The U.S consumer price index is used as a proxy for the world price index. 
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FIGURE 5-1: THE SHADOW AND OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE 







1991 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 
-+-FirstWay __ Second Way -t.-CPI(U.S) = CPlD 
_ PI (1995 = 100%) ____ CPI (1992 = 100%) ___ OER 
Source: study estimates (tables AS-I, AS-2, AS-3, AS-4 and AS-S Appendix V:I) 
5.4 : Social valuation of world prices for traded outputs 
The estimation of equivalent world prices at the fann gate level was 
carried out to cover all the traded crops using the same procedure of analysis 
(as stated earlier in charts 5-2 and 5-3) according to whether the commodity is 
exportable or importable. Egyptian exportable crops are cotton, rice, potatos, 
and tomatoes. The importable crops are wheat, maize, sugar cane l4, soybeans 
and broad beans. 
Because long and short berseem are not internationally traded, the 
study will use their domestic prices (private prices) to represent their social 
prices. 
The data needed for this valuation such as freight & insurance, costs of 
bagging and transportation from factory to mill were collected from a number 
14 Sugar cane is not traded in the world market in its raw form, so refined sugar is used instead 
(in the analysis) and then converted to sugar cane form by using the appropriate conversion 
allowance as one ton of raw sugar cane produces about 0.36 ton of sugar. 
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of sources, such as Omran (1997), (FAO 1993 and 1999) and EI-Guendy 
(1999), private business companies involved in export & import affairs, the 
Central Agency for Statistics and Mobilisation and the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade. World price data for inputs and outputs were mainly collected from 
International Monetary Fund Statistics (IMF), F AO production yearbooks, 
F AO trade yearbooks, United States Department of Agriculture publications 
and the national accounts of the ESCW A region. 
The estimation of equivalent world prices of the above crops and input 
factors will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
5.4.1 : Social valuation of cotton output: A case of exportable output. 
As cotton is one of the most important exportable crops in Egypt, it is 
worth explaining in detail the method adopted to estimate its export parity 
price. The principal difficulty is that the price received by farmers is for raw 
cotton while the world price reflects the processed cotton or lint. Additionally, 
seed cotton or raw cotton provides three main important tradable outputs lS, 
cotton lint, cottonseed oil and cottonseed meal (see Chart 5-4). As a result, in 
order to obtain the social valuation of cotton, adjustments are required to allow 
for those products that constitute the total product, as well as differences in 
processmg. 
Egypt is a net exporter of lint cotton, but does not trade cottonseed 
meal in the world market, so that its equivalent world price will be based on 
the assumption that Egypt could export the cottonseed meal to the United 
IS One ton of raw cotton produces about 66.8% cottonseed crush, 31.8% lint, 1.2% scarto and 
0.2% dust. Moreover, one ton of cottonseed crushes produces 46.5% cottonseed meal and 
16.5% cottonseed oil. 
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Kingdom, a major importer of cottonseed meal. On the other hand, Egypt is 
assumed to be a net importer of cottonseed oil. 
CHART 5-4: PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM RAw COTTON 
I Seed Cotton (raw) ~ ~
I 
I I I I 
Cottonseed Crush lint Scarto Dust 
(66.8%) (31.8%) (1.2%) (0.2%) 
I 
CottollSeed Meal CottollSeed Oil 
(46.5%) (16.5%) 
So, both the import and export parity price procedures will be used in 
estimation of the equivalent world price, as shown in Chart 5-5. Table 5-1 
illustrates an empirical example of calculating the equivalent world price of 
cotton at farm gate level. First, we start by calculating the equivalent world 
price for cottonseed crush, where we have to estimate the export parity price 
for cottonseed meal, as it is assumed that Egypt will export it to the UK, and 
the import parity price for cottonseed oil as Egypt is a net importer. 
The FOB (free on board) and CIF (cost, insurance and freight) prices 
for a given commodity serve as reference prices as they represent what the 
commodity or factor input can earn as an export or what it costs the economy 
as an import. 
To derive the export parity price of cottonseed meal, its world price is 
collected at the port of destination, in the United Kingdom. Then freight and 
insurance to Alexandria is deducted to obtain the border price at Alexandria. 
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CHART 5-5: THE SCHEME OF CALCULATING THE EQUIVALENT WORLD 
PRICES OF EGYPTIAN COTTON AT FARM GATE LEVEL. 
I-Cottonseed meal 
World Price of Cottonseed meal, CIF UK 
Deduct: 
Freight Alex to UK 
World Price of Cottonseed meal at Alex 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate 
World Price at Alexandria Port 
Deduct: 
Trans.& Marketing mill to Alex 
World Price of Cottonseed meal at Mill 
2-Cottonseed Oil 
Cottonseed Oil, FOB Rotterdam 
Add 
Freight Rotterdam to Alex Port 
World Price of Cottonseed Oil at Alex 
Add 
Import Duties (2%) + Fees( 8.3%) 
World Price of Cottonseed Oil at Alex ($) 
World Price of Cottonseed Oil at Alex (£E) 
Add 
Transportation & Marketing mill to AJex 
World Price of Cottonseed Oil at Mill 
From 1 & 2, Cottonseed crusb 
% of Cottonseed Meal (46.5%) 
% of Cottonseed Oil (16.5%) 
Cottonseed Crush 
Deduct: 
Cottonseed Crush Margin 
World Price of Cottonseed Crush at Mill 
Deduct: 
Trans.& Marketing Gin to Mill 
World Price of Cottonseed at Gin 
B- Lint Cotton 
World Price oflint at AJex ($) 
World Price of lint at Alex (£E) 
Deduct: 
Trans.& Marketing Gin to Alex port 
World Price of lint at Gin 
C- Scarto 
Domestic Price Scarto 
Seed Cotton 
Value of all Joint Product at Gin 
Deduct: 
Cotton Processing Margin 
World Price of Seed Cotton at Gin 
Deduct: 
Trans.& Marketing from Farm to Gin 
World Price at Farm Gate 
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The world price of cottonseed meal at Alexandria is then multiplied by 
the estimated shadow exchange rate, in order to convert to domestic currency. 
Transportation costs and the marketing margin of cottonseed meal from the 
mill to Alexandria are then subtracted to obtain its world price at the mill. 
The cottonseed oil FOB price is that at Rotterdam, with freight and 
insurance in addition to import duties added to obtain its price at Alexandria, 
and again is converted using the SER into local currency. Then, transportation 
costs and the marketing margin of cottonseed oil from port to mill are added to 
obtain its border price at the mill. 
One ton of cottonseed crush comprises of 46.6% of cottonseed meal 
and 16.5% of cottonseed oil. The equivalent world price of cottonseed crush is 
calculated at the mill. Then, the cottonseed crush marketing margin at the mill 
and transported from mill to gin is deducted to obtain the cottonseed world 
price at the gin. For lint cotton, the marketing margin and transport costs from 
gin to Alexandria port are deducted to obtain the world price of lint cotton at 
the gin. 
The world price of one ton of seed cotton (raw cotton) is calculated 
using the following ratios16: 66.8% cottonseed crush, 31.8% lint, 1.2% scarto. 
Then the cotton-processing margin and transport from farm gate to gin are 
deducted to obtain the world price of seed cotton at the farm gate level. 
16 cottonseed crush=(105/157)*100 = 66.8%, lint =(50/157)*100 =31.8 and scarto= 
(2/157)*100 =1.2% 
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World Price of Cottonseed meal, CIF UK srrON 166.12 144.01 173.69 175.10 179.16 131.75 152.13 161.28 142.00 145.19 164.88 165.56 189.71 82.94 115.19 
Deduct: Fmcht Alex to UK srrON 12.65 12.70 13.10 13.25 15.30 15.50 9.60 9.75 10.25 10.65 11.25 12.10 12.97 13.50 14.00 
World Price of Cottonseed meal at Alex srrON 153.47 131.31 160.59 161.85 163.86 116.25 142.53 151.53 131.75 134.54 153.63 153.46 176.74 69.44 101.19 
MoItiply: Shadow Exchange Rate £FJS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
World Price at Aleundrb Port £Efl'ON 207.19 199.60 356.52 407.87 444.05 421.66 537.88 583.74 513.16 521.22 596.99 595.71 685.15 291.64 438.15 
Deduct:Trans. & Markding mID to Alex £Efl'ON 15.10 15.25 15.85 18.10 21.75 22.75 23.90 25.00 26.50 27.80 29.00 30.20 31.00 32.56 33.46 
World Price of Cottonseed meal at MIlJ £Efl'ON 192.09 184.35 340.67 389.77 422.30 398.91 513.98 558.74 486.66 493.42 567.99 565.51 654.15 259.08 404.69 
1-Cotlonseeci on 
Cottonseed OU, FOB Rotterdam srrON 512.75 435.95 511.53 587.51 656.04 673.22 562.62 617.87 768.84 689.44 638.12 575.27 536.98 737.83 514.80 
Add: Freight Rotterda.m to Alex Port SrrON 12.50 12.70 13.00 13.20 15.20 15.25 9.20 9.60 10.10 10.60 11.20 11.99 12.50 13.00 13.10 
World Price of CottolUftd OU at Alex srrON 525.25 448.65 524.53 600.71 671.24 688.47 571.82 627.47 778.94 700.04 649.32 587.26 549.48 750.83 527.90 
Add Import Duties (2%) + Fees( 8.3%) SrrON 52.81 44.90 52.69 60.51 67.57 69.34 57.95 63.64 79.19 71.01 65.73 59.25 55.31 76.00 53.02 
World Price of CottolUftd OU at Alex srrON 578.06 493.55 577.21 661.22 738.81 757.81 629.77 691.11 858.14 771.05 715.05 646.51 604.79 826.82 580.92 
World Price of Cottonseed OU at Alex £Efl'ON 780.38 750.20 1281.41 1666.28 2002.17 2748.61 2376.68 2662.36 3342.35 2987.21 2778.68 2509.61 2344.52 3472.50 2515.46 
Add Trans. & MarkLtlnc mill to Alex £Efl'ON 15.10 15.25 15.85 18.10 21.75 22.75 23 .90 25.00 26.50 27.80 29.00 30.20 31.00 32.56 33.46 
World Price of Cottonseed OU at MIlJ £Efl'ON 795.48 765.45 1297.26 1684.38 2023.92 2771.36 2400.58 2687.36 3368.85 3015.01 2807.68 2539.81 2375.52 3505.06 2548.92 
From 1 & 1, Cottonseed crusb 
% of Cottonseed Meal (46.5%) 'Yo 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
% of Cottonseed Oil (16.5%) % 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Cottonseed Crusb £Efl'ON 220.58 212.02 372.46 459.17 530.32 642.77 635 .10 703.23 782.16 726.91 727.38 682.03 696.14 698.81 608.75 
Deduct: Cottonseed Crush Ma'l:in £Efl'ON 26.35 28.60 30.25 35.10 36.56 42.36 44.58 46.85 48.90 50.25 51.10 53.12 55.l0 56.40 58.10 
World Price of Cottonseed Crusb at MIlJ £flTON 194.23 183.42 342.21 424.07 493.76 600.41 590.52 656.38 733.26 676.66 676.28 628.91 641.04 642.41 550.65 
Deduct:Trans. & Marketing Gin to MiU £flTON 7.55 7.80 7.99 9.10 10.95 11.45 12.00 12.85 13.75 14.05 14.95 15.86 16.45 17.10 17.95 
World Price of Cottonseed at Gin £flTON 186.68 175.62 334.22 414.97 482.81 588.96 578.52 643.53 719.51 662.61 661.33 613.05 624.59 625.31 532.70 
B- UDt Cotton 
World Price of Iiut at Alex srrON 1321.35 1588.28 1433.09 1606.91 1796.85 1766.88 1372.96 1401.26 1854.47 2381.50 1981.98 1767.61 1682.80 1251.96 1407.95 
World Price of lint at Alex £Efl'ON 1783.83 2414.19 3181.46 4049.41 4869.45 6408.52 5181.42 5398.07 7222.97 9226.40 7701.98 6861.51 6523.54 5257.99 6096.59 
Deduct: Trans. & Markdlnc Gin to Alex £Efl'ON 15.10 15.25 15.85 18.10 21.75 22.75 23.90 25.00 26.50 27.80 29.00 30.20 31.00 32.56 33.46 
World Price of lint at Gin £Efl'ON 1768.73 2398.94 3165.61 4031.31 4847.70 6385.77 5157.52 5373.07 7196.47 9198.60 7672.98 6831.31 6492.54 5225.43 6063.13 
c-Scarto 
Domestic Price Scarto £flTON 5000.00 5100.00 5600.00 5700.00 6000.00 6100.00 6200.00 6300.00 6500.00 7000.00 7100.00 8000.00 8200.00 8300.00 8500.00 
Seed Cotton 
Value of aU Joint Product at Gin £Efl'ON 751.83 946.41 1303.02 1633.99 1943.18 2505.28 2108.41 222\.81 2855.87 3461.81 2976.36 2687.49 2589.86 2188.08 2395.48 
Deduct: Cotton Processinc Ma'l:in £flTON 73.89 81.21 92.36 93.12 93.95 95.54 97.\3 101.91 102.55 103.50 108.28 108.92 110.57 114.01 117.83 
World Price of Seed Cotton at Gin £fITON 677.94 865.20 1210.66 1540.87 1849.23 2409.74 2011.27 2119.90 2753.32 3358.31 2868.08 2578.57 2479.29 2074.07 2277.65 
Deduct: Trans & Markdlnc (rom Farm tn Gin £fITON 2.55 2.87 2.99 3.18 3.50 3.82 4.14 4.27 4.46 4.65 4.97 5. 10 5.41 5.73 5.92 
World Price at Farm Gate £E/l'on 675.40 861.34 1207.67 1537.69 1845.73 %405.91 1007.13 2115.63 2748.86 3353.66 2863.11 2573.48 2473.88 2068.34 2271.71 
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5.4.2 : Social valuation of Wheat output: A case of importable output. 
Egypt is a net importer for wheat. So the calculation of its equivalent 
world price at farm gate level will follow chart 3, as shown in Table 5-2. The 
wheat FOB price is that at the U.S Gulf, then freight and insurance and import 
duties are added to obtain its price at Alexandria. This is then multiplied by the 
SER to convert it into local currency. Transportation costs from Alexandria to 
the central market is added to obtain its world price at the central market. 
Then, transportation costs from the central market to the farm are deducted to 
obtain the world price at farm level. Finally, a conversion allowance!7 is used 
to standardise exported and domestically produced wheat in order for them to 
be compared on an equal basis. 
For the other studied crops, Egypt is a net importer of maize, broad 
beans, soybean and sugar cane, while a net exporter of rice, niH potatoes, and 
tomatoes. The valuation of the importable equivalent world price at the farm 
gate level is illustrated in detail in Tables A5-6, A5-7, A5-8 and A5-9 in which 
they follow Chart 2. Tables A5-10, A5-II and A5-I2 illustrate the Egyptian 
main studied exportable crops, rice, tomatoes and niH potatoes. 
17 Because the imported and domestically produced wheat are not the same quality. the study 
adopted the conversion allowance used by other studies such as Omran (1997); FAO (1999); 
Guendy (1999) to provide an equal basis of comparison. In this case it is usual to view 
imported wheat as lower quality to domestically produced wheat, and that the conversion 
allowance used in Table 5-2 is 95%. 
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TABLE 5-2: ESTIMATION OF IMpORT PARITY PRICE FOR WHEAT AT FARM GATE LEVEL 
Estimation Steps 
World P r I ~ e e (FOB-US GaU) 
Add: 
Freight Ir. I n s u r a n ~ e e SfI'ON 15.25 20.36 20.90 21.00 24.00 24.30 14.35 14.70 14.80 15.00 15.10 15.50 15.40 15.35 16.00 
Add: 
Import Dudes (2-1.) + Fees( 8.3%) SfI'ON 11.85 11.62 14.95 17.45 13.97 13.25 15.56 14.46 15.44 18.24 21.35 16.47 12.98 11.55 11.75 
World PrIu at Alexandria Port (CIF) SIrON 142.13 144.80 181.01 207.87 173.58 166.17 180.95 169.54 180.18 210.38 243.72 191.83 154.44 138.98 141.86 
MIIltiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate £EIS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.n 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
Border Prlu at Alexandria Port £ElTON 191.87 220.10 401.85 523.83 470.39 602.71 682.89 653.14 701.80 S15.05 947.09 744.64 598.69 583.70 614.28 
Add 
Transportadon from Port to Market £ElTON 7.40 S.50 10.00 13.50 16.00 17.20 IS.00 19.00 20.00 21.00 22.30 24.00 25.20 26.00 27.10 
World PrIce at Market £ElTON 199.27 228.60 411.85 537.33 486.39 619.91 700.89 672.14 721.80 836.05 969.39 768.64 623.89 609.70 641.38 
Dedact: 
Trus. From Market to Farm £ElTON 7.00 8.10 9.60 13.00 15.70 16.50 17.90 18.95 19.55 20.90 22.00 23.85 25.00 26.00 27.00 
World Price at Farm Gate £ElTON 192.27 220.50 402.25 524.33 470.69 603.41 682.99 653.19 702.25 815.15 947.39 744.79 598.89 583.70 614.38 
MIIltiply 
Convenion ADowanee @95-1. £ElTon 1112.66 209..48 382.14 498.11 447.15 573.24 6411.84 620.53 667.14 n4.40 900.02 707.55 568.94 sS4.51 583.66 
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5.5 Social valuation of world prices for traded inputs 
5.5.1 : Social valuation of fertilisers 
Traded factor inputs are mainly fertilisers, pesticides, and seeds. For fertilisers, 
Egypt is a net importer of potash and nitrogen fertiliser, while phosphate 
fertiliser is not traded l8• Tables 5-3 and 5-4 illustrate the method of calculating 
the equivalent world price for nitrogen (15.5%) and potash (48%). Nitrogen 
and potash world prices are those at the port of origin, then freight & insurance 
and import duties are added to obtain their world price at Alexandria. The 
result is multiplied by the shadow exchange rate, then transportation from port 
to factory is added, while the costs of bagging and transportation from factory 
to farm are deducted. 
Table 5-5 shows the procedure that has been carried out for phosphate 
fertiliser; freight and insurance and export duties are deducted from the 
phosphate world price at the port of destination then the result is multiplied by 
the shadow exchange rate. Transportation from port to factory, cost of bagging 
and transportation from factory to farm is deducted yielding phosphate 
equivalent world price at farm gate level. 
5.5.2 : Social valuation of pesticides and seeds 
For every single crop, one has to define the pesticides used in its 
production then calculate their equivalent world price, which is very difficult 
18 Because phosphate fertilizer is not traded in Egypt, it will be assumed in calculation of its 
equivalent world price that Egypt will be a net exporter for it. 
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TABLE 5-3: ESTIMA nON OF IMpORT PARITY PRICE FOR NITROGEN FERTILISER (15.5%) 
Estimation Steps I Uni I 
World PrIce (FOB-Enrope) $/I'ON 107.00 116.58 155.00 132.17 130.74 150.95 123.49 94.40 131.39 193.93 187.48 127.93 103.05 77.10 112.10 
Add: 
Freight & Insurance $/I'ON 12.45 12.73 13.00 13.24 15.25 15.82 9.15 9.60 10.10 10.60 11.10 11.96 12.68 12.90 13.10 
Add: 
Import Duties $/I'ON 32.10 34.97 46.50 39.65 39.22 45.29 37.05 28.32 39.42 58.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
World PrIce at AieDDdria Port (elF) $/I'ON 151.55 164.28 214.50 185.06 185.21 212.06 169.69 132.32 180.91 262.71 198.58 139.89 115.73 90.00 125.20 
Mrdtiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate £FJ$ 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
Bonier PrIce at AieDDdria Port £EITON 204.59 249.71 476.19 466.35 501.92 769.13 640.38 509.74 704.61 1017.79 771.68 543.03 448.64 377.98 542.13 
Add 
Transportation from Port to Factory £EITON 15.50 16.80 17.00 18.00 21.50 22.70 23.S0 25.00 26.30 27.60 29.00 30.10 31.00 31.75 33.00 
World PrIce at Factory £EITON 220.09 266.51 493.19 484.35 523.42 791.S3 664.1S 534.74 730.91 1045.39 800.68 573.13 479.64 409.73 575.13 
Deduct: 
Trans. From Fac.to Farm & Cost of Bagging £EITON 11.50 11.55 11.50 13.00 IS.80 19.35 19.90 20.52 21.15 21.80 22.50 23.45 25.00 27.00 28.90 
World PrIce at Farm Gate £EITON 208.59 254.96 4S1.69 471.35 504.62 772.48 644.28 514.22 709.76 1023.59 77S.18 549.68 454.64 382.73 546.23 
Mrdtiply 
Convenion Allowance· £ElTon 70.19 85.91 161.31 158.83 170.04 260.29 217.09 173.27 239.16 344.90 162.21 185.22 153.19 128.96 184.06 
• Since the traded Nitrogen fertilizer is 46% cone, and the actually used and distributed among growers is 15.5%, then a conversion allowance is used to adjust the price per 
ton where world price at farm gate for 15.5% = (world price at farm gate for 46% • 15.5%) /46%. 
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TABLE 5-4: ESTIMATION OF IMpORT PARITY PRICE OF POTASH FERTILISER 
Estimation Steps 1 Unit 11986 1 87 1 88 1 89 1 90 1 91 1 92 1 
World Price (FOB-Vancouver) SffON 68.79 69.04 87.54 98.88 98.13 108.85 112.08 107.42 105.72 117.76 116.93 116.53 116.89 121.64 122.50 
Add: 
Freight & Insurance SffON 16.67 22.25 22.50 22.95 26.35 26.59 15.80 16.15 16.35 16.45 16.90 17.00 18.00 18.28 19.00 
Add: 
Import Duties SffON 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
World Price at A1exlUldria Port (CIF) SffON 85.46 91.29 110.04 121.83 124.48 135.44 127.88 123.57 122.07 134.21 133.83 133.53 134.89 139.92 141.50 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate £EIS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
Border Price at A1exlUldria Port £FIfON 115.37 138.76 244.29 307.oI 337.34 491.24 482.61 476.03 475.45 519.96 520.06 518.34 522.91 587.64 612.71 
Add 
Transportation from Port to Factory £FIfON 15.50 16.80 17.00 18.00 21.50 22.70 23.80 25.00 26.30 27.60 29.00 30.10 31.00 31.75 33.00 
World Price at Factory £FIfON 130.87 155.56 261.29 325.oI 358.84 513.94 506.41 501.03 501.75 547.56 549.06 548.44 553.91 619.39 645.71 
Dduct: 
Trans. From Fac.to Farm & Cost of Bagging £FIfON 11.50 11.55 11.50 13.00 18.80 19.35 19.90 20.52 21.15 21.80 22.50 23.45 25.00 27.00 28.90 
World Price at Farm Gate £FIfON 119.37 144.01 249.79 312.01 340.04 494.59 486.51 480.51 480.60 525.76 526.56 524.99 528.91 592.39 616.81 
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TABLE 5-5: ESTIMA nON OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE FOR PHOSPHATE 
Estimation Steps Uol 
World Price (U.s-GuIf) $troN 121.17 138.00 158.38 144.00 131.82 133.12 120.74 1l1.95 132.1I 149.63 175.83 171.91 173.67 154.50 137.72 
DUlltl 
Freight & Insnrance StroN 15.25 20.36 20.90 21.00 24.00 24.30 14.35 14.70 14.80 15.00 15.10 15.50 15.40 15.35 16.00 
DUlltl 
Export Duties StroN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
World Price at Alexandria Port (CIF) StroN 105.92 117.64 137.48 123.00 107.82 108.82 106.39 97.25 II7.31 134.63 160.73 156.41 158.27 139.15 121.72 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate £EI$ 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
Border Price at Alexandria Port £EITON 142.99 178.81 305.21 309.96 292.19 394.69 401.51 374.64 456.91 521.58 624.60 607.15 613.55 584.40 527.06 
DUlltl 
Transportation from Port to Factory £EITON 15.50 16.80 17.00 18.00 21.50 22.70 23.80 25.00 26.30 27.60 29.00 30.10 31.00 31.75 33.00 
World Price at Factory £EITON 127.49 162.01 288.21 291.96 270.69 371.99 377.71 349.64 430.61 493.98 595.60 577.05 582.55 552.65 494.06 
DUllcl: 
Trans. From Fac.to Farm & Cost of Bagging £EITON 11.50 11.55 11.50 13.00 18.80 19.35 19.90 20.52 21.15 21.80 22.50 23.45 25.00 27.00 28.90 
World Price at Farm Gate £EITON 115.99 150.46 276.71 278.96 251.89 352.64 357.81 329.12 409.46 472.18 573.10 553.60 557.55 525.65 465.16 
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in practice for many reasons. First; the severe lack of detailed price data19 on 
every type of pesticide used in producing each crop in any official source. 
Second, prices for pesticides and seeds are often not precise guides in 
commercial sources, because the degree of discounts offered on list prices 
varies over time and can be very substantial. So the alternative is to use the 
domestic prices of seeds and pesticides as equivalent to their world prices or to 
adjust their domestic prices by the following formula, which the study will rely 
on. 
Shadow Price of Pesticides = 
Shadow Exchange Rate D . p. f ··d 
-------=-- x omestlc nce 0 Pestlc! es 
Official Exchange Rate 
(5.15) 
5.6 : Social valuation of non traded inputs 
5.6.1 : Social valuation of irrigation water. 
Water is provided to farmers free of charge; consequently, there is no 
market or domestic price for irrigation water. However, Abo-Saad (1998) and 
Abdel-Maksoud (1998) estimated the price of water, at 74.20 £E/IOOO M3 and 
67.23 £EI 1000 M3 respectively. A study carried out by the FAO (1999) 
adopted an estimated price of water of 70 £EIl 000M3. The study will rely on 
an average of these pre-estimated values ofinigation water. 
5.6.2 : Social valuation of land 
Most of Egypt's land is desert, and only 4.5 percent of the land area is 
used; i.e. of a total area of one million sq. km., only 4.5 thousand sq. km. are 
under usage. Only about 3.3% percent of the used land area is cultivated, and 
that is generally restricted to the Nile Valley and Delta area. Although the area 
19Even for domestic prices of pesticides and seeds, the valid data is the aggregate cost of 
pesticides used per feddan per crop. In other word, there is no detailed data that can help in 
proceeding with the estimation process. 
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of arable land in Egypt is small, it is highly fertile and provides the basis of the 
agricultural sector, still the core sector in the Egyptian economy. 
Land in general, and agricultural land in particular, is highly valued by 
the Egyptians, not only for its productive potential, but also for being a basic 
depository for value. Consequently, its value is difficult to assess as it is both a 
production input and an asset; moreover, its related markets are often thin, 
unreliable and complex (Hassan, 1991). 
The land rent value has been strongly influenced by the government 
since the 1952 rebellion. Its rental value was controlled (until the introduction 
of the reform policy regime), this value being determined at seven times the 
agricultural land tax20• This tax tends to remain at the same nominal level over 
a long period of time (about a decade) before it is revised. Thus the value of 
the land rent is also revised every ten years. This method of valuation lasted for 
about thirty-four years, ignoring the massive changes in the physical and 
financial relationships that occurred during this period. The consequence was 
that the landowner was not encouraged to make any improvement to his 
existing land or to invest in more land. 
Finally, the system of land tenancy has been reorganised after the 
adoption of the reformed policy regime in 1986, which achieved a remarkable 
shift towards liberalisation and free market operation. Within the reform policy 
period, the land rent was raised to twenty-two times the agricultural land tax, 
and then at the end of a five years transition period, it was allowed to operate 
completely freely in September 1997. 
20 The agricu1turalland tax is determined to each piece of land according to fertility, location 
zone and its close to irrigation water source. For example, if the agriculture land tax for feddan 
in zone (x) is £L 20 in year (t), according to the formula calculated by the Ministry of 
Agriculture the rent will be £L 140 in that year. 
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In the competitive market for renting or leasing land it can be assumed 
that land rental reflects its marginal productivity. Consequently, there is no 
problem in obtaining its social value, simply because the rental value 
represents the net value of production of land. But, if land or rental markets do 
not exist then the social rental value will be the foregone production in its best 
alternative use for a crop that competes directly for that land. The foregone 
production in our case is the social net return to land for the best competitive 
crop valued at social prices. In this task, the net return to land is defined as the 
social revenue after subtracting all other social costs except for land rent. 
If there is a competitive market of renting or leasing land, it can be 
assumed that the land rental reflects its marginal productivity. Consequently, 
there is no problem in determining its social value, simply because the rental 
value represents the net social value of production of land. But, if land or rental 
markets do not exist then the social rental value must be estimated. 
The net return to land is defined as the social revenue after subtracting 
all other social costs except for land rent. Rent is thus a residual in the social 
accounting framework. As such it suffers from the problems of all residual 
measures. Alston (1986, p.5), in his criticism of the residual income measure, 
argues that it is likely to be imperfect due to empirical and conceptual 
problems. 
'This (residual) measure incorrectly treats land as the residual claimant for 
agricultural production and suffers from sever measurement problems, 
particularly relating to imputing costs for capital equipment and management'. 
Melichar (1979), Haushen and Herr (1980), Dobbins et al. (1981), Phipps 
(1984), Hassan (1991) and Abdel-Aziz (1993), in addition to a number of 
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other empirical studies, used the residual income/return to measure returns to 
land. This return to land is obtained by deducting costs from total farm income. 
However, our study will rely on the opportunity cost approach to derive 
the social value rent of land. The opportunity cost of land in its existing use is 
derived by taking the alternative crop with the highest return excluding land 
rent (valued at social prices), then adjusted to account for the time period that 
each crop effectively occupies the land. For example, cotton, maize and rice 
are alternative summer crops, where cotton stays on the land for eight months 
while rice for five and maize for four months only. If we are concerned to 
estimate the social price of land for cotton in year (t) and it is found that the 
best alternative to cotton in that year is rice, then, 
Land Rent of Cotton = Net Social Profit of Rice (excluding land rent) 8 x-
4 
(5.16) 
The bullets in Table 5-6 show the alternatives for each crop. These 
alternatives are selected from the crops that are actually grown. For example, 
the competing crops to rice (as a summer crop) are cotton, corn and soybean 
while, for short season clover (short berseem) as a winter crop are broad bean, 
long season clover (long berssem) and wheat. 
However, in some cases a better alternative may be selected even 
though it might be physically impossible to grow. For example, cotton is 
grown in summer and wheat in winter, the opportunity cost price for cotton is 
the residual return to land (valued in world prices) in the alternative use, wheat. 
This is because cotton and wheat preclude each other since, wheat is not yet 
ripe when cotton has to be planted (Hassan, 1991). The same procedure is 
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adopted for winter tomatoes and nili potatoes on the basis that both crops are 
not included in the agriculture period21 rotation. 
TABLE 5-6: SUMMARY OF CROP ALTERNATIVES 
~ ~ III 8 8 ~ ~ CI Qj ~ ~ Qj Q Q ~ ~
= 





:= u ... 8 "" .0 ~ ~ ~ ~
cos 
~ ~ Q Q "CI .0 .0 "" ~ ~Q ~ ~ Q U ~ ~ >. ~ ~ ~ ~u ~ ~ Q Q ~ ~ 1:: ~ ~
== ~ ~ "" (I) CI Q :I Z ~ ~ Q ~ ~ (I) ~ ~ (I) 
Cotton ¢:l ¢:l ¢:l ¢:l 
Rice ¢:l ¢:l 
Nili 
Potatoes ¢:l ¢:l 
Winter 
Tomatoes ¢:l 




Bean ¢:l ¢:l ¢:l 
Long 
.Ber ¢:l ¢:l 
Short 
Ber ¢:l ¢:l 
Sugar 
Cane ¢:l 
Wheat ¢:l ¢:l ¢:l ¢:l 
Source: Computer Analysis Result 
5.6.3 : Social valuation of labour 
Labour is one of the important inputs in the production process. In case 
of hiring labour, the actual wage rate is the private price. But if labour comes 
from within the family, the private price would be then the opportunity cost of 
family labour. Theoretically, the opportunity cost of family labour should 
equal the wage rate of the best alternative employment opportunity apart from 
farming. But practically it is often very difficult to measure this opportunity 
cost, so for simplicity the study will deal with family labour in the same way as 
21 The agriculture period is a system that regulate the consequence of crop planting on the basis 
that aim to prevent the damage that might happen to soil due to the successive growing of the 
same crop year after year. 
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hired labour. In other words, the prevailing wage rate will be used as a proxy 
for the private price of family labour. 
The market wage rate in Egyptian agriculture was considered to be the 
appropriate measure of the shadow price of labour for all commodities. The 
reason for using the market wage was that labour is fully employed in the 
agricultural sector and acts as a reservoir for supplying demand in 
construction, services and other sectors. In other words, a reserve army of 
unemployed labour does not exist (Greenaway and Milner, 1993). Thus, the 
agricultural labour market can be assumed to be fairly competitive and wages 
presumably reflect fairly accurately the vale of labour's marginal product. 
Therefore, the estimates of the social price of labour will depend on the best 
alternative wage prevailing in the season, as shown in Table 5-7. 
TABLE 5-7: SOCIAL WAGE RATE FOR WINTER AND SUMMER SEASONS THROUGH 



















































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Bulletin of Agricultural Economics, 
Cairo,Egypt. 
2Z Wo-B, means Women or boy 
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5.6.4 : Social valuation of animal work and manure 
Animal work and manure are of course non-traded inputs, in other 
words not traded internationally, meaning that there are no international prices 
for these factors. The domestic prices of such factors are determined in the 
domestic markets. In the absence of distortions in those markets, the social 
prices of these inputs will be equal to their private prices. 
5.7 : Social valuation of machinery 
5.7.1 : Tractors 
Tractors23 and water pumps are two of the most important input factors 
in the agricultural production process, and estimating their social prices is one 
of the most difficult tasks in obtaining the data needed for the PAM. As their 
prices differ according to the country of manufacture, their power and 
discounts that vary from one supplier to another, detailed data on world prices 
are not found in official publications. So the approach used is to take the 
average price as the best estimate. 
Data used for this purpose were mainly collected from the Central 
Authority for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAMP AS). The following 
formula was used to obtain the world price of a tractor: 
TV 
Value of the Tractort = __ t NTt 
where, 
TV = Total value of tractors 
NT = Number of tractors 
t = Year 
(5.16) 
23 It is assumed that the markup is 10%, savage value is 200/c" use life is 10 years, maintenance 
is 5% per year, oil consumption is 4% per year and hours of use per year are 1500. These 
coefficients are comparable or similar to those used by (Yao. S., 1996), FAO (1999) and the 
United Nation (1993). 
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CHART 5-6: V ALUA nON FOR TRACTORS AND WATER PUMPS SOCIAL 
COSTS/HOUR 
I-Fixed Cost 
World Price at Port, Alexandria 
Multiply 
Shadow Exchange Rate 
World Price at Port, Alexandria 
+ 
Port Fees + Handling + Trasport to Warehouse + 
Markup@ 10% 
Price at Warehouse 
+ 
Transport to Farm 
Total Price at Farm 
Salvage Value @20% 
Initial Capital Cost 
Since 
Use Life (10 Years) 
Rate 0/ Interest (0/0) 
Hours 0/ Use/Year (J 500) 




Sub Total Cost (1) = Depreciation + Capital Cost 
2-Variable Cost 
Maintenance cost @ 5% /1500 
+ 
Mobile Oil cost @ 2% / 1500 
+ 
Feul cost + Tractor Driver cost 
Sub Total Cost (2) 
There/ore 
Total Cost = Sub Total Cost (1) + Sub Total Cost (2) 
5-39 
Social Valuation/or Inputs and Outputs 
The procedure for estimating the equivalent world price for a 
tractor/hour is illustrated in Chart 5-6 and calculated in Table A5-14, where 
costs are divided into fixed and variable components. 
The fixed cost is composed of the CIF price plus port fees and 
handling, mUltiplied by the appropriate shadow exchange rate. Then a 10% 
mark-up, transport costs to the farm and a 20% salvage value are added to 
obtain the initial capital cost. Annual depreciation is based on an estimated life 
of ten years and a salvage value of 20% of the purchase price. The calculations 
are as follows: 
Annual depreciation cost Total price at farm - Salvage value 
Years of use life 
The calculations of annual capital cost can be derived as follows: 
. (Total price at farm) Annual capItal cost = 2 x Interest rate 
(5.17) 
(5.18) 
Then, by dividing the above equations by the number of hours of use in a year, 
the hourly rates of depreciation and capital cost are obtained. 
The variable costs include maintenance, oil, fuel and driver wages. 
Yao (1996) and the FAO (1993 and 1999) relate the estimate of maintenance 
and oil cost to the total value of the tractor at the farm gate level (normally 5% 
and 2% respectively). For example, if we wish to estimate the maintenance and 
oil cost in 1990 and the value of the tractor at the farm gate level in that year is 
$10,000 then the maintenance cost for this year is estimated at $500 and the oil 
cost at $200. But is more reasonable to relate the maintenance and oil costs to 
the average value of the tractor stock in use in the country in 1990, not on its 
value in that particular year. 
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That is, the value of a tractor in year (t) in the country does not only 
depend on the value of a new tractor in year (t) but also on the values of the 
tractor stock in years (t-l), (t-2) ... {t-lO), on the assumption that the nonnallife 
of a tractor is 10 years. So we have to adjust the price of the tractor in year (t) 
taking into account the valuation of the tractor stock in the previous years of its 
life. 
Then, we can link the maintenance and oil cost to that estimated value 
price as illustrated in table AS-13; and the following fonnula gives the total 
cost 
Total cost = Fixed cost + Variable cost (S.19) 
The details of the estimation process for the social valuation of the 
tractor rent per hour, as well as the methodology used in calculating 
maintenance costs are illustrated numerically in tables AS-13 and AS-14. 
5.7.2 : Water pumps 
The social valuation of water pumps follows the procedure adopted in 
table AS-14 for tractors. 
5.8 : Summary and Conclusion 
The estimation of equivalent social (world) prices for input factors and 
output commodities is one of the most important and difficult issues for the 
derivation of the PAM. The analyst must first select the proper SER to convert 
imported or exported inputs and commodities traded in foreign currency into 
domestic currency. The selected SER is then used in calculating the import and 
export parity prices. Once these reference prices have been constructed then 
the PAM model may be constructed. 
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As noted earlier, the practitioner has to collect for the sector concerned 
the following. First, data for constructing the input/output table. Second, 
private or domestic price data for inputs and output to construct the private 
prices table. Third, the private budget table is then obtained by multiplying the 
entries in the input/output table by the corresponding entries in private prices 
table. Fourth, after estimating social or equivalent world parity prices for 
inputs and outputs, the social prices table is derived. Finally, the social budget 
table is obtained by multiplying the entries of the input/output table by the 
corresponding entries in the social prices table. 
Now the PAM model can be constructed by substituting for the entries 
of PAM matrix, as illustrated in Chapter 4. 
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Private Cost Ratio and Domestic Resource Results 
Chapter VI: Measures of Private and Social Comparative 
Advantage: Private Cost Ratio (PCR) and Domestic 
Resource Cost (ORC) Results 
6.1 : Introduction 
In this chapter we report results from the estimation of the PAM using 
data for the period 1986 to 2000, and the methods set out in Chapter 5. 
Attention focuses in this chapter on the two criteria presented to assess the 
private profitability and economic efficiency of crops within the Egyptian 
agricultural sector. These criteria are the private cost ratio (PCR) and domestic 
resource cost (DRC). 
As noted in Chapter 4, the private cost ratio and domestic resource cost 
are similar in their way of calculation, except that the first is calculated using 
private prices while the later uses social or world prices. This chapter reports 
on and analyses the results of the PCR and DRC estimates. These criteria are 
calculated annually for each crop, both separately and as part of a rotation. 
Although the alternative measurements for private and social profitability and 
comparative advantage such as net private profitability (NPP), net social 
profitability (NSP) and social cost benefit (SCB) that do not in the present 
context provide additional infonnation they are presented for completeness. 
Our principal motivation is to evaluate the effect of Egyptian 
agricultural policy refonns, as discussed in Chapter 4, in which we have 
characterised the period of study 1986-2000 as three distinct periods. The first 
period, 1986-89 represents the very early stages of refonn; the actual refonn 
period, running from 1990 to 2000 is (according to the availability of data) 
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divided into two periods, 1990-95 and 1996-2000, to evaluate the perfonnance 
of these economic indicators over time. 
Section 2 presents measures of private profitability and the empirical 
results for net private profit and private cost ratio. Section 3 reports the results 
of the domestic resource cost, net social profitability and social cost-benefit 
indicators. It also analyses the consistency of the results obtained from these 
three indicators. Section 4 discusses the implications for private profitability, 
and comparative advantage in Egyptian major crop outputs and exports 
throughout the refonn era. Section 5 is devoted to a summary and to 
conclusions. 
6.2 : Measures of Private Profitability 
6.2.1 : Net Private Profitability. 
In PAM notations, net private profitability (D) is defined as gross 
returns at market prices (A) less the tradable input cost (B) and the cost of 
domestic factors (C). Net private profitability (NPP) is a direct measure of the 
incentives to farmers to produce a commodity, and reflects the competitiveness 
of that commodity at the observed market prices. 
CONSTRUCTION OF PAM ANALYSIS 
PAM Revenues Tradable In uts Domestic Fadon Profits 
A B C D 
Private Revenue based Costs of tradable Costs of domestic Profit based on Prices 
on private profit inputs based on factors based on private profit private prices private prices D= (A-B-C) 
E F G H 
Social Prices Revenue based Costs of tradable Costs of domestic Profit based inputs based factors based on social profit 
on social profit 
on social prices on social prices H =(E- F-G) 
Effeets of I J K L 
divergences I=(A- E) J=(B-F) L=D-H = 
and emdent K=(C-G) (I - J - K) 
eollcl 
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A positive NPP implies that the commodity system is privately or 
domestically profitable, given input and output prices, technology level, 
current government policy and existing market distortions. 
A positive value of profits at prevailing market prices confirms the 
private profitability of the business. Positive profits also provide a stimulus for 
existing firms to increase output and for other finns to start production of the 
crop. But we have to be very cautious with this indicator because when the 
market prices of inputs or outputs are distorted by either market failure or by 
taxes or subsidies, then private profits alone could provide misleading signals. 
The total net private profitability of a sector can be calculated by 
multiplying the NPP per feddan by total planted area of that sector. The results 
of total NPP values obtained from the PAM during the period 1986-2000 are 
presented in Figure 6-1. From this figure we may observe that potatoes and 
soybean, where gross profitability is falling over time, seem to be the least 
profitable products during the period 1995-2000. 
FIGURE 6-1: NET PRIV ATE PROFITABILITY FOR MAJOR CROPS IN THE PERIOD 
1986-2000 










o + - ~ I - - , - B ~ " " " " . - . .
.Ri:e L.ber S.ber Tom Wheat S.eane 1vfai:z.e Cotton Broad Pot S.bean 
Source: Table A6-1. 
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In contrast, production of field crops (such as rice and wheat), fodder 
crop (such as long and short berseem) and vegetable crops (such as tomatoes) 
represents a sound of higher private profitability in national economic terms 
with positive gross NPPs (constant Egyptian million pounds) of about 1213, 
817 and 268 respectively. 
6.2.2 : The Private Cost Ratio (PCR) 
6.2.2.1 : Introduction 
To recap on the discussion in Chapter 4, profits valued at private prices 
can be used for comparing the competitiveness of systems producing identical 
outputs under existing policies, but are not sufficient for comparisons among 
systems producing different outputs. As residuals in the calculations, a given 
level of profits may be obtained from systems using different levels of inputs 
to yield outputs with widely varying prices. The private cost ratio (PCR) can 
overcome the ambiguity in comparisons of private profits of systems 
producing different commodities (Monke and Pearson, 1989). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the PCR is defined as the ratio of the 
domestic factor cost [C] to the difference between the value of output and the 
tradable cost valued at private prices [value added (A-B)]. This ratio 
demonstrates the ability of the production system to cover the cost of the 
domestic factors and remain in production. It is also a proxy for the degree of 
processing within the domestic economy. This ratio is important for investors 
because they can optimise their profits by minimising the cost of tradable 
inputs and factors (Kubursi, 200 1). 
If the PCR for a sector is less than one this means that the cost of 
domestic factors is less than the difference between total revenues and costs of 
tradable component valued at domestic or private prices. It indicates that the 
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sector is profitable domestically or, in other words, it has a competitive 
advantage domestically. If the peR is greater than one, then the domestic cost 
is higher than the difference between the value of output and the cost of 
tradable inputs then that sector is not profitable and it is more likely to contract 
in the future. 
Since the peR in our context is advocated as an indicator of which 
agricultural sector should expand and which should contract following 
liberalisation. The private cost ratio is affected by many factors that are related 
to government policies on either the input or output side. For example, forcing 
producers to grow certain crops, at predetermined (controlled) output levels 
and prices (and other forms of government controls) will directly affect farm 
revenue. On the other hand, if the government controls the prices and 
distribution of inputs, this also affects farm costs, and consequently the peR. 
In addition, the peR may be affected by the level of technology used by 
farmers, since they might adopt better technologies and then obtain higher 
yield and/or lower cost and thus higher revenue and consequently a lower 
peR. 
Before reporting the peR results, it is useful to investigate whether it is 
necessarily true that minimising the peR ratio is equivalent to maximising 
excess profits as stated in Monke and Pearson 1989 (p.26): "The entrepreneurs 
in the system prefer to earn excess profits (D>O), and they can achieve this 
result if their private factor costs (C) are less than their value added in private 
prices (A-B). Thus they try to minimise the private cost ratio by holding down 
factor and tradable input costs in order to maximise excess profits" 
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If we assume a 'nonnal profit' (Le. the wage to the fanners) then 
maximising excess profits must be equivalent to maximising total profit from 
the activity in question. It seems sensible to treat profits as the reward to the 
operator's own contribution to the process, which is a factor of production. In 
other words, if the profits are to be treated as the reward to the operator's own 
contribution to the process then profits are necessarily = O. Suppose that we 
specify non-tradable input 1 as the operator's own contribution, so that he 
receives a payment li1 per unit of his total input, cl' If we define profit per 
unit of output as the difference between the value of the output and the cost of 
traded inputs and of all non-traded inputs other than the operator's own efforts 
then we have 
'" II 
7r= p- ~ > I b l l - LWjCj 
1=1 j-2 
But the definition of profit as the reward to the operator's own efforts (Ct) 
implies that 
where WI is the operator's 'wage' per unit of effort (time) 
It then follows that 
'" " p - L 1jbl - L WjCj = 0 
1=1 j=1 
This is the result we would get if there were freedom of entry/exit (i.e., price = 
average cost). 
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A - The conventional approach 
Suppose we have a producer seeking to maximise the profit per unit of output, 
where output is produced by a set of tradable inputs b1, .. bm, and a set of non-
tradable inputs, C1, .. Cn, according to a production function that maybe written 
Q= f(g(b], .. b"J, h(c], .. c,J) (6.1) 
If the (exogenously determined) prices of the tradable inputs are rJ, .. rm , those 
of the non-tradable inputs are W], .. W n , and the price of the output isp then we 
may write the problem as: 
m n 
Max 1r= p - L'ibj - L WjCj subjecttof(g(b1, .. b"J, h(C1, .. c,J)=l (6.2) 
I I 
Writing it as a Lagrangean problem: 
m n 
Max L = p - L'ibj - LWjCj+A [f(g(b1, .. b"J, h(C1, .. c,J - 1 ] 
The first order conditions are then 
of og 
-r +A--=O 
j og obj 
0/ oh 
-W.+A---=O 
J oh oCj 
i= l. .. m 
i= l. .. n 
f(g(b1, .. b"J, h(C1, .. c,J)=l 
These may be rewritten as 
Ii = OgjOg i=2 ... m 
Ii obi o ~ ~
Wj = of oh /0/ og j=1. .. n 
Ii oh OCj og o ~ ~
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Suppose that the operator's own input is C}, and that w} is the 'nonnal' return. 
We might then increase (decrease) W} appropriately if the profits in the 
solution are positive (negative). 
B- the peR approach 
m 
Value added is, in tenns of the proceeding PAM notation, A-B = p - Lrpi' 
/ 
and the cost of domestic factors (including the operator's input) is given by C = 





-- subject tof(g(b}, .. b"J, h(c}, .. c,J)=l (6.7) 
p-L'ibj 
1 
which yields the Lagrangean 
n 
LWjCj 
Min -':"'/-m-- - f.J [1 - f(g(b}, .. b"J, h(cj, .. c,J] (6.8) 
p- Lrjbj 
/ 
The first order conditions are then, 
i= 1. .. m (6.9) 
j=1 (6.10) 
f(g(bl, .. b"J, h(Cl, .. c,J) = 1 (6.11) 
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m /I m /I 
But p- Lr;b; - LWjCj= 0 implies P- L'ib;= LWjCj , so we may rewrite 
1=1 j=l ;-1 j=l 
them as 
f (g (q , ... , bm ) , ( c. , ... 'Cn ) ) = 1 
and then some manipulation gives 
'i _ Og/Og i=2 ... m 
r. obi oq 




which are in fact the same FOCs as obtained in the 'conventional' approach. 
We must then deduce that the two approaches are identical in their outcomes. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Egyptian agricultural policy has undergone 
significant liberalisation since 1986, the effects of which should appear in the 
PCRs. The reform has generally increased private input costs and product 
prices, and indirectly impacted on the technologies adopted. We shall discuss 
in the next section the trend and estimates of the PCRs for major importable 
crops such as wheat, maize, sugar cane, soy and broad beans. The PCRs for 
exportable crops, such as cotton, rice, potatoes and tomatoes, and for fodder 
crops, such as long and short berseem, will also be evaluated from the early 
period of reform until the latest available data point ( 1 9 8 6 ~ 2 9 0 0 ) . .
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6.2.2.2 : Empirical Results 
The main results of the peR estimates for the main crops and their 
associated fourteen main rotations during the period 1986-2000 are 
summarised in Table 6-1. The overall picture! for the estimates indicate that all 
the studied crops and crop rotations had a peR less than one, implying that 
they are domestically profitable (Le. pay a positive reward to the average 
farmer). The estimated peR coefficients have gradually increased over time 
(for most crops); broadly, their levels increased in the third period of refonn 
compared to the second and first periods. This was mainly due to the gradual 
increase in the cost of the domestic factor component (the numerator), which in 
turn reflected the increase in land rent, which within the reform policy period 
was raised from seven times to twenty-two times the agricultural land tax, and 
finally at the end of a five years transition period, was determined in a free 
market (from September 1997). The average private cost ratio during the 
second period of reform fell for cotton and rice by 32% and 18% respectively 
compared to the first period. This fall may largely be explained by productivity 
changes and a greater intensity of input use that led to yield and area growth. 
For example, production of rice and cotton increased in the second stage of 
reform policy relative to the first by 25% and 11 % respectively. Consequently, 
the farmers total private revenues increased by 142% and 350% (so that the 
denominator increased), and therefore the peR decreased. 
The estimated peR coefficients for crop rotations are also reported in 
Table 6-1. These generally indicate that the private cost ratio increased over 
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90 91 92 93 94 
0.29 0.34 0.35 0.52 0.55 
0.39 0.44 0.48 0.67 0.63 
0.41 0.53 0.55 0.60 0.57 
0.56 0.55 0.72 1.12 0.95 
0.45 0.53 0.57 0.77 0.77 
0.52 0.42 0.37 0.43 0.65 
0.37 0.40 0.43 0.57 0.47 
0.29 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.35 
0.66 0.56 0.52 0.64 0.35 
0.41 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.49 
0.48 0.46 0.45 0.60 0.58 
90 91 92 93 94 
0.34 0.39 0.41 0.58 0.59 
0.33 0.37 0.39 0.54 0.50 
0.39 0.43 0.48 0.71 0.70 
0.45 0.45 0.44 0.58 0.41 
0.41 0.48 0.52 0.71 0.69 
0.40 0.45 0.48 0.65 0.57 
0.56 0.55 0.54 0.69 0.44 
0.50 0.54 0.64 0.91 0.86 
0.51 0.43 0.39 0.46 0.63 
0.39 0.41 0.43 0.52 0.48 
0.40 0.43 0.46 0.55 0.55 
0.48 0.48 0.54 0.66 0.65 
0.34 0.31 0.41 0.52 0.45 
0.31 0.30 0.37 0.47 0.42 
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90-94 95 96 97 98 99 
0.4 0.53 0.46 0.49 0.63 0.58 
O.S 0.68 0.59 0.51 0.70 0.59 
O.S 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.64 0.71 
0.7 0.96 0.82 0.82 1.06 0.98 
0.6 0.59 0.55 0.50 0.79 1.05 
0.5 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.86 0.83 
0.4 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.55 0.54 
0.3 027 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.32 
O.S 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.97 0.89 
0.4 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.42 0.44 
0.5 0.54 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.49 
90-94 95 96 97 98 99 
o.S 0.59 0.52 0.50 0.66 0.58 
0.4 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.59 0.56 
O.S 0.68 0.59 0.61 0.76 0.70 
O.S 0.60 0.55 0.56 0.78 0.72 
0.6 0.64 0.57 0.51 0.74 0.75 
O.S 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.64 0.69 
0.6 0.63 0.60 0.57 0.88 0.95 
0.7 0.74 0.66 0.62 0.89 1.01 
O.S 0.43 0.42 0.44 . 0.66 0.68 
0.4 0.45 0.41 0.40 0.48 0.49 
0.5 0.55 0.48 0.42 0.52 0.50 
0.6 0.62 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.57 
0.4 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.41 
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time for the majority of rotations. As before, the rise in domestic factor costs 
and tradable inputs might explain this increment. 
Using the average estimates for PCRs during the period 1995-2000, 
Figure 6-2 summarises the preferable crops and crop rotations from the private 
(domestic) profitability point of view, i.e. the lowest private cost ratio. 
Tomatoes had the lowest ratio (0.29) and soybeans the highest (0.94). Other 
crops showed some variation; for example, long and short berseem reached 
0.42 and 0.48 respectively, followed by rice (0.49), wheat (0.54), sugar cane 
and maize the same ratio (0.61) and finally cotton (0.62), broad beans (0.70) 
and potatoes (0.79). 
Considering different crop rotations, the results indicate that tomatoes 
followed by maize have the lowest PCR (0.36) while broad beans followed by 
soybean have the highest (0.79). Other preferable rotations ranked according to 
the lowest PCR are as follows: tomatoes followed by soybeans (0.39), long 
berseem followed by rice (0.45), long berseem followed by maize and wheat 
followed by rice were about 0.50. Next come short berseem followed by 
cotton, broad beans followed by rice, long berseem-followed by soybeans and 
wheat followed by maize, all about 0.56. Finally, the least preferable rotations 
are (all about 0.67) broad beans followed by maize, wheat followed by 
potatoes or soybeans and broad beans followed by potatoes. 
6.2.3 : Net Private Profitability, peR and Area 
The results of NPP values obtained from the PAM during the period 
1995-2000 for major crops along with their associated peR coefficients are 
portrayed in Figure 6-3. From this figure we may observe that the higher the 
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FIGURE 6-2: PCR ESTIMATES FOR CROP AND CROP ROTATIONS (1995-2000) 
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net private profitability the lower the value of the PCR coefficient and vice 
versa. For example, production of vegetable crops (such as tomatoes), fodder 
crop (such as long berseem) and field crops (such as rice, wheat and maize) 
represents a source of high profitability in private terms, with high positive 
NPP per feddan of about £E 3768, 1426, 1116, 820 and 610 respectively, and 
low PCR coefficients (0.29, 0.42, 0.49, 0.54 and 0.61 respectively). 
FIGURE 6-3: NET PRIVATE PROFITABILITY AND PRIVATE COST RATIO FOR SOME 
MAJOR CROPS DURING THE PERIOD 1995-2000 
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Source: Study Calculations. 
One might conjecture that there is a relationship between the cultivated 
area of the crop and its private cost ratio. This is because growers are likely to 
be willing to devote more area to the most profitable crop and/or rotation (Le., 
max D) which is in turn is reflected by a lower PCR. In this light, the private 
cost ratio can be considered as an indicator of sectors that might be enlarged 2 
or reduced according to private profitability. 
2 Because the farming area cannot be expanded, growers will be willing to substitute within 
their farming area other more profitable crops. 
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To investigate this conjecture Figures 6-4 illustrates the trends in the 
cultivated area and the private cost ratio using a three-year moving average. 
This suggests a number of conclusions about the growers' responses to 
profitability (taking in consideration the changes in farm input/output prices). 
Planted areas for crops such as wheat, soybean, broad bean and potatoes show 
generally high but variable response in relation to the private cost ratio. The 
inversely proportional relationship between the private cost ratio and the 
planted area is very clear in the case of wheat, where it can be seen that the 
lower the peR, the higher the planted area, and vice versa, along the period 
1986-2000 (see Figure 6-4). As mentioned earlier, this could be explained by 
the response of wheat growers to the changes in input and output prices which 
in turn affect their net revenues and consequently the decision on the growing 
of wheat in the future. For example, the yield and production of wheat 
increased in 1987 compared to 1986 by 24% and 41 % respectively and its net 
profitability increased by 18%. As a result, its peR fell by 11 %; this increase 
in net profitability (the fall in private cost ratio) encouraged wheat growers to 
enlarge the planted area by 14% in 1987. 
Soy and broad beans and potatoes also showed a high response to the 
lower peR in terms of their planted area. For example, the peR for soybean 
increased from 0.62 in the frrst stage to 0.78 and 0.94 in the second and third 
stages respectively, and its cultivated area decreased from 0.10 to 0.06 and 
0.03 million feddan in the same periods. 
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The same relation between planted area and peR can be seen for 
potatoes, maize and tomatoes (see Fig 6-4). For potatoes, the peR increased 
from 0.4 in the first stage to 0.5 and 0.8 in the second and third stages 
respectively, while the cultivated area decreased by 22% and 17% in the 
second and the third stages respectively. The case of tomatoes is characterised 
by a degree of stability, as its peR was around 0.3 on average during the 
period 1986-2000; the cultivated area fell by 10% while the peR increased 
from 0.29 in the first stage to 0.34 in the second. In the third period the 
cultivated area increased by 7.66 % while the peR fell to 29%. 
Profitability is not the only factor affecting the decision to grow a 
given crop. Figure 6-4A shows that the peR of cotton fell in the second stage 
of refonn relative to the first by about 23%, presumably due to the following 
reasons: 1- cotton yield had increased by about 11 % in that time, 2-
procurement prices rose from 75% of border prices in 1991 (priced at the 
market exchange rate) to 114% in 1992 and then 132% in 1993, 3- acreage 
controls were removed for the 1992 and 1993 crops, 4- the marketing of cotton 
was liberalised in 1994 where decrees for eliminating· market controls on 
fanners, merchants and exporters introduced for the 1994 crop (growers were 
required before refonns to sell their crop as seed cotton and were restricted to 
disposing it to the co-operative collection centre at a detennined government 
price). These changes would suggest growers should be willing to grow cotton. 
But, on the contrary we find that the cultivated area fell by 0.17 million feddan 
in the second stage compared to the first. The cultivated area continued its fall 











8 g ~ ~ g 00 :5 N I 0 0 0\ 
I 
I I I 1986-87-88 f ,. 1986-87-88 I + ..... 1986-87-88 ~ ~I ?:-
,I 
87-88-89 1 Ib' {\ 87-88-89 CIl 87-88-89 rn I'--j t:r' ~ ~CS 0 OQ 88-89-90 ::+ ~ ~88-89-90 I c::r c::r 88-89-90 0 0 tn .... (;! 0 en 0 0 89-90-91 1 0 89-90-9 1 0 89-90-91 "!j 
:3 S 
'"t:;j 
90-91-92 I ~ ~ • • I I I 
90-91-92 90-91-92 ~ ~ ~
91-92-93 t \ 91-92-93 t f\ 91-92-93 t \ / 
~ ~ ~ ~
0\ \ III 





0 92-93-94 92-93-94 
92-93-94 
-z ~ ~\0,., 
:l. oom 
93-94-95 I • • II I 
93-94-95 I , , III 93-94-95 O\t::I ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~
94-95-96 I 94-95-96 I 94-95-96 
~ ~





95-96-97 1 95-96-97 
95-96-97 ;::: 
• + II I " f II I 
~ ~ 0 
tn ~ ~
0 ;:s 
96-97-98 1 96-97-98 1 
96-97-98 [fi ~ ~ I:l.. ~ ~[il [] ~ ~ 0 97-98-99 ::I 97-98-99 1 97-98-99 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ <5 R 
98-99-2000 I 98-99-2000 "" ~ ~ 98-99-2000 
~ ~ ~ ~
(") ~ ~
~ ~ 0 0 ? 0 <=> 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ <=> ;:: 
0 ~ ~ 0 <=> 0 0 <:> 0 ? <=> 0 0 0 ~ . . :5 ... 
.., ~ ~ v- a.. :... 00 io ~ ~
N .., ~ ~ V- a.. N 





PCRratio "'. Z ~ ~~ ~;:: 
Ef 
Private Cost Ratio and Domestic Resource Results 
there were factors other than prices affecting the farmers' decision about 
growing cotton. 
The fall in cotton's area may be explained by the fact that its yield had 
fallen by 6% (which consequently decreased the total domestic revenue), and 
by the complete liberalisation of land rent controls in September 1997 (which 
dramatically increased rents). Consequently the PCR in the third stage 
increased by 20% compared to the second stage. These circumstances led 
cotton growers to plant other alternative and more profitable crops such as rice. 
The relationship between the PCR and the planted area for the most 
important fodder crops in Egypt, long and short berseem, differs from that for 
cotton. Even before the reform of policy there were no constraints on the 
growing of long and short berseem. The demand for these crops is largely 
determined by the stocks of cattle and buffalo, with prices adjusting to clear 
the market. The area of long berseem increased despite the increase in the PCR 
during the period 1986-95, while as the PCR decreased during the period 1996-
98, the area also fell. This result may be explained by the fact that the main 
factor affecting its cultivated area is the cattle and buffalo livestock. In other 
words, whether the PCR is high or low the areas devoted to this crop is 
determined according to supply and demand forces. The same reason can be 
considered in the case of short berseem however, the area planted with short 
berseem is affected indirectly by constraints on the growing of other crop for 
example; area planted by short berseem is correlated with the cotton area (as 
short berseem is normally the winter crop that precedes cotton). 3 
3 That's why the magnitude and pattern of short berseem and cotton area are very close (see 
Figure 6-4A) 
6-21 
Private Cost Ratio and Domestic Resource Results 
In short, the relatively high NPPs of wheat, rice and maize may explain 
the willingness of field crop growers to plant them. For example, wheat and 
rice area has increased in the third period of reform (1995-2000) above its level 
in 1986 by 77%, 54% and 22 % respectively. Similarly, the relatively low 
NNPs of soybean and potatoes may also explain why farmers reduced their 
planted area by 68% and 35% respectively over the same period. 
6.3 : Measures of Efflciency and Resource Allocation 
6.3.1 : Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) Results 
6.3.1.1 : Introduction 
As defined in Chapter 4, The starting point of international 
competitiveness evaluation is to derive the actual costs of production by 
adjusting domestic costs and tradable products for taxes, subsidies and other 
price distortions. Once the real costs of production are estimated, 
competitiveness, will be evaluated along the lines initially developed by Bruno 
(1967) in his measurement of domestic resource cost and the various 
refinements that subsequently have been introduced (Corden, 1974; Ingram 
and Pearson, 1981; Pearson et aI., 1987; Monke and Pearson, 1989). The 
domestic resource cost is the ratio of domestic factors valued at social prices to 
the difference between the gross benefit and the costs of tradable inputs. It has 
been widely used in developing countries to measure efficiency or comparative 
advantage and guide policy reforms (World Bank, 1991; Appleyard, 1987; 
Morris, 1990; Gonzales et aI., 1993; Alpine and Pickett, 1993). It compares 
the opportunity costs of domestic factors to the value added at border prices. If 
the DRC is less than one then the implication is that the value of domestic 
resources used in the production of the commodity is less than the value added 
at social prices and the production of the commodity represents an efficient use 
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of domestic resources. If the ORC is greater than one then the implication is 
that the economy is incurring costs in excess of value added at social prices 
and foreign exchange is lost by producing the commodity under that 
technology set. If the ORC equals to one then it is indicated that the economy 
on balance neither gains nor saves foreign exchange through production 
(Adesina and Coulibaly, 1998; Adesina et aI., 2002). 
6.3.1.2 : Empirical Results 
The main results of our ORC estimates using the PAM matrix analysis 
for main crops and their associated fourteen main rotations during the period 
1986-2000 are summarised in Table 6-2. It indicates a comparative advantage 
in most commodities studied for 1986-2000. Egypt appears to have had a 
comparative advantage in tomatoes and potatoes (0.60), wheat and rice (0.87) 
and long berseem (0.94). However, the domestic resource cost coefficients for 
sugar cane and short berseem and soybean are more than one (1.18 and 1.28 
respectively) that suggests Egypt faces a comparative disadvantage in their 
production. At the same time, Egypt appears to have a neutral comparative 
advantage in producing cotton, broad beans and maize whereas their ORe 
estimate values are nearly one. 
As mentioned earlier, the lower the coefficient of the ORC of the 
product the more comparative advantage the product enjoys. The estimates 
suggest a number of conclusions about comparative advantage within 
agriculture in the period 1986-2000. In the import crops, for example, sugar 
cane has a ORC coefficient, in some years, below one. These coefficients 
substantially reflect the drastic changes that occurred in the world market. 
Sugar prices were 133 U.S $ and 148 U.S $ per ton, in 1986 and 1987 
respectively in which this was reflected on higher ORC coefficients 1.58 and 
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Wheat & Maize 1.05 1.08 
Wheat & Rice 1.17 1.15 
Wheat & Soybean 1.08 1.08 
Wheat & Pot 0.55 0.58 
Broad bean & Maize 1.10 0.86 
Broad bean & Rice 1.25 0.92 
Broad bean & Potatoes 0.54 0.51 
Broad bean & Soybean 1.14 0.85 
S.Berseem & Cotton 0.76 0.89 
L.Berseem&Rice 1.12 0.90 
L.Berseem & Maize 1.00 0.84 
L.Berseem & Soybean 1.03 0.84 
Tomatoes & Soybean 0.51 0.83 
Tomatoes & Maize 0.51 0.83 









































































































































































































































































































0.98 0.98 0.87 
0.86 0.65 0.71 
1.04 0.89 0.92 
0.82 0.72 0.63 
0.94 1.03 1.16 
0.83 0.69 0.93 
0.79 0.75 0.75 
1.00 0.95 1.34 
0.98 1.08 1.12 
0.81 0.64 0.69 
0.91 0.88 0.81 
0.95 0.80 0.83 
1.13 0.98 0.53 
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1.60 respectively. But when world prices increased to 224 U.S $, 281 U.S $ 
and 275 U.S $ per ton for years 1988, 1989 and 1990, the DRC coefficients fell 
to 0.76, 0.64 and 0.72 respectively. And again when sugar world prices fell to 
138 U.S $ and 178 U.S $ in 1999 and 2000 the corresponding DRC 
coefficients rose to exceed one. The increased comparative advantage of 
wheat in the period 1998-2000 is due to the fall in the opportunity cost of land 
by 44% (compared with its average in 1995-1997), which in tum lowered the 
numerator, and hence the DRC coefficient decreased. 
For export crops, it is clear that Egypt had a strong comparative 
advantage in producing tomatoes and potatoes during the period 1986-2000 
with DRC coefficients around 0.60. Other export crops such as rice have an 
increasing comparative advantage while cotton has nearly a neutral 
comparative advantage during the same period. Rice showed a significant 
increase in its comparative advantage, estimated at 30%, in the second period 
compared to its level in the first period and further by of 5% during the third 
period. This increased comparative advantage is mainly due to the fall in 
cotton residual that lowered the opportunity cost of land and from the other 
side, the rise of rice world prices during the second period. 
The cotton results show that its estimated DRC coefficients increased 
during the third period to around 1.21, which indicates that cotton has lost its 
comparative advantage since 19964• This result is mainly due to the fall in the 
world price from 866 U.S $ per ton in 1995 to 737 U.S $, 663 U.S $, 638 U.S $ 
and 492 U.S $ in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 respectively. 
4 Except for 1997, cotton reached neutral comparative advantage of DRC= 1. 
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Although fodder crops are not traded internationally, it is useful to 
consider their DRC coefficients as this might help the policy adviser in his 
decision about producing, importing or exporting fodder alternatives, such as 
concentrates. For example, if the country has no comparative advantage in 
producing short berseem then it would be useful (from the social point of view) 
to advise growers to plant another competitive crop in which the country does 
have a comparative advantage; and on the other hand it might be useful to 
extend the production of non-traditional fodder such as concentrates. It appears 
that Egypt had a comparative advantage in long berseem rather than short 
berseem in the period 1986-2000. This was mainly due to the higher value 
added of long berseem, as its yield per feddan is nearly triple that of short 
berseem. 
In short, most of the changes in the domestic resource cost coefficients 
are explained by changes in world prices, which in tum affect the value added 
for the crop itself or the opportunity cost of land (through the competitive 
crops). 
Using the average estimates for DRCs during the period 1995-2000, 
Figure 6-5 summarises the results of estimated coefficients for crop and crop 
rotations. From these results we may conclude that sugar cane, soybeans and 
cotton are produced despite a comparative disadvantage. Their DRe 
coefficients are well in excess of unity (average 1.28), indicating that the 
present levels of their production represent an uneconomic use of resources. 
Wheat, maize and broad bean have a neutral comparative advantage, as their 
ORC is close to one. Production of potatoes, tomatoes, rice, long berseem and 
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wheat represents a sound use of resources in national economic terms, with all 
having DRC coefficients less than one. 
For crop rotations, the results indicate that rotations such as broad 
beans followed by soybeans and short berseem followed by cotton are a case of 
slightly inefficient use of resources during the period 1995-2000, as their 
estimated DRCs are 1.14 and 1.11 respectively. By contrast, there appears to 
be a comparative advantage for rotations such as wheat followed by potatoes 
(0.69), broad beans followed by potatoes, tomatoes followed by maize, 
tomatoes followed by soybeans, long berseem followed by rice, and wheat 
followed by rice, which were all about 0.76. Next come broad beans followed 
by rice, and long berseem followed by maize (0.87). Finally, wheat followed 
by maize and long berseem followed by soybean (0.94). Other rotations such 
as wheat followed by soybean and broad beans followed by maize indicate a 
neutral comparative advantage with a DRC coefficient close to one. 
6.3.2 : Agricultural Products and Net Social ProfitabiUty 
The main objective for an agricultural policy advisor is to eliminate the 
distortions among various competing sectors so that distortions are reduced as 
eliminated resources (e.g. land) is efficiently allocated between alternative 
crops. Hence, addressing the net social profitability as an indicator of 
economic efficiency could be useful. The net social profitability is defined as 
total revenue minus total tradable and domestic costs valued at social prices. 
The NSP formulation used here (referring to PAM notation in Chapter 4) is H= 
E - [F+G]. If NSP is positive (negative), then the sector may be considered 
economically efficient (inefficient), with the value of output at world prices 
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being greater (less) than the sum of tradable inputs plus domestic factor costs 
(Hassan, 1991). 
The gross net social profitability of a sector can be calculated by 
multiplying the NSP per feddan by total planted area of that sector. The results 
for the NSP values obtained from the PAM during the period 1995-2000 are 
presented in Figure 6-6. From this figure we may consider that cotton and 
sugar cane face an acute disadvantage. The DRC coefficients are well above 
unity while the NSPs are extremely negative. These two crops represents 97% 
of the total deficit in the imported and exported crops studied. The main reason 
for this result is the high opportunity cost of land on one side and the low 
world prices for their products (as discussed earlier) on the other side. 
According to the results obtained, the current level of production of these two 
important crops represents an inefficient use of resources. In addition, 
soybeans have a DRC coefficient more than one, so that its existing level of 
output appears to be uneconomic at the given NSP estimate. 






Source: Table A6-2. 
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In contrast, production of field crops (such as rice and wheat), 
vegetable crops (such as tomatoes and potatoes) and fodder crop (such as long 
berseem) represents a sound use of resources in national economic terms, with 
DRC coefficients less than one, and positive NSPs of about 748, 683, 493, 113 
and 938 million Egyptian pounds respectively. 
6.3.3 : The domestic resource cost (DRC) and the social cost benefit 
(SeD). 
However, the DRC may be biased against activities that rely heavily on 
domestic non-traded factors, i.e., land and some subsets of labour (Fang and 
Beghin, 2000). A good alternative to the DRC is the social cost-benefit ratio 
(SCB), which accounts for all costs and avoids classification errors (in 
classifying traded and non-traded components) in the calculation of DRC 
(Masters and Winter Nelson, 1995). The SCB is defined as traded and non-
traded costs divided by total revenue both valued at social prices and in PAM 
notations as {F+G)IE. The lower values of SCB indicate stronger 
competitiveness and vice versa. 
Table 6-3 shows the results of the SCB analysis. Using the values of 
the SCB ratios led to only a very slight change in commodity ranking 
compared to the estimated DRCs and essentially brings the same message. 
That is, the SCB results indicate that wheat and rice are ranked jointly as the 
third most socially profitable crops that are worth expanding (after tomatoes 
and potatoes) while they are ranked third and fourth according to the DRC 
estimates. Moreover, the SCB results mirror the same results, obtained from 
the DRC results, implying that the government should review its policy 
towards cotton, sugar cane, short berseem and soy bean if its objective is to 
encourage activities that earn foreign exchange. 
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TABLE 6-3 : DRC AND SCB RESULTS AND RANKING 
DRC SCB 
Q 
= = = Q\ ~ ~ Q = ',:,:: Q\ ~ ~ = = ',:,:: 00 Q\ = = 00 Q\ = = .,c I ~ ~ N = .,c I N N ~ ~Q .,c = .h .,c 00 Q\ ~ ~ 00 Q\ Q\ Q\ 0\ 00 Q\ 0\ 0\ 00 ~ ~ ~ ~ Q\ Q\ ~ ~ ~ ~ Q\ Q\ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Tomatoes 0.62 0.42 0.71 0.59 1 0.68 0.47 0.74 0.63 1 
Potatoes 0.50 0.65 0.62 0.60 2 0.73 0.77 0.74 0.75 2 
Wheat 0.82 0.92 0.85 0.86 3 0.85 0.93 0.87 0.89 3 
Rice 1.14 0.80 0.76 0.87 4 1.07 0.84 0.80 0.89 3 
Long berseem 0.94 1.12 0.80 0.94 5 0.94 1.10 0.82 0.95 4 
Broad bean 0.80 1.09 1.03 0.99 6 0.85 1.06 1.02 0.99 S 
Maize 1.08 0.94 1.00 1.01 7 1.06 0.95 1.01 1.00 6 
Cotton 0.96 0.97 1.21 1.06 8 0.96 0.98 1.18 1.05 7 
Sugar cane 1.14 1.06 1.33 1.19 9 1.07 1.04 1.23 1.12 8 
Short berseem 0.95 1.54 1.00 1.22 10 1.07 1.47 1.02 1.19 9 
S o ~ b e a n n 1.21 1.28 1.32 1.28 11 1.14 1.21 1.23 1.20 10 
Source: PAM results. 
• Ranked according to 1986-2000 results. 
6.3.4 : ConsistencylInconsistency of DRC Coefficients Estimated by This 
Study and Other Studies. 
Tables 6-4, 6-4A and 6-4B summarise the results ofDRC coefficient estimated 
by other researchers for Egypt throughout the period 1965-2000. They show 
that despite the differences in the methodology and periods of study, a few of 
the estimated coefficients are very similar throughout the three studies. For 
example, the DRC coefficient of rice was less than one during the periods 
1965-76 and 1980-87 with an average 0.62 and 0.92 respectively. In the study, 
the DRC coefficient of rice is less than one with an average 0.87. Soybean and 
sugar cane appeared to be activities of comparative disadvantage, meanwhile 
tomatoes and potatoes indicate a comparative advantage throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, with average DRCs of 1.42, 1.26,0.48 and 0.66 respectively. Also 
it is noticeable that the DRC coefficient of cotton increased from 0.31 during 
the period 1965-76 to 0.56 during 1980s and further to 1.06 in the 1990s the 
case that indicate that Egypt is currently experiencing a comparative 
disadvantage in that sector. 
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Source: Hassan, R. "Economic Efficiency of the Use of Agricultural Resources." Ph.D., 
Nottingham University, 1991, Chapter 6 p.31. 
TABLE 6-4A: DRC COEFFICIENTS OF MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT ESTIMATED BY 
HASSAN 



















0.55 0.75 0.74 0.56 
2.04 1.57 1.61 2.26 
0.82 0.56 0.68 1.19 
2.53 2.93 3.57 2.01 
0.53 0.60 1.39 1.74 
0.99 0.76 1.29 1.14 
1.55 1.08 0.86 1.17 
0.69 0.72 0.75 0.47 
0.40 0.39 0.34 0.58 
0.53 0.47 0.43 
2.42 2.84 3.60 
1.14 0.91 1.07 
3.06 4.76 8.42 
2.07 1.19 2.38 
1.24 2.67 3.37 
1.51 1.19 1.21 
0.76 1.01 0.59 










Source: Hassan, R. "Economic Efficiency of the Use of Agricultural Resources." Ph.D., 
Nottingham University, 1991, Chapter 6 p.31. 
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In contrast, the comparative advantage of the competitive crops as rice 
and maize has improved. DRC coefficients of maize, for instance, fell from 
1.57 and 3.77 in the period 1965-76 and 1980s to nearly one during the 1990s. 
6.4 : Private Profitability, Efficiency and Reform. 
In this section we try to answer very briefly some of the fundamental 
questions such as: (a) whether refonn has generally improved private 
profitability and efficiency of agricultural product (b); whether production of 
crops with the greatest private profitability (or lower PCR) has increased 
during the refonn era; (c) have exports of products with the greatest 
comparative advantage have expanded during the refonn era; (d) do the 
estimated measures of profitability and efficiency tell a unambiguous story? 
As mentioned in earlier discussions (see Table 2-8 and Figure 6-1), 
both private profitability and its rate of change have improved over time for 
most crops during the period 1986-2000. Net private profitability increased 
(for most cropss) during the second and third periods compared to its original 
level in the first stage ofrefonn by on average 74% and 125% respectively. 
The DRC measure of efficiency of resource allocation reveals that 
soybean and cotton are losing comparative advantage over time, with their 
DRCs increasing from 1.21 and 0.96 to 1.28 and 0.97 and further to 1.32 and 
1.21 during the first, second and third periods, respectively. In contrast, the 
comparative advantage of rice imprOVed from a high DRC of 1.14 to 0.80 and 
0.76 respectively. 
Crops with higher private profitability attracted· farmers to growing 
them. For example, crops with a rise in their profitability during the third 
S However, potatoes and soybean private profitability fell by 46% and 70% at the same time of 
measurement. 
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period compared to their level in the first, such as wheat (275%), rice (152%) 
and tomatoes (98%) (see Tables 2-4 and 2-8) and a low PCR (average 0.4, see 
Table 6-1). Their areas have increased by 83%, 52% and 9% respectively and 
consequently their production has increased significantly, by 190%, 126% and 
103% respectively over the three periods. These high volumes of production 
had a great impact on their trade performance. For example, the import volume 
of wheat fell (despite the high popUlation growth rate of 2.8%) in the third 
period compared to its original level in the first by 51,0000 ton saving the 
country, in constant price terms, about 25.5 million £E. In contrast, the fall in 
soybean and potatoes profitability by 70% and 46%, with a relatively high 
PCR of 0.8 (on average), reduced their production sharply by about 76% and 
33% respectively. 
On the international trade level, Table 6-5 shows the improvement in 
the value of exports (in constant price terms) for major crops; these almost 
doubled during the period 1995-2000 compared with their original level in 
1986-89. Despite the fall in potato production, exports increased remarkably; 
the fall in output was absorbed by the domestic market, its domestic supply 
falling from 0.82 to 0.46 to 0.31 million ton during the first, second and third 
stage respectively. Moreover, despite the rise in domestic production of 
importable crops such as maize, broad beans and sugar cane, their import 
values increased dramatically, to as much as seven times their value in the first 
period. 
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TABLE 6-5: PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS DURING 




Rice 6.1 127.3 30.3 604.6 
Potatoes 13.8 119.3 26.6 243.5 
Cotton 10.4 78.9 6.2 33.4 
Tomatoes 1.8 80.2 1.0 25.8 
Total 405.8 907.3 
Import Products 
Wheat 688.3 118.9 616.8 93.4 
Maize 174.0 81.7 329.1 176.3 
Broad bean 0.8 330.4 11.7 2183.3 
Soybean 4.6 105.1 17.1 397.7 
Sugar 5.6 440.5 53.2 4228.9 
Total 1076.5 7079.6 
Calculated from Table A6-3. 
Quantity in 0000 ton and Values in constant terms 1986=100% 
6.5 : Summary and Conclusion. 
In this Chapter we have tried to measure domestic profitability and 
comparative advantage in Egyptian agriculture using the private cost ratio for 
the first and domestic resource cost, net social profitability and social cost 
benefit indicators for the latter. Computations were carried out for 11 crops and 
14 crop rotations for 16 years, making this more comprehensive and 
unexpurgated than any previous study. The PCR results during the period 
1986-2000 suggest that tomatoes had the lowest ratio (0.3) and soybeans the 
highest (0.8) while other crops showed some variation in between. Moreover, 
peR results for crops are consistent, along with planted areas, in identifying 
activities that are privately profitable at domestic prices. They indicate a high 
response of planted area to private profitability for most crops. The peR 
estimates for crop rotations varied between the lowest of 0.36 for tomatoes 
followed by maize and the highest of 0.69 for broad beans followed by 
soybean during the same period. 
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The three measures of comparative advantage showed consistent results 
in identifying activities that are socially profitable at world prices. The DRC 
results suggest that Egypt, during the period 1986-2000, had a comparative 
advantage in producing tomatoes, potatoes, wheat, rice and long berseem, and 
a comparative disadvantage in cotton, short berseem, sugar cane and soybean, 
and a neutral comparative advantage in broad beans and maize. These results 
are confirmed by the NSP and SCB measures, which show that wherever there 
is a net social loss there is a comparative disadvantage. 
6-36 
Chapter VII 
Nominal and Effective Protection Results 
7 Chapter VII: Measures of Protection: Nominal and 
Effective Protection Coefficients (NPC and EPC) Results. 
7.1 : Introduction 
Protection coefficients can characterise the policy setting in broad quantitative 
tenns. They are diagnostic and prescriptive. They are prescriptive, however, 
only in the sense that the divergence between a domestic price and the system 
of reference prices has efficiency implications. At the simplest level, nominal 
protection coefficients focus only on output or input prices. At a more 
comprehensive level, the effective protection coefficient expands to capture 
protection of the entire productive activity (Taskok, 1990). Major questions 
raised by policy interventions are (1) What are the net effects of economic 
policies for different sectors? (2) To what extent are different sectors protected 
or disprotected in relation to other sectors? (3) Are those sectors that the 
government seeks to promote being in fact promoted? (Tyler, 1985). Our 
principal motivation in this chapter is to answer such questions by reporting 
and analysing the results of nominal and effective protection coefficients 
obtained from the estimation of the PAM using data from the period 1986 to 
2000, and the methods set out in Chapter 5. These criteria are calculated 
annually for each crop, both separately and as part of a rotation. 
Our intention is to evaluate the effect of agriCUltural policy reforms (or 
market failures not corrected via efficient policies) in output and factor 
markets, as discussed in Chapter 4, in which we have categorised the period of 
study 1986-2000 as three distinct periods as noted in Chapter 6. 
This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 gIves a brief 
introduction. Section 2 presents the results for Nominal Protection for outputs 
and inputs for crops and crop rotations. In section 3, the results of the effective 
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protection coefficient estimations for crops and crop rotations are discussed. A 
comparison between the results of this study and other earlier studies is given 
in section 4. Section 5 summaries and concludes the main findings. 
7.2 : Nominal Protection Coefficients. 
7.2.1 : Nominal Protection Coefficients for Outputs (NPCO). 
7.2.1.1 : Introduction 
To recap on the discussion in Chapter 4, a NPCO is calculated in the 
PAM matrix by dividing the revenue valued at private prices [A] by revenue 
valued at social prices [E]. The objective of calculating the NPCO is to 
measure the actual divergences or distortions between the domestic and 
international prices of output (at the farm gate level). If the NPCO is less than 
one, it implies that producers are receiving less (for their products) than the 
prevailing world prices i.e., it confirms the presence of taxes on outputs. An 
NPCO greater than one shows the presence of subsidies where producers are 
getting (for their products) more than the prevailing social prices. An NPCO 
equal to one (in the absence of market failure) reveals the absence of 
intervention. 
The estimated NPCs for different products and sectors can provide a 
comparison for the relative incentive structure. When the estimated NPC for a 
product (or sector), say x, exceeds that for another product (sector), say y, it 
implies that producers of product (in sector) x are receiving better incentives 
than the producers of product (in sector) y. Such discriminatory interventions 
transfer resources from one use to others and frequently lead to inefficient use 
(Shllpi, 1996). Moreover, from a strictly trade theoretic point of view, the 
welfare (and efficiency) of the economy can be improved by letting domestic 
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prices anchor around the appropriately adjusted world prices (Corden, 1979, 
and Timmer, 1989). 
7.2.1.2 Empirical Results 
The calculated NPCOs for the II crops and their associated 14 crop rotations 
during the period 1986-2000 are summarised in Table 7-1. The principal result 
for crop analysis during the period 1986-2000 is that, on average, the market 
prices for all the studied crops (except for sugar cane and fodder crops) have 
been set at levels less than those prevailing on world markets, thus implying a 
tax on those crops; the all-crop average over the entire sample has an NPCO of 
0.90. However, variation exists both across time and by crop type. For 
example, the NPCO value (average 1995-2000) of 0.60 for potatoes means that 
potatoes producers are only receiving 60 percent of the equivalent potatoes 
world price. If the Egyptian agricultural trade policy for potatoes were allowed 
to operate in absence of intervention, producers could export their products and 
receive more than 1.6 as much. In contrast, an NPCO for sugar cane of 1.25 
(average 1995-2000) shows that policies are increasing the market price to a 
level 25 percent higher than the world price. And thus, in the absence of 
barriers or government protection, the model predicts that sugar cane producers 
would have received only 80% of the price they had during that period. 
The results also reveal, first, that the level of governmental taxes 
imposed on exportable outputs} is higher than those on importable outputs2 
throughout the three distinct periods. 
1 Export crops are cotton, rice, tomatoes and potatoes. 
2 Import crops are wheat, maize, sugar cane, soybean and broad bean. 
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TABLE 7-1: NOMINAL PROTECTION COEFFICIENT RESULTS FOR CROP AND CROP ROTATION OUTPUTS (NPCO) IN THE PERlOD 1986-2000. 
Crop 1986 87 88 89 86-89 90 91 92 93 94 90-94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 95-2000 1986-2000 
Wheat 1.12 1.03 0.71 0.90 0.94 1.05 0.90 0.81 0.89 0.84 0.90 0.77 0.75 0.95 1.15 1.19 1.15 0.99 0.95 
Maize 1.27 1.41 0.96 1.01 1.16 0.99 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.80 0.65 0.90 1.06 1.13 1.18 0.95 0.98 
Sugarcane 1.39 1.26 0.66 0.61 0.98 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.85 0.78 0.76 0.80 0.91 1.02 1.44 1.93 1.40 1.25 1.01 
Soybeans 1.14 1.11 0.65 1.00 0.98 1.03 0.84 0.83 0.71 0.78 0.84 0.91 0.78 0.80 0.96 1.07 1.01 0.92 0.91 
Broad beans 1.22 0.82 0.70 0.65 0.85 0.71 0.64 0.67 0.92 0.86 0.76 0.87 0.75 0.86 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.86 0.82 
Cotton 0.92 0.85 0.77 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.85 1.03 1.12 0.76 0.93 1.03 1.14 1.16 0.91 1.06 0.99 1.05 0.96 
Rice 1.56 1.05 0.67 0.76 1.01 0.84 0.65 0.74 0.88 0.91 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.9 0.94 1.12 1.30 1.04 0.96 
Tomatoes 0.57 0.88 0.74 0.42 0.65 0.62 0.46 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.42 0.56 0.83 1.36 1.15 0.60 0.48 0.83 0.65 
Potatoes 0.60 0.51 0.51 0.69 0.58 0.71 0.47 0.55 0.72 0.80 0.65 0.45 0.61 0.69 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.61 
Long Berseem 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Short Berseem . 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 1.07 0.99 0.76 0.81 0.91 0.87 0.76 0.78 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.97 1.01 1.06 1.00 0.95 0.90 
Crop Rotation 1986 87 88 89 86-89 90 91 92 93 94 90-94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 95-2000 1986-2000 
Wheat & Maize 1.18 1.18 0.82 0.95 1.03 1.02 0.84 0.82 0.87 0.84 0.88 0.78 0.70 0.92 1.11 1.16 1.16 0.97 0.96 
Wheat & Rice 1.31 1.04 0.69 0.83 0.97 0.94 0.75 0.78 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.80 0.81 0.97 1.06 1.17 1.29 1.02 0.95 
Wheat & Soybean 1.13 1.07 0.68 0.94 0.95 1.04 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.82 0.76 0.89 1.08 1.15 1.10 0.96 0.93 
Wheat & Pot 0.71 0.62 0.55 0.75 0.66 0.81 0.56 0.61 0.77 0.81 0.71 0.52 0.65 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.69 
Broad bean & Maize 1.24 1.02 0.83 0.81 0.97 0.84 0.72 0.75 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.84 0.70 0.88 0.97 1.05 1.02 0.91 0.89 
Broad bean & Rice 1.38 0.91 0.69 0.70 0.92 0.78 0 .65 0.71 0.89 0.90 0.79 0.85 0.81 0.93 0.95 1.07 1.16 0.96 0.89 
Broad bean & Potatoes 0.71 0.59 0.55 0.68 0.63 0.71 0.51 0.57 0.76 0.81 0.67 0.53 0.65 0.74 0.69 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.66 
Broad bean & Soybean 1.18 0.92 0.68 0.79 0.89 0.83 0.73 0.74 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.89 0.76 0.83 0.91 0.99 0.93 0.89 0.85 
S.Berseem & Cotton 0.75 0.90 0.83 0.88 0.84 0.93 0.88 1.02 1.09 0.82 0.95 1.02 1.10 1.11 0.94 1.04 0.99 1.04 0.95 
L.Berseem & Rice 1.24 1.02 0.81 0.85 0.98 0.90 0.77 0.84 0.94 0.95 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.07 1.1 7 1.01 0.96 
L.Berseem & Maize 1.11 1.14 0.98 1.01 1.06 1.00 0.87 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.81 0.95 1.02 1.05 1.07 0.97 0.98 
L.Berseem & Soybean 1.06 1.04 0.81 1.00 0.98 1.01 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.97 0.91 0.93 0.99 1.02 1.00 0.97 0.96 
Tomatoes & Soybean 0.63 0.92 0.72 0.49 0.69 0.68 0.50 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.47 0.60 0.83 1.22 1.12 0.65 0.53 0.82 0.67 
Tomatoes & Maize 0.64 0.95 0.78 0.51 0.72 0.70 0.50 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.48 0.59 0.79 1.21 1.13 0.68 0.57 0.83 0.69 
Average 1.02 0.95 0.74 0.80 0.88 0.87 0.72 0.74 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.86 
Source: PAM analysis results. 
"It is assumed that domestic price for fodder crops (long and short berseem) equals to its world price because they are not traded internationally and consequently they do not 
have a world reference price. 
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The average NPCO for exportable outputs is lower than that of importable 
outputs throughout the three periods, implying that producers of export 
products are receiving less for their output than those for import products 
during the first, second and third periods by 21 %, 12% and 11 % respectively. 
Second, governmental taxes imposed on export and import outputs reached 
their highest levels of 18% and 30% respectively, during the second period of 
reform. Third, producers for export were almost getting the equivalent world 
prices for their commodities during the third period of reform, implying that 
the government was taking serious steps toward free market operation. The 
same could be seen in case of import products (at the same time of 
measurement); presumably the government aimed to encourage exports and 
imports by setting private prices closer to their social prices. (see Figure7-1). 
FIGURE (7 -1): NPCO AVERAGE FOR MAJOR IMPORTED AND EXPORTED 








1986-89 1990-94 1995-2000 
• Import Products 0 Export Products 
Source: Table 7-1. 
Using the average estimates for NPCOs during the period 1995-2000, 
Figure 7-2 summarises the level of incentives received for the production of 
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major importable and exportable crops in Egypt. From the protection point of 
view, sugar cane, cotton and rice had the highest NPCOs (1.25, 1.05 and 1.04 
respectively) implying that their producers are receiving 25%, 5% and 4% 
more through their output prices than they would at prevailing world prices. 
Wheat showed a neutral NPCO implying that its producers are receiving the 
prevailing prices in the world market (Le., neither taxed nor subsidised). The 
estimated NPCOs for other crops showed various levels of disprotection. For 
example, the estimated NPCOs for maize and soybean reached 0.95 and 0.92 
respectively, followed by broad beans (0.86), tomatoes (0.83) and finally 
potatoes (0.60) implying the imposition of taxes or (tariffs) on their output, 
with their producers getting 5%-40% less than their world equivalent prices. 
Using the average estimates for NPCOs during the period 1995-2000, 
Figure 7-3 shows the level of protection (disprotection) gained (suffered) by 
producers from the following different crop rotations. The estimated NPCOs 
for short berseem followed by cotton (1.04), wheat followed by rice and (1.02) 
and for long berseem followed by rice (1.01) indicate a very slight protection 
(where growers receive 4%-1% more than the equivalent parity prices). In 
contrast, rotations such as long berseem followed by maize, long berseem 
followed by soybean and wheat followed by maize, with NPCOs of 0.97, show 
a very slight disprotection, implying the imposition of a very low taxes 
(tariffs). Other rotations are disprotected at various levels, with the NPCOs 
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FIGURE (7-2): NPCOs FOR MAJOR AGRICULTURAL OUTPUTS DURING THE 
PERIOD 1995-2000 







Source: Table 7-1. 
Note: as we move toward the right hand side the level of protection falls. 
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Source: Table 7-1. 
Note: as we move toward the right hand side the level of protection increases. 
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for broad beans followed by maize or soybean estimated at nearly 0.90 and for 
tomatoes followed by maize or soybean at about 0.82, and finally wheat or 
broad beans followed by potatoes by 0.68. 
7.2.2 : Nominal Protection Coefficients for Inputs (NPCI). 
7.2.2.1 : Introduction 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, from the mid 1950s until the mid 
1980s, the Egyptian government took upon itself the burden and responsibility 
of producing, importing and distributing most of the agricultural inputs and 
introducing modem technology. Input subsidies were extensively used during 
the 1970s to encourage the adoption of modem technology (Wally et aI., 
1983). 
Owing to (Goletti, 1996) "when agricultural technology is not well 
developed and markets are weak, there is a rationale for input subsidies. 
However, as modern technology spreads and modern input use increases, 
input subsidies are often maintained as a means of compensating farmers for 
lower output prices, a situation that characterised Egypt up to 1986. The 
argument that subsidies are necessary because of slow adoption rates is 
obviously inapplicable to Egypt, as the country's agriculture is very input 
intensive and characterised by the use of a broad range of modern 
technologies". 
Since the reform started in 1986 the government has made a sustained 
effort to reduce subsidies on the most important agricultural inputs: fertiliser, 
cotton pesticides and applications, agricultural equipment, and agricultural 
credit. For example, fertiliser subsidies supplied by the Principal Bank of 
Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC), the major state enterprise 
involved in input distribution, declined (in real terms) from an average 100 
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million £E during the period 1989-91 to 41 million £E in 1992 and further to 
18 million £E in 1993. 
It might be useful to the policy advisor to measure the effects of 
government policy in tradable input markets. The NPCI was calculated 
annually for each crop, both separately and as part of a rotation during the 
period 1986-2000. 
7.2.2.2 : Empirical Results 
Referring to the discussion in Chapter 4, the NPCI is calculated in the 
PAM matrix by dividing the costs of tradable inputs valued at private prices 
[B] by its equivalent valued at social prices [F]. The aim of calculating the 
NPCI is to measure the actual divergences or distortions between domestic and 
international prices of tradable inputs (at the farm gate level). If NPCI is less 
than one, then it confirms the presence of subsidies (protection) on tradable 
inputs because producers are paying less (for using tradable inputs) than their 
equivalent world prices. An NPCI greater than one shows the presence of taxes 
(tariffs) because growers are paying more than their parity prices. An NPCI 
equal to one (in the absence of market failure) reveals the absence of 
distortions. The estimated NPCIs for different products and sectors can provide 
a comparison for the relative incentive structure for tradable inputs. 
The main results of our NPCI estimates3 using the PAM matrix 
analysis for main crops and their associated fourteen main rotations during the 
period 1986-2000 are summarised in Table 7-2. The estimates suggest a 
number of conclusions about government protection within agriculture in the 
3 This estimate is in terms of the average taxlsubsidy on inputs, but of course the tax/subsidy 
on specific inputs do vary. 
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TABLE 7-2: NOMINAL PROTECTION COEFFICIENT RESULTS FOR TRADABLE INPUTS FOR CROP AND CROP ROTATIONS (NPCI) 
IN THE PERIOD 1986-2000 
NPCI 1986 87 88 89 86-89 90 91 92 93 94 90-94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 95-2000 1986-2000 
Wheat 0.55 0.49 0.32 0.43 0.45 0.56 0.60 0.74 0.93 0.84 0.73 0.75 0.82 0.91 1.00 1.04 0.93 0.91 0.73 
Maize 0.63 0.58 0.36 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.74 0.90 0.84 0.71 0.72 0.84 0.96 1.03 1.06 0.97 0.93 0.74 
Sugar cane 0.58 0.52 0.33 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.55 0.72 0.88 0.80 0.69 0.77 0.88 1.02 1.10 1.13 1.07 0.99 0.75 
Soybeans 0.58 0.52 0.37 0.46 0.48 0.63 0.62 0.79 0.90 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.85 0.88 0.93 0.89 0.85 0.72 
Broad beans 0.47 0.43 0.29 0.39 0.40 0.56 0.64 0.75 0.81 0.73 0.70 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.65 
Cotton 0.56 0.51 0.33 0.42 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.74 0.87 0.77 0.69 0.73 0.80 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.86 0.87 0.70 
Rice 0.55 0.50 0.35 0.45 0.46 0.63 0.70 0.81 0.86 0.83 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.73 
Tomatoes 0.51 0.46 0.32 0.43 0.43 0.62 0.67 0.78 0.93 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.80 0.87 0.90 0.96 0.95 0.87 0.72 
Potatoes 0.53 0.47 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.69 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.75 
Long Berseem 0.49 0.45 0.32 0.41 0.42 0.54 0.58 0.72 0.76 0.71 0.66 0.71 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.93 0.90 0.81 0.66 
Short Berseem 0.50 0.47 0.34 0.44 0.44 0.64 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.76 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.71 
Avera&.e 0.54 0.49 0.33 0.43 0.45 0.59 0.64 0.77 0.87 0.80 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.71 
NPCI 1986 87 88 89 86-89 90 91 92 93 94 90-94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 95-2000 1986-2000 
Wheat & Maize 0.58 0.53 0.33 0.44 0.47 0.55 0.57 0.74 0.92 0.84 0.72 0.74 0.83 0.94 1.02 1.05 0.95 0.92 0.73 
Wheat & Rice 0.55 0.50 0.34 0.44 0.46 0.60 0.65 0.78 0.89 0.83 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.73 
Wheat & Soybean 0.56 0.50 0.35 0.45 0.47 0.59 0.61 0.77 0.92 0.84 0.75 0.76 0.79 0.88 0.94 0.99 0.91 0.88 0.72 
Wheat & Pot 0.53 0.47 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.67 0.79 0.84 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.75 
Broad bean & Maize 0.54 0.49 0.32 0.41 0.44 0.55 0.59 0.75 0.85 0.79 0.71 0.73 0.79 0.86 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.85 0.69 
Broad bean & Rice 0.52 0.47 0.32 0.42 0.43 0.60 0.67 0.78 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.69 
Broad bean & Potatoes 0.52 0.46 0.32 0.43 0.43 0.67 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.74 
Broad bean & Soybean 0.53 0.47 0.33 0.42 0.44 0.60 0.63 0.77 0.86 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.80 0.68 
S.Berseem & Cotton 0.54 0.50 0.34 0.43 0.45 0.56 0.58 0.75 0.86 0.78 0.71 0.75 0.81 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.70 
L.Berseem & Rice 0.53 0.49 0.34 0.43 0.45 0.60 0.67 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.85 0.71 
L.Berseem & Maize 0.57 0.52 0.34 0.43 0.46 0.54 0.55 0.74 0.86 0.80 0.70 0.72 0.80 0.90 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.89 0.71 
L.Berseem & Soybean 0.54 0.50 0.36 0.44 0.46 0.60 0.61 0.77 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.85 0.93 0.90 0.83 0.70 
Tomatoes & Soybean 0.53 0.47 0.33 0.43 0.44 0.62 0.66 0.78 0.92 0.8\ 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.87 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.87 0.72 
Tomatoes & Maize 0.54 0.48 0.33 0.43 0.44 0.60 0.63 0.77 0.92 0.81 0.7S 0.74 0.81 0.90 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.89 0.72 
Avera&.e 0.54 0.49 0.33 0.43 0.45 0.60 0.64 0.78 0.88 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.71 
Source: PAM analysis results 
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period 1986-2000. With estimated NPCls less than one in all years during the 
period 1986-2000, the results indicate that the widespread subsidisation of 
tradable inputs implying that producers are paying less for using tradable 
inputs than they would have paid in the absence of government subsidies. 
However, there has been considerable liberalisation of input markets during the 
sample period as evidenced by the doubling of the average all-crop NPCI 
(from 0.45 in 1986-89 to 0.88 in 1995-2000). 
As mentioned earlier, the higher the coefficient of the NPCI of the 
product, the less protection (subsidy) the product enjoys. Thus, the gradual 
increases in NPCIs over time for all crops and crop rotations suggest that the 
level of protection or governmental subsidy in tradable inputs is falling over 
time. For example, the average estimated NPCI coefficients during the first, 
second and third period of reform, 0.45, 0.73 and 0.88 respectively, imply that 
the level of subsidies on tradable inputs fell from 55% during 1986-89 to 27% 
in 1990-94 and further to 12% during 1995-2000. As mentioned earlier, this 
fall in protection level is a direct result of government policy introduced in the 
1986 reforms to decrease input subsidies and transfer to a free market situation. 
Unlike protection of outputs (NPCO), which tends to be crop specific, every 
crop seems to have been subsidised to about the same degree. Moreover most, 
if not all, crops have been affected equally (the exception being broad beans) 
by liberalisation. 
Figure 7-4 shows the ranking of major crops according to the level of 
tradable input protection (measured by the NPCI economic indicator) during 
the period 1995-2000. The overall picture shows that the tradable inputs for all 
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crops are protected (subsidised) with various levels with NPCls less than one, 
implying a range of subsidies of 1 %-23%. From these results we may conclude 
that tradable inputs for sugar cane are the least subsidised with an NPCI value 
of 0.99 while broad beans is the most highly subsidised with an estimated 
NPCI of 0.77. The NPCls for other crops, such as maize, wheat and potatoes 
are around 0.92, for cotton, rice and tomatoes 0.87, and for soybean, short and 
long berseem 0.83. 
Since the NPCls for crop results show that tradable inputs for all crops 
are subsidised, then we should expect that tradable inputs for crop rotations 
would be subsidised as well. The crop rotation NPCIs results presented in table 
7-2 shows a similar picture to that for individual crops. For example, the 
average NPCls for crop rotations during the three distinct periods 1986-89, 
1990-94 and 1995-2000 are estimated to be 0.45, 0.74 and 0.87 respectively, 
and are closely similar to those estimated for crop level. This similarity is 
mainly because the government eliminated all input subsidies over time on a 
gradual basis. 
Considering different crop rotations, the results for NPCls during the 
period 1995-2000 confinned our expectation that tradable inputs for all crop 
rotations were subsidised by 8%-20%. Results indicate that broad beans 
followed by soybean has the highest subsidy (20%) while wheat followed by 
maize has the lowest (8%). Other subsidised rotations ranked according to the 
lowest NPCI are as follows: broad beans followed by rice and long berseem 
followed by soybean (0.83). Next come wheat followed by rice or soybean, 
broad beans followed by potatoes, tomatoes followed by soybeans, short 
berseem followed by cotton, long berseem followed by rice and broad bean 
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followed by maize, all about 0.86. Finally, the least subsidised rotations in 
tradable inputs are (all about 0.90) wheat followed by potatoes, and tomatoes 
or long berseem followed by maize. 
7.3 : Effective Protection Coefficients (EPC). 
7.3.1 : Introduction 
The effective protection coefficient4 (EPC) reflects the complete 
pattern of incentives to farmers in the tradable commodities markets, 
combining the separate influences of polices represented by the NPCO and 
NPCI measures. It allows the assessment of the net effects of subsidies, taxes 
and overvalued (or undervalued) exchange rate taking in consideration both the 
product and input markets. The effective protection coefficient is measured in 
the PAM matrix as the revenue less costs of tradable inputs [A-B], both valued 
at private prices, divided by revenue less costs of tradable inputs [E-F], both 
valued at social prices. In other words, it quantifies the net effect of protection 
on inputs as well as outputs by measuring the domestic value added reSUlting 
from the imposition of tariff and other protective measures on the product and 
its inputs as a proportion of foreign or world value added calculated using 
domestic market prices to value added calculated using social prices (Hassan, 
1992). 
If the EPC is greater than one, it implies that domestic producers are 
enjoying positive protection. If the EPC is less than one, it implies that 
producers would have received a higher return if they had faced world prices 
instead of domestic prices on both output and inputs i.e. they are receiving 
negative protection . 
.. Partial equilibrium structure of effective protection has been criticised as being inappropriate 
for commenting upon general equih'brium resource allocation effect. This theoretical critique is 
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However, unlike the NPC, the EPC can also be negative. A positive 
(negative) EPC denotes a potential incentive (disincentive) not an actual one. 
The fact that producers are facing net price levels higher than those they would 
have faced without intervention (a potential disincentive) does not ensure that 
those levels are translated into concrete resource allocation decisions (actual 
disincentives). If the EPC is equal to one, it implies that the structure of 
protection is neutral i.e. producers are neither favoured nor discriminated 
against. The EPC can have a negative value in two cases: first; if the value 
added in domestic prices is negative (i.e. [A-B] is negative), in which case 
producers would not stay in the business unless they are subsidised by the 
government (to remain in an unprofitable business). Second, if the value 
added at social prices is negative (i.e. [E-F] is negative) where the economy is 
losing foreign exchange by producing the commodity because the costs of 
traded inputs is higher than the gross value of output. A change in domestic 
price policy is needed to solve the first problem while an improvement in 
productivity is required to solve the second. However, it is important to 
remember that EPCs are indicative of relative incentives in production 
(Taskok, 1990). 
7.3.2 : Empirical Results 
The calculated EPCs for the 11 crops and their associated 14 crop 
rotations during the period 1986-2000 are summarised in Table 7-3. The 
principal result from the crop analysis is that export crops had EPCs less than 
discussed in greater details in Greenaway and Milner (1993, p.163-164); Bbagwati and 
Srinivasan (1973); Taylor and Black (1974); De Melo (1980 and 1978) 
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TABLE 7-3: EFFECTIVE PROTECTION COEFFICIENT RESULTS FOR CROP AND CROP ROTATIONS (EPC) IN THE PERIOD 1986-2000. 
Crop 1986 87 88 89 86-89 90 91 92 93 94 90-94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 95-2000 1986-2000 
Wheat 1.28 1.19 0.84 1.01 1.08 1.15 0.96 0.83 0.88 0.83 0.93 0.77 0.74 0.96 U8 1.22 U9 1.01 1.00 
Maize 1.46 1.68 1.14 1.17 1.36 1.09 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.89 0.83 0.62 0.88 1.07 1.15 1.22 0.96 1.05 
Sugarcane 1.86 1.66 0.77 0.66 1.24 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.84 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.92 1.02 1.54 2.38 1.51 1.36 1.13 
Soybeans 1.42 1.45 0.78 1.31 1.24 1.19 0.90 0.84 0.65 0.76 0.87 0.99 0.78 0.78 0.98 1.12 1.05 0.95 1.00 
Broad beans 1.47 0.93 0.89 0.72 1.00 0.74 0.64 0.65 0.95 0.90 0.78 0.90 0.75 0.88 0.92 0.99 0.90 0.89 0.88 
Cotton 0.97 0.90 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.96 0.88 1.06 1.14 0.76 0.96 1.07 1.18 1.20 0.89 1.09 1.02 1.08 0.99 
Rice 2.13 1.35 0.80 0.84 1.28 0.88 0.65 0.73 0.89 0.94 0.81 0.84 0.86 1.01 1.02 1.22 1.64 1.10 1.05 
Tomatoes 0.58 0.96 0.86 0.42 0.71 0.62 0.44 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.39 0.54 0.84 1.51 1.21 0.57 0.45 0.85 0.66 
Potatoes 0.65 0.54 0.72 0.90 0.70 0.75 0.32 0.40 0.61 0.77 0.57 0.30 0.46 0.55 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.55 
Long Berseem 1.08 1.07 1.18 1.14 1.12 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.05 
Short Berseem 1.13 1.10 1.25 1.17 1.16 1.06 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.06 
Avera&..e 1.28 1.17 0.92 0.93 1.07 0.93 0.77 0.77 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.98 1.03 1.11 1.04 0.97 0.95 
Crop Rotations 1986 87 88 89 86-89 90 91 92 93 94 90-94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 95-2000 1986-2000 
Wheat & Maize 1.36 1.38 0.98 1.08 1.20 1.12 0.90 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.91 0.80 0.68 0.92 1.13 1.19 1.21 0.99 1.02 
Wheat & Rice 1.60 1.25 0.82 0.92 1.15 1.01 0.77 0.78 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.80 0.99 1.09 1.22 1.40 1.05 1.02 
Wheat & Soybean 1.34 1.28 0.82 1.10 1.13 1.16 0.93 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.90 0.84 0.75 0.89 1.11 1.19 1.14 0.99 1.00 
Wheat & Pot 0.82 0.72 0.76 0.93 0.81 0.93 0.47 0.52 0.71 0.79 0.68 0.42 0.57 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.62 0.69 
Broad bean & Maize 1.47 1.17 1.01 0.93 1.14 0.90 0.75 0.76 0.89 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.68 0.88 0.99 1.09 1.06 0.93 0.95 
Broad bean & Rice 1.76 1.07 0.84 0.78 1.11 0.81 0.64 0.70 0.91 0.93 0.80 0.86 0.81 0.96 0.98 1.14 1.25 1.00 0.96 
Broad bean & Potatoes 0.83 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.78 0.75 0.40 0.45 0.70 0.80 0.62 0.41 0.56 0.67 0.59 0.56 0.60 0.56 0.64 
Broad bean & Soybean 1.45 l.08 0.84 0.92 1.07 0.90 0.76 0.73 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.93 0.76 0.84 0.94 1.05 0.95 0.91 0.92 
S.Berseem & Cotton 0.78 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.91 1.05 1.11 0.82 0.98 1.06 1.14 1.14 0.95 1.06 1.01 1.06 0.99 
L.Berseem & Rice 1.47 1.15 0.97 0.95 1.14 0.95 0.79 0.85 0.95 0.98 0.90 0.92 0.94 1.02 1.02 1.09 1.21 1.03 1.02 
L.Berseem & Maize 1.23 1.25 1.16 1.16 1.20 1.08 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.81 0.96 1.03 1.06 1.08 0.98 1.03 
L.Berseem & Soybean 1.21 1.17 0.98 1.22 1.15 1.11 0.98 0.95 0.88 0.92 0.97 1.02 0.94 0.94 1.01 1.03 1.02 0.99 1.02 
Tomatoes & Soybean 0.64 1.02 0.85 0.50 0.75 0.69 0.48 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.44 0.57 0.83 1.33 1.17 0.61 0.49 0.83 0.68 
Tomatoes & Maize 0.65 1.06 0.92 0.53 0.79 0.71 0.49 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.46 0.57 0.79 1.30 1.1 8 0.65 0.54 0.84 0.70 
Average 1.19 1.09 0.91 0:-92 1.02 0.94 0.73 0.73 0.79 0.79 0.79 0 ~ 7 9 9 0.79 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.97 0: 91 0.90 
Source: PAM analysis results. 
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one throughout the period 1986-2000,with an average value of 0.90, 0.68 and 
0.87 during the first, second and third periods respectively, indicating negative 
effective protection and thus potential disincentives. In contrast, fodder and 
import products (except for the second period for the latter) all enjoyed 
positive protection, with EPCs more than one. In other words, their producers 
are enjoying positive incentives (see Figure 7-6). This result confirms the 
NPCOs results shown in Figure 7-1, which indicate the general policy theme of 
the government of Egypt (as well as most developing countries) in 
accomplishing self sufficiency and reducing dependency on imported 
agricultural products particularly wheat and other grain commodities. 
The estimated EPC values show that the government is encouraging 
domestic production of import products by setting producer prices higher than 
parity prices. On the other hand, export crops are "taxed" in net terms relative 
to their equivalent world prices. 
FIGURE (7-6): EPC FOR MAJOR IMPORTED AND EXPORTED AGRICULTURAL 







1986-89 1990-94 1995-2000 
• Import products Q Export products m Fodder products 
Source: Table 7-3 
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Using the average estimates for EPCs during the period 1995-2000, 
Figure 7-7 presents the ranking of the major importable and exportable 
agricultural products in Egypt according to the level of incentives 
(disincentives). Sugar cane, rice and cotton had the highest EPCs (1.36, 1.10 
and 1.08 respectively) implying that their producers were enjoying an incentive 
of 36%, 10% and 8%. Other crops showed neutral EPC; for example, wheat 
reached almost unity, implying that its producers were neither favoured nor 
discriminated against. The estimated EPCs for other crops showed various 
levels of disincentive, with some variation in. For example, the estimated EPC 
for maize and soybean reached about 0.95, followed by broad beans (0.89), 
tomatoes (0.85) and finally potatoes (0.45), implying that trade policies were 
taxing them relative to international prices. 
Figure 7-8 ranks different crop rotations during the period 1995-2000 
according to incentives (disincentive) enjoyed (suffered) by rotations. The 
estimated EPCs for short berseem followed by cotton (1.06), wheat followed 
by rice and (1.05) long berseem followed by rice (1.03) indicate a very slight 
incentive of 6%-3% relative to international prices. Rotations such as broad 
beans followed by rice, wheat followed by maize or soybean and long berseem 
followed by soybean had EPCs close to unity, implying that they were neither 
favoured nor discriminated against. In contrast, other rotations were 
discouraged to varying degrees, the EPC for broad beans followed by maize or 
soybean being estimated at nearly 0.92, tomatoes followed by maize or 
soybean at about 0.83 and finally wheat or broad beans followed by potatoes at 
0.58. 
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FIGURE (7 -7): EPC ESTIMATES FOR MAJOR AGRICULTURAL OUTPUTS DURING 
THE PERIOD 1995-2000 
FIGURE (7-8): EPC ESTIMATES FOR MAJOR CROP ROTATIONS DURING THE 
PERIOD 1995-2000 
Neutral -. ...... 1-__ Negative Protection -. 
cid 8 ctd ctd ., til ctd o'IJ o'IJ cid o'IJ cid ~ ~ cid j ~ ~ ~ ~ b ]8 . ~ ~ P 2 . ~ ~ Jj .r I! BI JB ::E ctd cid ~ ~ ~ rl! 11 ~ ~~ ~ lliil o'IJ ~ : : 1 l l ~ a s s 1 ~ ~.,0 1 CQ 1ii CQ(/) ':Il {!. ~ ~cr.i ...i e ., ...i ..J f... CQ ~ ~ CQ CQ III 
Source: Table 7-1. 
Note: as we move toward the right hand side the level of disincentives increases. 
7-20 
Nominal and Effective Protection Results 
As discussed earlier, and shown for crops in Figures 7-2 and 7-7 and 
for crop rotations in Figures 7-3 and 7-8, it may be concluded that the rankings 
of crops and crop rotations according to the NPCO results do not differ from 
the EPC rankings. This result is presumably because the traded input 
component in agricultural production constitutes a relatively small proportion 
of the value of outputs compared to manufactured products. 
7.4 : Consistencyflnconsistency of Protection Coefficients Estimated by 
This Study and Other Studies. 
A number of studies have estimated the nominal and effective coefficients for 
Egypt in the last two decades. Table 7-4 shows the results for NPCO obtained 
from previous studies compared to this study. Despite the differences in the 
methodology of the obtained results, they reveal two main findings. 
First, the study results are consistent with the results estimated by other 
researchers during the periods 1986-89 and 1990-96. For example, the NPCOs 
(during the period 1986-89) for wheat, cotton, rice and maize in this study are 
estimated at 0.94, 0.84, 1.01 and 1.16 respectively, where as the average for 
the same measure in previous studies is about 0.92, 0.78, 1.07 and 1.13 
respectively. Similar consistency could be seen between the results of this and 
other studies during the period 1990-96. 
Second, the estimated NPCOs for all products during the pre refonn 
period 1981-85 (that were estimated by earlier studies) are significantlr 
different from those estimated by this study during the period 1986-00, which 
is consistent with the economic refonn having started in 1986 and reforming 
domestic prices (see Table 2-7 which shows the annual growth rates of farm 
S Statistically significant at 5%. 
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TABLE 7-4: NOMINAL PROTECTION COEFFICIENT RESULTS OF MAJOR CROPS IN 
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1990 Ibrahim, A. 0.99 0.55 0.97 1.04 0.72 Na 
1993·95 Omran, M. 0.86 1.02 0.76 0.90 0.85 0.84 
1996 FAO 0.77 1.13 0.79 0.67 0.89 Na 
1996 E1-Gucndy, M. 0.77 1.51 0.79 0.68 0.89 0.82 
1990-96 Average 0.85 1.05 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.83 
1990-96 This Study 0.86 0.98 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.84 
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1.00 0.58 0.65 0.98 
1.09 Na Na Na 0.58 
1.14 1.14 1.03 0.60 Na 
1.66 1.66 Na Na 1.09 
1.00 1.00 Na Na 0.92 
1.11 t.27 1.03 0.60 0.86 
1.00 1.00 0.81 0.50 0.78 
1.00 1.00 0.61 0.65 1.01 
1980-85 Hassan, R. 0.74 0.51 0.31 0.84 0.9\ 0.73 Na Na 0.53 0.46 0.76 
1990 Ibrahim, A. 1.05 0.6\ 1.01 1.15 0.74 Na 1.06 Na Na Na 0.59 
1993 Abo·Saad 0.81 0.40 0.29 0.90 1.0\ Na Na 1.10 Na Na 0.60 
1993·95 Omran, M. 0.85 1.04 0.74 0.92 0.84 0.85 1.14 1.17 1.02 0.58 Na 
1996 FAO 0.74 1.15 0.81 0.61 0.88 Na 1.96 1.84 Na Na 1.19 
1996 EI·Guendy, M. 0.78 1.62 0.79 0.66 0.92 0.82 1.00 1.01 Na Na 0.97 
1990-96 Average 0.85 1.01 0.73 0.85 0.88 0.84 1.19 t.28 1.01 0.58 0.84 
1990-96 ThIs Study 0.88 1.01 0.83 0.85 0.79 0.87 1.03 1.04 0.51 0.48 0.80 
1986-1000 This Study 1.00 0.99 1.0S 1.0S 0.88 1.00 1.06 1.05 0.55 0.66 1.13 
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gate prices for major agricultural commodities during the period 1986-2000, 
e.g. annual price growth rate of wheat, cotton, rice, maize and sugar cane are 
8.1%, 9.5%, 9.3%, 6.4% and 8.7% respectively). In other words the nominal 
protection coefficients for wheat, cotton, rice, maize and sugar cane in this 
study during the post refonn period (1986-2000) are estimated to be about 
0.95, 0.96,0.96, 0.98 and 1.01 but the average for the same measure in previous 
studies during the pre refonn period (1981-85) is about 0.63, 0.51, 0.75, 0.84 
and 0.70 respectively. The same outcome is observed when the estimates of 
effective protection coefficient in this study are compared with those from 
other studies during the period 1996, or with earlier studies throughout the 
period 1980-85 (see Table 7-4). 
As noted in Karayiannis-Bacon (1976) 'The main expectation that one 
might have from the literature on effective protection would be that the 
effective rates would be generally above the nominal rates and in some cases 
would be much higher. One might also expect that the two methods could 
produce a very different ranking of the industries'. But for the agricultural 
sector in Egypt there was no significant difference between the ranking of 
crops by nominal or by effective protection. The majority of crops throughout 
the three distinct periods had rates of nominal protection close to the level of 
effective protection, implying that the weighted tariffs (subsidy) on inputs 
offset the protection (tax) on outputs. 
7.5 : Protection Measures. Area and Production 
In this section we examine very briefly the relationship between the 
falling/increasing of protection during the beginning and late phases of reform 
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(the distinct periods 1995-2000 and 1986-89) and changes in area or output 
across crops. 
As mentioned in earlier discussions, the structure of incentives for most 
crops has changed in the late phase of reform compared to its original level 
during the first period. For example, the NPCI (averages) for all crops has 
increased over time from 0.45 during the first period to 0.73 and then to 0.88 
during the second and third periods respectively (see Table 7-2). This implies 
that the subsidy on tradable inputs received by the farmers had fallen by nearly 
one half in the late episode of reform than its beginning the case that should 
affected area and production of crops that intensely use tradable inputs such as 
potatoes. Since the tradable input cost for potatoes constitutes nearly 60% of 
the total cost, reducing the tradable input subsidy by nearly 50% during the 
reform era negatively affected its planted area and production. 
The gradual fall in the EPC values for potatoes from 0.70 to 0.57 and 
further to 0.44 during the first, second and third periods of reform indicates 
that its growers suffer from continuing disincentives. The area planted fell by 
33%, and consequently production by 32%, during the late phase of reform 
compared to its level in the first period. 
Crops enjoying a rise in their domestic farm gate prices (becoming 
closer to the world price) attracted farmers. For example, the NPCO results 
reveal that the output prices for crops such as wheat and tomatoes were 
effectively taxed during the early stage of reform 1986-89 by about 6% and 
35% respectively. The reduction of these disincentives during the third period, 
to only 1 % for wheat and 17% for tomatoes, led farmers to grow more of them 
(see Tables 2-4 and 7-1). Their areas have increased by 83% and 9% 
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respectively, and consequently their production has increased significantly, by 
190%and 103% respectively. These high volumes of production had a great 
impact on their trade perfonnance (see Table 6-5). 
The NPCO measure of protection also reveals that soybean output has 
been taxed over time, but with the NPCO decreasing from 0.98 to 0.92 during 
the first and third periods respectively. The case that simulated (with other 
factors) its ignorance of being planted where its area fell from 0.12 million 
feddan in 1986-89 to about only 0.03 million feddan. In contrast, the NPCO 
estimates for cotton increased gradually throughout the reform era, from 0.84 
in the first period to 0.93 and further to 1.05 in the second and third periods 
respectively. The government not only changed the cotton's pricing policy 
toward free market operation, but actually subsidised its output during the third 
period by about 5%. However, its cultivated area fell from 1.06 million feddan 
in 1986-89 to only 0.83 million feddan in 1985-2000. This suggests that there 
were factors other than prices affecting the farmers' decision about growing 
cotton. The EPC calculations mirror these results (obtained from the NPCO), 
with the EPC for cotton estimated in the three distinct periods as 0.91,0.96 and 
1.08 respectively, which essentially tells the same story. 
7.6 : Summary and Conclusions: 
In the analysis of trade and price policy incentives, it has become 
customary to estimate the Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) and Effective 
Protection Coefficient (EPC). In general, most of the crops studied have 
distorted prices for their output and/or their inputs. The NPCO results during 
the third period reveal that the market prices for five of the nine traded crops 
(maize, soybean, broad bean, tomatoes and potatoes) have been set at levels 
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less than those prevailing in world markets, thus implying a tax on those crops. 
In the remainder (sugar cane, cotton and rice), the NPCO results showed 
different levels of output subsidy. In contrast, the NPCI results show that the 
input prices for most crops and crop rotations are subsidised. But the average 
level of input subsidy has gradually fallen from 55% in 1986-89 to 27% in 
1990-94 and further to 12% in 1995-2000. The effective protection coefficient 
results confinned the results obtained from the NPCO estimates for crop and 
crop rotation rankings according to the incentives (disincentives) enjoyed 
(suffered) by producers; the sugar cane, rice and cotton EPCs results indicating 
that their producers were enjoying an incentive of 36%, 10% and 8%. Other 
crops showed neutral EPCs, as in wheat, implying that their producers were 
neither favoured nor discriminated against. The estimated EPCs for maize, 
soybean, broad beans tomatoes and potatoes showed various levels of 
disincentive, implying that trade policies are taxing them relative to 
international prices. 
Although the results generally revealed that EPCs and NPCOs 
coefficients were very close for the majority of sectors, this was not the case 
for potatoes during the third period 1995-2000, where the EPC and NPCO 
were estimated to be 0.44 and 0.60 respectively. The reason for the EPC 
coefficient being lower than the NPCO is mainly that the value added 
calculated using social prices (E-F) is much higher than the value added 
calculated using private prices (A-B), consequently denominator increases and 
as a result the EPC decreases. 
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Profitability Coefficient and Subsidy Ratio to Producer Results 
Chapter VIll: Measures of Net Transfers: Profitability 
Coefficient (PC) and Subsidy Ratio to Producer (SRP) 
Results. 
8.1 : Introduction 
The last row of the PAM model (calculated as the difference between 
the private and social valuations of revenues, costs and profits) measures the 
policy-induced transfers that result from policy-induced market failures or 
distortions. Hence, four types may be calculated from the PAM matrix: output 
transfers, input transfers, factor transfer and net transfers. 




A C D 
Private Prices Revenue based Costs of tradable Costs of domestic Profit based on 
on private profit inputs based on factors based on private profit private prices private prices D = (A - B - C) 
E F G H 
Social Prices Revenue based Costs of tradable Costs of domestic Profit based 
on social profit inputs based factors based on social profit 
on social prices on social prices H = (E - F- G) 
Effects of 1 J K L 
divergences 1 = (A - E) J = (B-F) K = (C- G) L = D -H = 
and efficient (I - J - K) 
policy 
The output transfer, is expressed in PAM notation as 1= A-E. A 
positive value of I (private revenues [A] greater than social revenues [ED 
implies that producers receive a subsidy due to current policies as they get a 
higher price than the world price for the commodity. Similarly, a negative 
value of I indicates that producers are taxed as they get prices lower than world 
prices for their output under existing policies. 
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The input transfers, calculated as J= B-F, measure the difference 
between input costs at private and social prices. A positive value of J implies 
that producers are taxed (i.e. producers are paying more than if they would 
purchase at world prices), while a negative value implies that producers are 
subsidised (i.e. producers are paying lower prices for their tradable inputs than 
they would have to pay in the absence of government intervention). 
The factor transfers is calculated as K = C-G; a positive value indicates 
that producers are paying more for their domestic factors than their opportunity 
cost, while a negative value implies a case of subsidised factors. 
The net transfers, expressed by L, equal output transfers (I) minus input 
transfers (J) minus factor transfers (K); i.e. L=D-H. The value of L measures 
the net transfers from all policy distortions and/or from market failures not 
corrected by efficient policies. If L is greater than zero (i.e. NPP>NSP), it 
indicates that there is a net transfer to producers from government, i.e., a 
subsidy. In contrast, if L is less than zero, it implies the existence of a net tax 
on producers. 
The profitability coefficient (PC) and the subsidy ratio to producers 
(SRP) are two main measures for tracing net policy transfer effects. However, 
we should be very cautious with the PC economic indicator, particularly if it 
has a negative value (discussed in greater detail below). So we shall just report 
the PC results along with a short comment on the obtained results, and mainly 
focus in our study on the SRP, especially as it will address the same issues as 
would the PC. 
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8.2 : Profitability Coefficient 
8.2.1 : Introduction 
The profitability coefficient (PC), defined as PC= DIH, is a measure of 
the degree to which net transfers have caused private profits to exceed social 
profits, where D= A-B-C and H= E-F-G. The PC extends the effective 
protection coefficient EPC [defined in Chapter 7 as (A-B)/(E-F)] to include 
factor transfers. Although the PC is considered more comprehensive than the 
EPC because it provides an indication of the total incentive effect of policies 
(including those influencing factor markets), it is an incomplete economic 
indicator. Its usefulness is restricted when private or social profits are 
negative l . For example, an obtained negative PC result does not tell us 
whether it is negative due to a negative value in private or social profits, and 
we must refer back to the original PAM matrix for that information. 
8.2.2 : Empirical Results 
A profitability coefficient of unity implies that the structure of profits is 
"neutral"; that is, domestic producers are receiving the same profit, as they 
would have achieved at world prices, i.e. profits valued in private and social 
prices are the equal. If the PC is greater than one, it implies that policy 
transfers have pennitted domestic producers to receive a greater profit for their 
resources given intervention than they would in the absence of intervention. 
I If the PC value is negative because of private profits being negative, this implies that the 
sector under consideration is not privately profitable while it is socially profitable and 
consequently the sector is losing foreign exchange in its production. In contrast, if the PC 
value is negative because of social profits being negative, this implies that the sector is 
privately profitable while it is socially not profitable i.e. it is heavily subsidised. 
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Wheat & Maize -12.16 -9.23 2.S4 3.33 
Wheat & Rice ..... 56 -3.57 1.86 1.79 
Wheat & Soybean -6.87 -7.74 2.02 4.27 
Wheat & Pot 0.9 0.82 1.08 1.8 
Broad bean & Maize -6.75 4.55 3.43 3.52 
Broad bean & Rice -3.69 6.76 2.42 1.58 
Broad bean & Potatoes 0.95 0.72 1.16 1.67 
Broad bean & Soybean ..... 62 4.1 3 5.48 
S.Berseem & Cotton 1.06 3.47 -120.74 -8.42 
L.Berseem & Rice -6.48 6.81 4.79 5.43 
L.Berseem & Maize -148.89 4.9 6.87 -72 
L.Berseem & Soybean -16.48 4.53 9.03 -2.65 
Tomatoes & Soybean 0.89 4.09 2.6 0.76 
Tomatoes & Maize 0.9 4.24 2.75 0.82 



































































8.21 3.71 6.23 
3.01 2.11 3.03 
71.88 -133.49 -6.78 
6.08 0.65 0.8 
4.32 2.45 8.91 
1.92 1.48 2.68 
1.94 0.44 0.57 
8.76 72.84 -1.89 
-6.32 -10.98 -2.81 
6.47 4.08 9.3 
-8.58 -105.79 -8.57 
-2.74 -2.53 -1.71 
0.86 0.86 0.54 

















































































































.... 2 2.93 
4.78 1.42 
0.37 1.18 
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For example, a PC of 7.922 means that policy transfers have permitted 
private profits nearly eight times greater than social profits. If PC is less than 
one (but positive), it implies that domestic producers would have received 
higher profits if they faced world prices instead of domestic prices on both 
output and inputs. A negative PC denotes a loss in either private or social 
profits and hence implies a drain on the economy's resources. 
Table 8-1 shows the calculated PCs for the 11 crops and their 
associated 14 crop rotations during the period 1986-2000. In general, the PC 
results for crop and crop rotations reveal continuous government intervention 
either in output or input and factor prices, this being reflected in the divergence 
between private and social profits in all years throughout the three distinct 
periods (1986-89, 1990-94 and 1995-2000). For 55 of the 165 crop analysis 
results and 60 of the 165 crop rotation analysis results, throughout the period 
1986-2000, we have a negative PC (pC<O). In all of the 115 negative PC 
results for crop and crop rotations, it was found that D>O>H, which means that 
these economic activities were privately profitable but socially not profitable, 
which indicates a misuse of the Egyptian economy's resources. 
8.3 : Subsidy Ratio to Producers (SRP) 
8.3.1 : Introduction 
The subsidy ratio to producers (SRP) is another ratio indicator used to measure 
net transfers across different sectors. The SRP is defined as the ratio of the net 
transfers to revenues valued at social prices, i.e. in PAM notation as VB. The 
aim of this indicator is to show the level of transfers from divergences as a 
proportion of the undistorted value of the system revenues. In other words, it 
2 The PC result for maize in 2000 
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TABLE 8-2: SUBSIDY RA no TO PRODUCER (SRP) FOR MAIN CROPS & CROP ROTA nONS IN THE PERIOD 1986-2000. 


















0.31 0.34 0.54 0.41 0.38 0.36 
0.57 0.82 0.52 OS; 0.53 0.25 0.30 0.21 
0.91 0.86 -0.01 0.47 0.12 0.43 0.43 0.42 
0.53 0.62 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.46 0.42 0.20 
0.62 0.19 0.14 0.30 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.42 




1.01 0.56 0.14 0.45 0.22 0.08 0.16 0.27 
-0.11 0.39 -0.17 0.10 -0.17 -0.11 -0.24 -0.49 
-0.16 -0.18 0.14 ~ . 0 5 5 0.10 -0.24 -0.19 -0.05 
Long Berseem 0.43 0.37 0.82 0.55 0.71 0.75 0.70 0.47 
Short Berseem 0.50 0.44 0.88 0.62 0.92 1.03 1.18 0.75 
Crop Rotations 1986 87 88 89 86-89 90 91 92 93 
Wheat & Maize 0.49 0.59 0.24 0.4 0.43 0.54 0.33 0.34 0.29 
Wheat & Rice 0.68 0.5 0.13 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.22 0.26 0.31 
Wheat & Soybean 0.48 0.52 0.13 0.4 0.38 0.54 0.43 0.39 0.29 
Wheat & Pot -0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.19 0.03 0.23 -0.1 -0.05 0.07 
Broad bean & Maize 0.59 0.4 0.29 0.32 0.40 0.34 0.19 0.26 0.31 
Broad bean & Rice 0.8 0.33 0.17 0.14 0.36 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.33 
Broad bean & Potatoes -0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.12 -0.16 -0.11 0.06 
Broad bean & Soybean 0.58 0.34 0.17 0.3 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.3 0.31 
S.Berseem & Cotton 0.01 0.24 0.29 0.42 0.24 0.49 0.51 0.78 0.59 
L.Berseem & Rice 0.68 0.44 0.32 0.39 0.46 0.42 0.31 0.37 0.36 
L.Berseem & Maize 0.49 0.52 0.47 0.65 0.53 0.61 0.46 0.49 0.35 
L.Berseem & Soybean 0.47 0.45 0.33 0.68 0.48 0.63 0.6 0.56 0.35 
Tomatoes & Soybean -0.05 0.42 0.26 -0.08 0.14 -0.06 -0.05 -0.17 -0.41 
Tomatoes & Maize -0.05 0.45 0.31 -0.06 0.16 -0.03 -0.06 -0.17 -0.4 
Source: PAM analysis results. 
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~ . 0 7 7 -0.31 
0.62 0.49 
0.92 0.82 
94 90-94 95 96 
0.26 0.35 0.27 0.12 
0.29 0.29 0.25 0.17 
0.27 0.38 0.4 0.19 
0.09 0.05 -0.17 0.01 
0.34 0.29 0.3 0.16 
0.36 0.23 0.28 0.21 
0.11 0.00 -0.19 0.02 
0.36 0.31 0.47 0.25 
0.33 0.54 0.6 0.88 
0.37 0.37 0.33 0.31 
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0.37 0.50 0.54 0.39 
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0.16 0.23 0.30 
0.44 0.39 0.35 
0.55 1.18 0.69 
0.05 0.20 0.23 
0.03 0.27 0.15 
0.37 0.50 0.42 
0.03 0.19 0.54 
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0.31 0.27 0.27 
98 99 2000 
0.3 0.31 0.33 
0.08 0.21 0.42 
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0.03 0.22 0.35 
-0.12 -0.15 -0.19 
0.04 0.24 0.18 
0.34 0.4 0.36, 
0.15 0.22 0.36 
0.33 0.3 0.28 
0.2 0.23 0.24 
0.51 -0.1 -0.28 
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Profitability Coefficient and Subsidy Ratio to Producer Results 
shows the extent to which a sector's revenues have been increased or 
decreased because of government policy. The smaller the SRP, the less 
distorted the agricultural sector, with a positive (negative) value of SRP 
implying a producer subsidy (tax). The SRP, converted to a percentage, also 
indicates the equivalent output tariff required to maintain current private 
profits if all other policies are removed. For example, the SRP of 0.48 (average 
1986-2000) for sugar cane means that the divergences have increased the gross 
revenues of the sector by nearly one half. If hypothetically, all distortion 
policies and market failures on tradable inputs and factors were eliminated, the 
sugar cane sector's NPCO would have to be increased from 1.01 to 1.48 to 
permit its growers to maintain the same level of private profits. It thus shows 
how much incentive or disincentive the sector is receiving from all the effects 
of divergences. 
8.3.2 : Empirical Results 
The calculated SRPs for the 11 crops and their associated 14 crop 
rotations during the period 1986-2000 are summarised in Table 8-2. The 
principal results for crop analysis are as follows: 
(1) Long and short berseem received on average the highest SRP (0.60) 
of all the studied sectors throughout the period 1986-2000; next come import3 
and export4 commodities with average of 0.36 and 0.15 respectively. Implying 
that: first, export commodities are less distorted than . import and fodder 
commodities; and second, policy divergences have increased the gross 
revenues for fodder crops by 
3 Import commodities are wheat, sugar cane, broad bean, soybean and maize. 
4 Export commodities are cotton, potatoes, tomatoes and rice. 
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more than one-half, and for import and export sectors by one-third and one-
quarter respectively. 
(2) The SRP values for import commodities are higher than those for 
exports throughout the first, second and third periods by 25%, 26% and 12% 
respectively, indicating that export commodities are less protected than import 
commodities (see Figure 8-1). These results confinn the NPCO and EPC 
results reported in Chapter 7 (see Figures 7-1 and 7-6). 
(3) The NPCO and EPC results obtained earlier are confirmed again by 
the SRP estimate for potatoes, tomato and cotton. For example, the SRP results 
for potatoes indicate that producers are heavily taxed in most years throughout 
the three distinct periods, with negative SRPs of 0.05, 0.07 and 0.20 
respectively (the same picture can be seen for tomatoes). In contrast, cotton 
producers received an increasingly high level of subsidy during the periods 
1986-89, 1990-94 and 1995-2000 with SRPs of 0.19, 0.43 and 0.55 
respectively (see Table 8-2). 





1986-89 1990-94 1995-2000 
• Import products [] Export products m Fodder products 
Source: Table 8-2 
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Using the average estimates for SRPs during the period 1995-2000, 
Figure 8-2 presents the ranking of the major importable, exportable and fodder 
products in Egypt according to the level of subsidy (tax). Sugar cane, cotton 
and fodder crops (long and short berseem) had the highest SRPs (0.60, 0.55 
and 0.43 respectively) implying that divergences have increased the gross 
revenues by two-thirds for sugar cane and nearly by one-half for cotton and 
fodder crops. The estimated SRPs for other crops showed various levels of 
subsidy, with some variation. For example, the estimated SRPs for maize and 
soybean are about 0.31 and 0.27 respectively, followed by wheat, rice, 
tomatoes and broad beans (0.24.). In contrast, potatoes showed a negative SRP 
(-0.20) implying that divergences have decreased its gross revenues by about 
one-fifth. 
Figure 8-3 ranks different crop rotations during the period 1995-2000 
according to the extent to which a sector's revenues have been increased or 
decreased by governmental policies. The short berseem followed by cotton 
rotation reached the highest SRP of 0.52. In contrast, wheat or broad beans 
followed by potatoes had negative SRPs of -0.08 and -0.10 respectively. All 
other rotations have a SRP of 0.26 on average. 
8.4 : Summary and conclusion 
Measures of transfers can provide an insight to the extent of 
inefficiency in an agriCUltural sector. The policy analysis matrix (PAM) allows 
the analyst to estimate the value and magnitude of these transfers by two main 
economic indicators, the profitability coefficient (PC) and the subsidy ratio to 
producers (SRP). In this chapter we have estimated both of the PC and SRP 
coefficients to measure the effect of policy transfers for Egyptian major 
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FIGURE (8-2): SRP ESTIMATES FOR MAJOR CROPS DURING THE PERIOD 1995-
2000 
Source: Table 7-1. 
Note: as we move toward the right hand side the level of subsidy decreases. 
FIGURE (8-3): SRP ESTIMATES FOR MAJOR CROP ROTATIONS DURING THE 
PERIOD 1995-2000 
Source: Table 7-1. 
Note: as we move toward the right hand side the level of subsidy decreases. 
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agricultural commodities. Although the profitability coefficient (PC) 
measurement extends the effective protection coefficient (EPC) to include 
factor transfers, it is an incomplete measure, particularly if any of its two 
components (private or social profits) are negative. Hence, we rely on the SRP 
as a more comprehensive and more consistent measure. In general, the 
estimated SRP results indicated that: (1) all the studied crops and crop 
rotations in all years are distorted, in other words, either subsidised or taxed. 
(2) the SRP values for import commodities are higher than those for export 
commodities, implying that the level of subsidy received by import commodity 
producers is higher than for export commodity producers. The result is 
consistent and is confirmed by NPCO and EPC results estimated in Chapter 7. 
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Policy Implications: The PAM and Area Predictions 
Chapter IX: Policy Implications: The Policy Analysis 
Matrix (PAM) and Planted Area Predictions 
9.1 Introduction 
The policy analysis matrix analysis is static and partial equilibrium in 
nature. The PAM model can detect the impact of changes in production, 
profitability or costs on sector (x) but it cannot measure the impact of these 
changes on other sectors. For example, if wheat profitability increased (say, 
due to a rise in the wheat price or the use of an improved seed variety), the 
P AM can measure the impact of these changes on the wheat sector' but is 
unable to capture the indirect impact on other sectors simultaneously. 
Assessing the relationships between sectors has some appeal as sectors 
compete for resources. Consequently, we attempt to bridge the gap in the 
partial equilibrium nature of the analysis by linking the PAM for each 
commodity together. Linking of P AMs in this way allows us to analyse the 
effect of changes in policy on the profitability and hence the area planted to 
each crop in Egyptian agriculture. Whilst there are many scenarios that could 
be evaluated, we focus attention on the sectoral impacts of a water charge. 
Section 2 presents a theoretical methodology for modelling the 
statistical relationships between the calculated PCRs and the planted areas of 
major crops. Section 3 reports the empirical results for general and specific 
models for the area and PCRs relationships using both levels and first 
differences data. Section 4 discusses the implications of the introduction of 
, By estimating economic indicators (pCR, ORC, NPCO, NPCI and SRP) using the new set of 
data. 
9-2 
Policy Implications: The PAM and Area Predictions 
irrigation water charges on areas of major crops. Section 5 summarises and 
concludes. 
9.2 Methodology 
In this section, we attempt to estimate statistical relationships between 
the PCRs and the planted area of each crop. This will allow us to make 
predictions of the outcomes of policy simulations across Egyptian agriculture. 
The PCR was selected because it reflects the domestic competitiveness and 
profitability of the crops through the relationship between the PCR and 
profitability (the lower the PCR, the higher the profitability) on the grounds 
that profitability is one of the most important motivations for growers in 
allocating their land among competing crops. 
We assume that the planted area for crop x in year t is affected by the 
PCR of crop x and other competing and following summer crops in year (t-1). 
i.e., Area X, = f{PCRXt-I, PCRW,_I' PCRC,_I .... ) 
While we propose no explicit structural economIC model for the 
relationship between the area planted and profitability (as measured by the 
PCR), it seems reasonable to expect the following a priori. (1) A negative sign 
for the relationship between a crop's area in year t and its PCR in year t-l 
because higher profitability in year t-l (i.e. a lower PCR) will encourage 
growers to devote more land to that crop in year t. (2) A negative relationship 
between a winter crop area (such as wheat) and the PCRs for summer crops 
that follow wheat, such as maize and rice, because higher profitability in t-l in 
these crops would encourage growers to expand their area and consequently 
the preceding wheat area. (3) A positive relationship between the area of a 
2 This issue has been discussed in greater detail in chapter 6. 
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winter crop and the PCRs of competing crops such as broad beans, short and 
long berseem, and tomatoes. This is because the lower profitability in t-l of 
these crops (i.e. higher PCR) the more reluctant the growers will be to extend 
their area in year t and consequently they will direct at least some of their area 
to competing crops such as wheat. 
In order to detect the impact of the changes to the PCRs on the area of 
crops it is necessary to model areas planted to crops as a function of those 
PCRs. Four different models have been estimated for each crop, using 
MicroFIT.4. Area data are reported in Table A4-2 and the PCRs are reported 
in Table 6-1. The estimated models are: (1) a 'general' model using levels data 
in logs; (2) a 'specific' model using levels data in logs; (3) a 'general' model 
using first differences of the log levels and (4) a 'specific' model using first 
differences of the log levels. In this context the general models are those that 
include the PCRs of all summer and winter crops, irrespective of the statistical 
significance of the coefficients. The 'specific' models are those in which 
statistically insignificant regressors have been excluded 
9.2.1 Type I models: general models for major crops using levels data in 
logs 
In the first model we work in terms of the (natural) logarithms of the 
data in levels, specifying the logarithm of the area planted to the crop under 
consideration as a linear function of the logarithms of the PCRs of that and 
other competitive crops. The intercept coefficient is then a measure of the scale 
effect of the explanatory variables, and the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are the elasticities of the area planted with respect to those variables. 
Since the data display strong trends (i.e. are probably non-stationary), the 
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statistical significance of the coefficients is likely to be inflated. However, 
since the main cause of that inflation is the underestimation of the residual 
variance, we would expect the ranking of the variables in terms of the 
significance of their coefficients to be unaffected by any non-stationarity, and 
thus the calculated t statistics will be a useful guide in the determination of the 
corresponding 'specific' models. However, we should not expect to observe 
much statistical significance given the small sample size (15 observations). 
In this model we assume that the area of a crop (say wheat) may be 
described by a simple linear econometric model, using the PCRs for wheat and 
other competitive and rotational following crops in year t-l. Applying logs will 
yield 
LA JV,= f30 + PI LPJV,-J+ f32 LPBBt-J+ f33 LPLBt-J+ f34LPSBt-J + f3s LPTt-J 
+ f36LPMt-J+ f37LPCt-J+ f3sLPRt-J+ P9LPSt-J+ f3toLPPt-J+ f.l t (9.1) 
where the variables are denoted according to, 
A area L natural logarithms 
p peR f30 Logarithms of scale parameter 
W wheat f31 elasticity for wheat peR in year t-l 
BB broad beans f32 elasticity for broad bean PCR in year t-l 
LB long berseem f33 elasticity for long berseem PCR in year t-l 
SB short berseem f34 elasticity for short berseem peR in year t-l 
T tomatoes f3s = elasticity for tomatoes PCR in year t-l 
M maize f36 elasticity for maize PCR in year t-l 
C cotton f37 elasticity for cotton PCR in year t-l 
R rice f3s = elasticity for rice peR in year t-l 
S soybean f39 elasticity for soybean peR in year t-l 
P potatoes f3lo elasticity for potatoes PCR in year t-l 
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9.2.2 Type II Models: specific models for major crops using levels data 
in logs 
In this model the results obtained from Model I are refined by 
excluding variables where that exclusion does not reduce R2, in order to 
improve the model specification. For example, in the results that follow in the 
potatoes model, eliminating the peR variables for wheat, long berseem, 
tomatoes, maize, rice and soybean improved the specification of the model 
since its R2 increased from 0.63 (in the general model) to 0.85 (in the specific 
model), and the remaining explanatory variables (broad bean, short berseem 
and cotton) became significant at the 10% level. 
Introducing another explanatory variable to a regression equation 
estimated by ordinary least squares cannot reduce the sum of squared errors, 
since the coefficients are estimated by minimising that sum, and will reduce 
the sum of squared errors if the estimated coefficient of the new regressor is 
non-zero. Thus a reduction in the sum of squared errors (an increase in R2) is 
not a reliable indicator of an improvement in the explanatory power of that 
equation. To correct for this problem we adjust R2 by taking account of the 
degrees of freedom in the model, n - k , which are reduced by the inclusion of 
an additional regressor, the adjusted measure being known as li2. More 
formally, R2 is defined by 
( 2) -2 l-R l-R =(n-l) n-k (9.1) 
where k is the number of regressors. Adding a new regressor will only decrease 
1-1P (i.e. increase R2) if the proportionate decrease in 1-R2 is greater than 
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the proportionate decrease in the degrees of freedom, and indeed adding a new 
regressor may decrease Ji2. Thus Ji2 is a better guide to whether the addition 
of another variable has indeed improved the explanatory power of an equation 
-2 
Modelling of the Adjusted Coefficient of Determination (R ) 
" e ~ ~We can define R2 = 1-_L.J_,_ LY; 




We define R as the 'Adjusted Coefficient of Determination' by 
dividing both sides of equation (9.3) by their respective degrees of freedom to 
make the equality true. 
Unexplained SS = Total SS (1- R2) 
n-k n-l 
(9.4) 
where, n = total number of observations, k = number of parameters to be 
estimated. 
R2 = 1-( n-l )(UneXPlained SS) 
n-k Total SS 
(9.5) 
by substituting equation (9.3) in equation (9.5) we get 
-2 (n-l)( 2) _ (n-l)(Lei ) R = 1- - l-R - 1- - --2 
n-k n-k LYi (9.6) 
-2 n-l L.Je. ( )( '" 2) Note that unlike Rl, R can be negative when n _ k L ;; is greater than 
one. This means that the regression model explains a very small fraction of the 
total sum of squares. For example, in the regression model for tomatoes using 
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differenced data, n = 13, k = 11 and R2 = 0.62259, thenR 2 = 1- [(13-1)/(13-
11)](1-0.62259) = -1.2645. 
9.2.3 Type III Models: general models for major crops using differences 
in the logs of the data. 
As argued in Chapter 2, it is often better to work with differenced data 
rather than with data in levels. The reason is that the errors in the levels 
equation often have variances increasing over time, and consequently the 
properties of the least squares estimators (OLS) are non-standard, and the 
values of the standard test statistics for significance are inflated. Hence, 
although models in first differences will tend to have lower explanatory power, 
they offer a more reliable guide to the statistical significance of variables. They 
will also suffer less from the consequences of multicollinearity - there is often 
a common trend in levels data, especially with small samples. Therefore, 
applying first differences to the logs of the levels data for wheat will yield 
DLA w,= Yo + YtDLPW,-J+ Y2DLPBBt-J+ Y3DLPLBt-J+ Y4DLPSBt-J + 
Ys D LPTt-J+ Y6 DLPMt-J+ Y7DLPCt-J+ Ys DLPRt-J+ Y9 DLPSt-J 
(9.2) 
where the variables are denoted as in Equation (9-1) except that we are using 
here the first differences of the logarithms; for example, DLA W means the 
change in the logarithm of the wheat area. 
9.2.4 Type IV Models: specific models for major crops using differences 
in the logs of the data. 
In the same way as we did in Model II, in this model we refine the 
results obtained from Model III by eliminating variables where that exclusion 
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-2 
does not decrease R in order to improve our model specification. For example, 
the exclusion of the explanatory variable for soybean (whose probability value 
-2 [0.768]) from the wheat modelled to an increase in the value of R from 0.93 
to 0.95 and statistical significance for the other explanatory variable 
coefficients (at the 10% level). 
9.3 j r e s t i n ~ ~
9.3.1 Testing the general models in levels 
Table 9-1 reports the results from testing the significance of possible 
explanatory variables in levels for the major crops used in this study. In 
general, the majority of explanatory variables in most crop models do not show 
statistical significance at conventional levels, but the full set has relatively high 
-2 
explanatory power (as indicated by R ). Such results suggest the presence of 
multicollinearity. For example, in the equations for soybean, rice, long 
berseem, short berseem, wheat and potatoes there were insignificant 
coefficients for many variables on the basis of t ratios, although the equations 
-2 
showed high values for R at 0.96, 0.95, 0.84, 0.63, 0.63 and 0.63 
respectively. In contrast, the regression models for maize, tomatoes, and broad 
beans reported negative values for R2 estimated at -0.16, -0.26 and -0.40 
respectively implying that those models explain a very small fraction of the 
total sum of squares. 
Figure 9-1 shows the plot of the actual and fitted values of the general 
models of area using levels data. It illustrates the results of the models reported 
in Table 9-1. As noted above, the results do not appear to be significant in 
levels but the sign and magnitude for the majority of coefficients are consistent 
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with the economic logic. Moreover, the actual and fitted plots of values are 
very close implying that the specified model fits the data well. 
9.3.2 Testing the general models in first differences 
In general, the results show that the significance levels and the values of R2 in 
the first differences model are higher than of those for the model in levels for 
the majority of crops. Moreover, the magnitudes and signs for the coefficients 
in first differences are quite similar to those estimated in levels for the majority 
of crops (see Tables 9-1 and 9-2). For example, in the wheat model, although 
the coefficients Yo, YI'" YIO are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels, their probability values are remarkably less than for those for PI' P2' 
... Pto (see Table A9-1). At the same time, the coefficients' signs and 
magnitudes are similar to those estimated using levels data, and the value of 
R2 has improved from 0.63 in levels to 0.93 in first differences. A similar 
result can be observed for short berseem3 (see Table 9-2). The results from the 
t tests indicate that the statistical significance of coefficients improved in the 
cases of soybean, maize, potatoes and broad beans, but that there was no 
improvement for rice, long berseem, cotton and tomatoes (see Table 9-2 and 
Figure 9-2). 
-2 
3 Where its R has increased from 0.63 in levels to 0.97 in first differences. 
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TABLE 9-1:.AREA MODELLING USING DATA IN LEVELS FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT (GENERAL MODELS) 
Regressor 
Crop Po PI P2 P3 P4 Ps P6 P7 Ps P9 PIO R2 -2 R 
(Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPT) (LPM) apC) (LPR) apS) (LPP) 
Wheat 11.2 -1.1 0.9 2.8 0.70 0.60 1.00 0.37 -1.57 1.02 -0.17 0.91 0.63 [0.0111 [0.5181 [0.1801 [0.145] [0.4661 [0.5851 [0.3031 rO.3661 rO.0521 [0.4401 rO.5741 
Short berseem 13.81 0.06 -0.45 0.48 -0.03 0.05 0.22 -0.09 -0.36 0.06 -0.02 0.92 0.63 LO.0011 [0.9451 [0.1611 [0.533] [0.9511 rO.9201 rO.591] [0.603] [0.233] rO.9191 [0.908] 
Long berseem 15.27 0.65 -0.04 0.21 -0.07 0.50 -0.09 -0.04 -0.23 -0.50 0.12 0.96 0.84 : [0.000] [0.050] [0.568] [0.339] [0.571] [0.028] [0.443] [0.436] [0.040] [0.045] [0.045] 
Rice 12.46 -0.86 0.77 -0.66 -0.29 -0.53 0.64 0.06 -0.57 0.76 -0.11 0.99 0.95 . [0.0001 [0.191] [0.019] [0.248] [0.354] [0.185] [0.084] [0.637] [0.038] [0.136] [0.292] 
Tomatoes 11.64 0.32 0.06 0.30 -0.46 -0.27 -0.22 0.0006 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.71 -0.26 [.0031 [.778J [.872J [.775J [.468J [.706] [.7ooJ [.998] [.863] [.967] [.848] 
Maize 14.02 0.04 0.15 -0.49 0.33 0.001 -0.08 -0.09 -0.15 
0.04 -0.02 0.73 -0.16 [0.001] [0.964] [0.637] [0.587] [0.531] [0.999] [0.874] 10.6851 [0.6301 [0.953J 10.9081 
Cotton 12.62 -0.67 -0.21 0.25 -0.40 -0.60 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.57 -0.13 0.84 0.30 [O.004J [0.617] [0.631] [0.837] [0.574J [0.477] [0.788] [0.509] [0.682] [0.564] [0.589] 
Soybean 12.72 -1.03 -2.12 -0.03 3.54 -0.13 -0.58 0.57 2.30 -0.14 -0.46 0.99 0.96 [0.008] [0.550] [0.0241 [0.986] [0.022] [0.896] [0.500] [0.189] [0.018] [0.910] [0.185] 
Potatoes 12.36 0.51 -1.24 0.16 1.66 
0.01 -0.21 0.33 0.31 -0.55 -0.35 0.92 0.63 [0.0351 [0.860] [0.247] [0.951] [0.319] [0.998] [0.884J 1 0 . 6 0 ~ ~ LO.7371 lO.797J 10.4971 
I Broad beans 12.50 1.19 0.11 -1.92 1.07 0.46 
0.19 -0.16 -0.85 -1.20 0.14 0.68 -0.40 [0.019] [0.609] [0.883] [0.388J [O.404J [0.742] [0. 863J 10.7511 [0.2961 [0.494] L O . 7 2 ~ ~
Source: Tables A31-A35. 
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FIGURE 9-1: ACTUAL AND PITIED VALUES OF AREA IN LEVELS FOR SOME 
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Figure 9-2 shows the actual and fitted values for the first differenced 
models for wheat, short berseem, rice and soybean, the same crops previously 
plotted in Figure 9-1. 
The graphs show that the estimated coefficients Yo, YI'" YIO are very 
close in magnitude and similar in signs to those plotted in Figure 9-1. 
Moreover, the actual and fitted plot of values is very close, implying that the 
differences model fits the data well. 
9.3.3 Testing models in levels (specific models) 
As discussed earlier, these models are obtained by using R2 as the main 
criterion for excluding explanatory regressors from Model I, the t ratios and 
coefficient values also being helpful guides. 
In general, the results reported in Tables 9-1 and 9-3 for the general and 
specific models in levels show thatR2 has increased for almost all crops in the 
specific compared to the general models. The highest increase recorded was 
0.66 (on average) for tomatoes, maize and broad beans, 0.20 for wheat and 
cotton, 0.08 for short and long berseem and 0.01 for wheat and rice. In contrast, 
-2 
the R of soybean fell slightly from 0.96 to 0.93. 
The results also reveal that some crops, wheat, short berseem, and 
cotton, showed no change in statistical significance in the specific model 
compared to the general model in levels (see Tables 9-1 and 9-3). In contrast, 
soybean showed statistical significance for all explanatory variables at either 
the 5% or the 10% level of significance, implying that the exclusion of 
variables (from general model) led to a better specification to the model. The t 
ratios for other crops such as tomatoes, maize and potatoes have improved but 
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TABLE 9-2: AREA MODELLING USING DATA IN FIRST DIFFERENCES FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT (GENERAL MODELS) 
Regressor 
Crop If -2 Yo Yl Y2 Y3 Y4 Ys Y6 Y7 Ys Y9 YIO R 
(Constant) (DLPW) (DLPBB) (DLPLB) (DLPSB) (DLPT) . (DLPMl (QLPCl -.m.LPR) (DLPS) ( D L P P ~ ~
Wheat 0.26 -2.02 3.01 5.69 0.59 -1.01 0.97 0.77 -4.20 0.09 -.518 0.99 0.93 
.[0.0221 [0.0261 rO.0341 rO.0501 fO.066] 1.0.0401 [0.0971 [0.0121 rO.0421 10.768] [0.03U 
Short berseem -0.13 0.58 -1.44 3.62 -0.01 0.32 0.71 -0.33 -2.46 0.44 0.17 0.99 0.97 [0.011] [0.036] 1.0.0181 [0.0151 [0.865] [0.0451 rO.0231 rO.0071 [0.0141 [0.0361 rO.0321 
Long berseem 0.01 0.55 -0.22 0.61 -0.07 0.46 -0.21 -0.02 0.05 -0.48 0.09 0.94 0.64 [0.731] [0.146] lO.6401 [0.5821 10.595] 10.0921 rO.465] [0.7691 [0.9481 [0.1191 rO.321] 
Rice -0.06 -0.70 1.67 -2.69 -0.25 -0.51 1.19 0.04 -1.88 0.95 -0.03 0.94 0.65 [0.521] [0.384] 1.0.263] [0.3941 [0.498] [0.329] [0.1921 [0.8251 [0.3811 rO.1891 [0.8861 
Tomatoes -0.01 0.75 0.15 0.23 -0.53 0.07 -0.33 -0.24 -0.36 -0.23 0.04 0.62 -1.3 [0.952] [0.616] 10.950] [0.9681 [0.476] .[0.9421 rO.8151 [0.5371 [0.9261 [0.8371 rO.930] 
Maize 0.12 -0.27 -1.67 3.47 0.28 -0.15 -0.95 0.09 2.51 -0.48 -0.16 0.85 0.08 [0.150] [0.618] 10.1651 [0.1921 10.328J 1.0.6551 rO.1631 rO.5241 [0.1721 rO.3001 rO.3351 
Cotton -0.08 0.23 0.95 -2.16 -0.46 -0.05 0.70 -0.16 -1.73 0.40 0.10 0.56 -1.6 [.685] [.885] 1-7311 17331 f.5651 r.9561 f.6591 [.6921 [.6871 r.748] r.8161 
Soybean 0.24 -2.41 -5.79 7.88 3.51 -0.87 -2.41 1.12 7.87 -0.60 -0.90 0.98 0.90 [0.179] [0.140] [0.079] [0.187] [0.018] [0.302] [0.1341 rO.0481 rO.l001 rO.5241 [0.0851 
Potatoes 0.38 
-0.13 -6.97 12.76 1.42 -0.18 -3.14 0.67 8.56 -2.36 -0.74 0.90 0.38 
rO.241] [0.954] [0.173] [0.239] [0.267] [0.8951 rO.2401 rO.3081 rO.2411 rO.2581 fO.3041 
Broad beans -0.12 
1.94 2.12 -6.43 1.15 0.71 1.55 -0.24 -3.81 -1.14 0.42 0.72 -0.7 
rO.715] [0.515] [0.668] [0.578] [0.433] [0.691] [0.586] . [0.7371. UM21] .[0.609] L [0.600L 
.- ---_.-
Source: Tables A31-A35. 
Note: Figures in parentheses are probability values. 
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FIGURE 9-2: A CTUAL AND FITIED V A LUES OF AREA IN FIRST D IFFERENCES FOR 
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remain insignificant. However, we have to deal with these results with caution, 
as we know that the test statistics for models using levels data are inflated. 
Although the results were insignificant, they showed to a large extent 
what would be expected in tenns of the signs and magnitudes in the standard 
economic interpretation. For example, the rice area showed a negative 
relationship with its PCR in previous year, the estimated elasticity being -0.65 
which means that a decrease in the PCR of rice in year t-l by 1 % (Le. a higher 
profitability) increases the rice area in year t by 0.65% on average. The results 
also indicate a negative relationship between rice area and the PCRs for winter 
crops that follow rice such as wheat (-0.41), long berseem (-0.78) and tomatoes 
(-0.23). The negative coefficients of the winter following crops in year t-l 
implies that the higher is their profitability, the more likely it is that growers 
will devote their area to those crops and consequently to rice in year t. The 
results also indicate a positive relationship between rice area and the PCRs for 
competitive crops such as soybean (0.35) and maize (0.53). The positive 
coefficients of competitive crops in year t-l imply that the lower is their 
profitability, the more likely the growers will devote their area to rice as a next 
best alternative. The same relationships can be seen for other crops, such as 
potatoes and tomatoes (see Table 9-3). 
Figure 9-3 shows actual and fitted values for those specific models in 
levels, rice, soybean, long berseem, and potatoes, that have the highest 
R2 (0.95, 0.93, 0.91 and 0.85 respectively). The graphs show that the estimated 
coefficients of the regressors Po, PI ... /3\0 are very close in magnitude and 
similar in signs to those plotted in Figure 9-1, but the majority of these 
coefficients are significant at the 10%. 
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TABLE 9-3: AREA MODELLING USING DATA IN LEVELS FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT (SPECIFIC MODELS) 
Refressor 
Crop Po PI P2 P3 P4 Ps P6 P7 Ps P9 PIO If -2 R 
(Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPT) (LPM) (LPC) (LPR) (LPS) (LPP) 
Wheat 12.7 0.10 0.75 2.36 0.60 0.14 0.69 0.11 -1.75 -0.003 0.89 0.65 [.000] [.896] [0.189] [0.145] [0.492] rO.779] [0.377] [0.5831 rO.017] - rO.9891 
Short berseem 13.79 0.04 -0.45 0.44 0.04 0.21 -0.09 -0.36 0.07 -0.02 0.92 0.73 [0.000] [0.953] [0.077] [0.288] - rO.920] [0.506] [0.524] [0.159] [0.897] [0.872] 
Long berseem 15.04 0.47 0.06 0.41 -0.23 -0.40 0.09 0.95 0.91 [0.000] [0.000] - [0.250] - [0.000] - - [0.002] [0.000] rO.0001 
Rice 13.05 -0.41 0.69 -0.78 -0.23 0.53 -0.65 0.35 0.98 0.95 [0.000] [0.098] 10.0011 [0.018] - [0.174] [0.032] - [0.007] [0.102] -
Tomatoes 11.77 0.33 0.44 -0.49 -0.25 -0.31 0.70 0.50 [0.000] [0.0441 - 10.1931 [0.100] [0.0651 (0.1281 - - - -
Maize 14.02 0.17 -0.57 0.40 -0.02 -0.08 -0.15 0.72 0.47 [0.0001 rO.081] [0.150] 10.1621 - rO.8591 rO.2611 r0.391 ] - -
Cotton 12.37 -0.83 -0.14 -0.29 -0.68 0.28 0.23 0.16 0.64 -0.15 0.84 0.47 
rO.0001 [0.3741 rO.5501 - rO.4461 rO.2911 rO.4501 rO.3071 rO.651] 10.4261 [0.369] 
Soybean 13.23 -1.60 3.l4 2.19 -1.64 -0.55 0.96 0.93 
rO.0001 [0.001] - [0.001] - - - [0.0011 [0.0051 [0.0141 
Potatoes 11.76 -1.32 1.47 0.51 -0.35 0.90 0.85 [0.000] - [0.000] - [0.006] - - [0.011] - - [0.0341 
Broad beans 11.85 0.75 0.16 -1.77 0.99 -0.8 -0.60 -0.65 0.63 0.20 [0.000] [0.175] [0.622] [0.102] (0.236] - - (0.717] (0.172] [0.318 -
Source: Tables A31-35. 
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FIGURE 9-3: ACTUAL AND FIITED VALUES OF AREA IN LEVELS FOR SOME 
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9.3.4 Testing the specific models in first differences 
As with the models in levels, the specific models in first differences are 
developed from the Type I by exclusion explanatory regressors who does not 
-2 
decrease R . In general, the results reported in Tables 9-2 and 9-4 for the 
general and specific model in differences show that R2 has increased for almost 
all crops in the specific models compared to their general model counterparts. 
Crops, ranked according to the increase in R2 in the specific model in first 
differences compared to the general model in first differences are as follows: 
tomatoes (1.37), broad beans (0.79), cotton (0.70); long berseem, rice and 
potatoes are about 0.14, and next come wheat and short berseem at about 0.02. 
Finally, soybean and maize showed a very slight fall (of 0.02 on average). 
The results for the specific models in first differences reported in Table 
9-4 show that the wheat and short berseem regressions had statistically 
significant coefficients (at the 10% level). In addition, the estimated signs of 
the elasticities for the explanatory variables were as expected. For example, the 
estimated elasticity for the rice peR in the previous year was -2.4, implying 
that a fall in the rice PCR in year /-1 (i.e. higher profitability) of 1 % would 
encourage growers to expand the rice area by 2.4%. The elasticities of 
competitive crops (soybean and maize) in year t-I were estimated at 0.95 and 
1.46 respectively, implying that growers would divert some of their land in 
year t to rice if profitability of soybean and maize declined. 
The elasticities for its common proceeding winter crops (wheat and 
long berseem) in year t-I were estimated to be -0.62 and -3.75, implying that 
if the high profitability of wheat and long berseem in year /-1 became more 
profitable i.e. then growers would devote more area in year t to grow them, and 
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consequently planting rice (a common summer crop that commonly follows 
wheat and long berseem) would become more attractive. 
A similar picture can be seen for wheat. In contrast, the elasticities in 
the cotton and soybean models do not show any major changes compared to 
those in the first difference general model. The statistical significance of the 
estimated elasticities for long berseem, tomatoes, maize has improved but they 
are still not significant (see Table 9-1). Figure 9-4 shows the actual and fitted 
values for wheat, short berseem, rice and long berseem. The graphs show that 
the estimated coefficients of the regressors, Yo, YI'" YIO' are very close in 
magnitude and similar in sign to those plotted in Figure 9-2. But the 
significance level of these coefficients has improved compared to those in the 
original model in differences and for some crops (such as wheat) they are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the actual and fitted plots 
of values are very close, implying that the differences model is a good fit to the 
data. 
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TABLE 9-4: AREA MODELLING USING DATA IN FIRST DIFFERENCES FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT (SPECIFIC MODELS) 
R ~ r e s s o r r
Crop Yo Yl Y2 Y3 Y4 Ys Y6 If -2 Y7 Ys Y9 YIO R 
(Constant) (DLPW) (DLPBB) (J)LPLB) (DLPSB) (DLPT) (J)LPM) (J)LPC) (J)LPR) (J)LPS) (J)LPP) 
Wheat 0.27 -1.97 3.11 5.95 0.57 -0.98 1.04 0.76 -4.33 -0.52 0.99 0.95 fO.0031 rO.0041 rO.0051 rO.0071 rO.0211 rO.0071 fO.0141 [0.0011 [0.0071 - [0.0071 
Short berseem -0.13 0.59 -1.43 3.60 0.33 0.70 -0.33 -2.46 0.44 0.17 0.99 0.98 fO.0011 rO.0061 [0.0031 [0.0021 - [0.0081 ro.0041 fO.0001 fO.0021 fO.0081 fO.0061 
Long berseem -0.0007 0.47 0.01 0.39 -0.27 -0.36 0.08 0.91 0.81 fO.9121 rO.0031 - [0.943] - [0.001] - - fO.0291 rO.0031 fO.0181 
Rice -0.08 -0.62 2.07 -3.75 -0.47 1.46 -2.42 0.95 0.91 0.78 fO.0951 [0.0361 [0.018] [0.039] - [0.0361 fO.0151 - fO.0311 fO.0431 -
Tomatoes 0.003 0.21 0.33 -0.31 -0.24 -0.31 0.45 0.07 [0.9011 ro.3111 - [0.377] [0.330] [0.205] rO.2391 - - - -
Maize 0.03 -0.32 0.31 0.25 -0.30 0.04 0.35 0.53 0.05 f.2371 - f.3681 r.687] [.241] - f.3001 [.6041 f.3951 - -
Cotton -0.08 0.23 0.95 -2.16 -0.46 -0.05 0.70 -0.16 -1.73 0.40 0.10 0.56 -0.90 
r.6851 r.8851 f.7311 f.7331 r.5651 f.9561 f.6591 r.6921 [.6871 [.7481 [.8161 
-0.01 -1.65 2.82 1.77 -1.04 -0.45 0.65 0.88 Soybean fO.9031 - [0.024] - [0.0181 - - - rO.052] rO.1921 [0.0951 
0.02 -1.49 1.36 0.63 -0.23 0.90 0.49 Potatoes 
rO.7711 - rO.0121 - rO.0211 - - rO.0521 - - rO.1421 
0.08 0.73 -0.89 0.46 1.12 0.01 1.06 -1.47 0.62 0.09 Broad beans 10.3961 rO.2841 __ 10.797] _ Ll!!:181l - - fO.9611 rO.3811 fO.l081 -
~ - - ~ ~
[0.365] 
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FIGURE 9-4: ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES OF AREA IN FIRsT D IFFERENCES FOR 















1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
-0. 1 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 






1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
/ Actua1 / Fitted 
9-22 
Policy Implications: The PAM and Area Predictions 
Discussion 
It is apparent that the levels data results do not concur with those 
discussed in Chapter 3, where it was argued that significance tests offer a very 
different picture when the regressions are conducted in first differences rather 
than in levels. It is commonly found that the magnitude of estimated 
coefficients in the two approaches are similar, but that the significance of the 
estimated coefficients as well as of the R2 value in the first differences 
approach are not statistically significant whereas they are in levels. 
In this chapter we find that data using first differences yield results that 
are better, or at least equivalent, to those obtained in levels in terms of 
statistical significance and R2 values for most crops under consideration, 
despite the relatively low number of observations (see Table A9-1). These 
rather unexpected results are presumably due to: (1) multicollinearity, which 
affects the t ratios in levels, so that R2 is significant but none of the p, are 
significant (see Table 9-1); (2) the better specification of the first differenced 
model in terms of working with the explanatory variables that explain changes 
in crop areas (rather trying to explain changes in production in terms of a 
simple trend as in chapter 3). 
Overall, although the results are subject to caveats, they do show that 
for some crops the modelling of changes in area planted as a function of 
changes in the PCRs of the crop in question, of crops that are substitutes for 
the focus crop, and of crops that are complementary to the focus crop in that 
they are part of a common rotation, is satisfactory. For such crops, such as 
short berseem and wheat, the estimated elasticities are significant (although 
often only at the 10% level) and have the expected sign, so that the economic 
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interpretation is straightforward. However, for other crops, such as cotton and 
maize, the results are less satisfactory. 
9.4 Policy Changes and Prediction of Crop Areas 
In this section we attempt to use the specific models (in general and 
first differences data) constructed in section 9.3 to estimate the expected 
changes in crop areas under the assumption that the government has decided to 
charge the growers for irrigation water at its shadow price (see chapter 5). 
Charging for irrigation water would obviously increase the PCR for all 
crops due to the rise in domestic factor costs, i.e. the numerator (cell C in PAM 
notation) and consequently the PCR value. Thus 60 new P AMs were 
constructed to cover the period4 1995-2000 in order to estimate the impact of 
policy changes (introducing the water charge) on the PCR value. 
Table 9-5 shows the PCR estimates for the main crops during the 
period 1995-2000 for the base scenario (without the water charge) and the 
alternative scenario 1 (with the water charge). The over-all picture for scenario 
1 estimates concur with what we would expect since the values of PCR 
coefficients have increased for all crops (with some variations) compared to 
the base scenario i.e, profitability is lower. For example, broad beans, cotton, 
soybean and rice are affected the most, profitability (as measured by peR) is 
falling by nearly 14%. Next comes wheat, short berseem, maize, long berseem 
and potatoes by about 10% and finally tomatoes by 5%. 
4 Although the choice of a period or a single year to be the year t-l is arbitrary, we chose the 
average for 1995-2000 assuming that this period reflected a more sustainable period of reform 
besides it represents the latest available. 
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TABLE 9-5: V ALUES OF PCR COEFFICIENTS FOR PRE AND POST WATER 
CHARGING IN THE PERIOD 1995-2000 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average 
I Wheat I Base Scenario • 0.53 0.46 0.49 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.69 0.63 0.73 0.64 Scenario 1 
I Tomatoes I Base Scenario 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.31 Scenario 1 
I Broad beans I Base Scenario 0.59 0.55 0.5 0.79 1.05 0.73 0.70 
0.67 0.64 0.59 0.88 1.2 0.84 0.80 Scenario 1 
Base Scenario 0.54 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.48 
Short berseem Scenario 1 0.59 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.53 
I Base Scenario I Long berseem 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.42 
0.52 0.46 0.41 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.47 Scenario 1 
I Rice I Base Scenario 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.56 Scenario 1 
I Cotton I Base Scenario 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.62 0.45 0.46 0.49 1.00 0.95 0.93 0.71 Scenario 1 
I Maize I Base Scenario 0.68 0.59 0.51 0.70 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.75 0.66 0.58 0.77 0.66 0.66 0.68 Scenario 1 
I Soybean I Base Scenario 0.96 0.82 0.82 1.06 0.98 0.99 0.94 1.07 0.93 0.94 1.20 1.12 1.15 1.07 Scenario 1 
I Potatoes I Base Scenario 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.97 0.89 0.93 0.78 0.71 0.69 0.68 1.05 0.97 1.02 0.85 Scenario 1 
'Source: Table 6-1 
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9.4.1 Methodology 
Four different models are estimated for each crop by using MicroFIT.4. 
The first and second models (using the specific model in levels) aimed to 
detect the impact of the changes in the peR on the proportional change in area 
of crops, in which the first model uses peR results obtained in the base 
scenario while the second model uses results obtained in scenario 1. The 
impact of the changes in the peR on area is obtained as the difference between 
the second and first model. 
The third and fourth models are estimated (using specific model in first 
differences) to measure the change in growth rate of area. The third model uses 
the data of the base scenario (without the water charge) while the fourth model 
uses the data of scenario 1 (with the water charge). The change in growth rate 
of area is obtained as the difference between the fourth and third model. 
9.4.2 Results 
Table 9-6 shows the results for the estimatedf percentage change in 
area and growth rate in area for major crops, following the introduction of 
water charges. In general and as might be expected, most of the crops appear to 
be negatively affected by the new water charge, with a total fall in total crop 
area of about 660, 000 feddan. 
The most affected crops in terms of area are broad beans and wheat, 
with an expected fall in their areas of nearly 500,000 and 71,000 feddan 
respectively. Maize and rice are the next most susceptible, their areas falling 
by 46,000 and 36,000 feddan respectively. Next comes cotton (9,700 feddan), 
tomatoes (2,800 feddan) soybean (1,900 feddan) and long berseem (63 
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feddan). In contrast, short berseem and potatoes areas are expected to expand 
by 5,800 and 670 feddan respectively. 
TABLE 9-6: ESTIMATED EFFECT ON THE PROPORTIONAL AND GROWTH RATE 
CHANGE IN AREA FOR MAJOR CROPS OF WATER CHARGE 
Crop % Change Change in Growth in Area Rate of Area 
Wheat 
-20 -499,538 -8.60E-04 
Broad beans 
-26 -70,778 -1.06E-02 
Tomatoes 
-2 -2,776 -1.19E-03 
Long berseem 
-3.E-03 -63 -1.72E-03 
Short berseem 1 5,863 1.07E-03 
Maize 
-3 -46,235 -7.60E-04 
Rice 
-2 -36,086 -S.S9E-03 
Cotton 
-1 -9,669 -5.10E-04 
Soybean 
-13 -1,878 -1.06E-02 
Potatoes 2 667 4.38E-03 
Total 
-660492 
Source: own calculations. 
Crops with an intensive water requirement such as rice (3,500 
M3/feddan) might be expected to show the largest decline in area in response to 
the water charge, while crops with less water requirement such as wheat (2,500 
M3/feddan) might be expected to be less affected. However, the results show a 
different picture. This result may be explained through the ability of the 
sector's net private profitability to cover the cost of water. For example, the net 
private profitability for rice and wheat (after applying water charge) is 
estimated at £E 956 and £E 706 per feddan respectively, that might let rice 
growers are more able to pay for the charge than wheat growers. This 
explanation could be seen also for other crops such as cotton and maize. 
Moreover, the change in growth rate of area results mirror the same 
results, obtained from the proportional change in area results implying that all 
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crops (except for potatoes and short berseem) have achieved negative growth 
rates in response to charging for irrigation water. 
These results however, with a large 'predicted' total fall in the area 
planted, are an example of the well-known shortcomings of partial equilibrium 
analysis when applied to the issue of a general equilibrium reallocation of a 
resource that is in fixed supply. Our knowledge of the general equilibrium 
effects of a policy change (for example in the theory of international trade) 
tells us that a given change will lead to both a reallocation of inputs, and 
changes in the relative prices of those inputs, such that all resources will be 
fully employed. 
The preceding results should provide the 'basis' for an analysis of the 
likely changes in the allocation of the full land area between crops. The theory 
of comparative advantage 'chains' predicts that the production of the good at 
the top of the chain will increase (since it will be exported) and that production 
of the good at the bottom of the chain will contract (since it will be imported). 
However, whether the good next to the top will be exported (or whether that 
next to the bottom will be imported) depends on the endogenous changes in the 
prices of other goods (e.g. through substitution in consumption) and in the 
prices of other inputs (e.g. through substitution in production). 
It would have been preferable to have estimated the system of 
equations discussed earlier subject to the constraint that the total land area 
would be planted. Better still would have been to estimate a system of 
equations which included specifically the unit cost equations, factor demand 
equations, factor allocation constraints etc that are familiar from general 
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equilibrium modelling. However the shortage of data precluded the first, let 
alone the second. 
Nevertheless, the estimated elasticities of planted areas to changes in 
the PCRs could in principle be incorporated as parameters in a simultaneous, 
but not general, computable equilibrium model. Such a model would 
endogenise changes in prices of goods and factors, some of these being subject 
to quantity constraints (e.g. total planted area), the others being specified 
according to exogenous supply/demand functions. If this were done then the 
policy analysis matrix would become more akin to the social accounting matrix 
underlying almost all computable general eqUilibrium modelling. However, 
where a sequence of 'micro-consistent' P AMs can be constructed, as here, the 
modeller has an advantage over the CGE modeller in being able to estimate 
certain parameters that are consistent with the data, as here. Constructing such 
a model for Egyptian agriculture is the obvious next step. 
9.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In this Chapter we have estimated the statistical relationships between 
the PCRs and the planted areas of major crops. This was done for 4 different 
models, two of which are for general and specific models using data in levels, 
the other two being for general and specific models using first differenced data. 
The specific models in levels and first differences were used to indicate the 
impact of charging for irrigation water on crop areas. Sixty new P AMs were 
estimated to measure the implications of policy changes on sector 
competitiveness. An increase in the new PCRs results (scenario 1) is generated 
for all crops through the negative effect of a new water charge on private 
profitability. The results obtained from specific models in levels and first 
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differences for measuring the impact of policy changes in crop areas indicated 
that there is a high response of the change in planted area to water charges. 
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10 Chapter X: Summary of Conclusions and 
Recommendations for Egypt's Agricultural Future 
10.1 : Introduction. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Egyptian agricultural sector was 
severely burdened by unfavourable government intervention policies during 
the pre-reform period. This era was characterised by government dominance in 
all activities, both on the input and the output side, through what were known 
as 'Agricultural Co-operatives'. Areas for most crops were specified on a 
regional basis, mandatory delivery quotas were enforced, producer prices were 
predetermined at levels below world prices, and the bigger enterprises in 
processing, marketing and trade were state-owned. Moreover, the overvalued 
exchange rate implicitly taxed agricultural exports and subsidised competing 
imports. 
These policies had a negative effect on the performance of the 
agricultural sector. The weak performance of the Egyptian economy in general 
and the agricultural sector in particular, plus the cost of servicing the massive 
international debt, left the government of Egypt no option other than to seek 
comprehensive structural reforms. 
Many of the policy changes adopted in the reform period affected, 
directly and/or indirectly, grower's revenues, incomes and profits. The most 
significant of these were: (1) the elimination the system of predetermined and 
fixed prices for agricultural products, (although the government did provide 
voluntary guarantee prices for certain strategic crops from time to time); (2) 
the removal of crop area controls and compulsory delivery quotas; (3) the 
elimination of subsidies on inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides; (4) the 
decontrol of the role of the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural 
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Credit (PBDAC) in input and output marketing; (5) reductions in consumer 
and industrial subsidies; (6)reductions in certain services for farmers, such as 
agricultural credit at lower interest rates and the provision of machinery; (7) 
the liberalisation of foreign trade and reductions in non-tariff barriers to 
imports and exports and a move towards the tariff as the only trade instrument; 
(8) the unification of exchange rates and the devaluation of the Egyptian 
currency; (9) reductions in the growth of the money supply and the fiscal 
deficit; (10) the deregulation of interest rates; (11) the restructuring of public 
enterprises and their gradual privatisation; (12) giving private investment an 
opportunity to play an effective role (WTO, 1999). 
The agricultural sector was the pioneer in implementing and applying 
the comprehensive structural refonns that started in 1986. Since then, growers 
have had the freedom to choose what and how much to grow. They are allowed 
to buy fertiliser, seeds, pesticides and all other inputs from the private sector 
(who assumed a greater role in the refonn era) at market prices that are much 
closer to the equivalent world prices (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of agricultural policies 
on the protectionldisprotection (at the farm gate level) on the efficiency of 
resource allocation and private profitability for the major crops and/or rotations 
in Egypt from the start of the refonn era in 1986 until 2000 (the latest 
available data). The policy analysis matrix (PAM) approach has been used as a 
policy tool to accomplish that aim (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
The major crops in Egypt are cotton, rice, maize, sugar cane, wheat, 
broad beans, soybeans, tomatoes, potatoes and Egyptian clover (long and short 
season berseem). The main crop rotations are: 1- wheat or broad beans 
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followed by any of the summer crops, such as maize, rice, soybean or potatoes; 
2- short berseem followed by cotton; 3- long berseem followed by rice, maize 
or soy bean; 4-tomatoes followed by soybean or maize. 
A P AM matrix was constructed for each crop and crop rotation for each 
year, constituting 375 PAMs, 165 for crops and the remainder for crop 
rotations. Each PAM allows us to estimate six economic indicators; the private 
cost ratio (PCR), the domestic resource ratio (DRC), the nominal protection 
coefficient for outputs (NPCO), the nominal protection coefficient for inputs 
(NPCI), the profitability coefficient (PC) and the subsidy ratio to producer 
(SRP). The PAM methodology approach and an illustrative example for 
soybean in 1986 were illustrated in detail in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 gives a 
detailed illustration for estimating the PAM entries, such as evaluating the 
social prices for tradable and non-tradable inputs and factors and the shadow 
exchange rate (SER). The PAM results are reported and discussed in Chapters 
6, 7 and 8. 
10.2 : Summary of Conclusions 
The volume of production for most major crops (such as wheat, rice 
and maize) increased remarkably in the reform era, owing to growth in both 
the planted area and in productivity. Wheat was a remarkably positive example 
of the high response from farmers to the reformed pricing policies and the 
elimination of governmental controls (quotas and area restrictions); its area 
increased by 83%, and its productivity by 60%, so that total production 
increased from 2.2 million tons in 1986-89 to 6.4 million tons in 1995-2000. In 
contrast, crops such as cotton, potatoes and soybean showed a remarkable 
decrease in their volumes of production. For example, cotton production fell 
10-4 
Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
decrease in their volumes of production. For example, cotton production fell 
by 27% in effect due to declines of its planted area and productivity of 22% 
and 6% respectively; many farmers chose not to grow cotton (after the 
elimination of governmental controls and penalties) because of market price 
uncertainty. 
The costs ofland, fertiliser and pesticides (as a percentage of total cost) 
showed a gradual increase during the reform era as a result of the freeing of 
land rents and the elimination of input subsidies. For example, the cost of land 
rent, fertiliser and pesticides for cotton increased from 13%, 5% and 2% in 
1986-89 to about 34%, 9% and 3% respectively in 1996-2000. 
Agricultural profitability increased during the reform period for most 
crops at various rates. For example, wheat profitability almost doubled (in real 
terms), which encouraged its area expansion (as noted earlier). In contrast, 
soybean profitability fell by an estimated 80% throughout the reform period. 
The private cost ratio (peR), a measure of private profitability, has 
been estimated for the major agricultural commodities by dividing the costs of 
domestic factors valued at private prices (e) by the difference between 
revenues and the costs of tradable inputs valued at private prices (A-B). 
Generally, the results reveal that the peR increased over time for most crops, 
owing largely to the increase in domestic factor costs (mainly land rent), and 
the domestic cost of tradable inputs (such as chemical fertilisers). The results 
also indicate that tomatoes had the lowest peR (0.29) while soybean had the 
highest peR value (0.94) during the period 1995-200, implying that the first 
was the most privately profitable whereas the latter was the least privately 
profitable crop. 
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The PCR results for crop rotations indicated that tomatoes followed by 
maize was the most preferable rotation, with the lowest PCR (0.36), while 
broad beans followed by soybean was the least preferable, with the highest 
PCR(0.79). 
Net private profitability (NPP) was estimated for the major crops by 
subtracting the costs of tradable and domestic inputs from total revenues, all 
valued at private prices. The results reveal a rise in NPP over time for most 
products, and there was an inverse relationship between the net private 
profitability (NPP) and the PCR; that is, the higher the NPP, the lower the 
value of the PCR coefficient, and vice versa. 
The domestic resource cost (DRC), a measure of the comparative 
advantage of agricultural commodities during the period 1986-2000, was 
estimated by dividing the costs of domestic factors valued at social prices by 
the difference between revenues and costs of tradable inputs valued at social 
prices. Potatoes, tomatoes, rice and wheat showed a favourable comparative 
advantage during the period 1995-2000, implying that their production should 
have been extended. For maize and broad beans the estimates indicated a 
neutral comparative advantage. Cotton, soybean and sugar cane showed a 
distinct comparative disadvantage. 
The DRC estimates for crop rotations indicate that broad beans 
followed by soybeans and short berseem followed by cotton had a comparative 
disadvantage, with DRCs greater than one. In contrast, wheat followed by 
potatoes indicated the highest comparative advantage, with the lowest DRC of 
0.69, and then, as a group, broad beans followed by potatoes, tomatoes 
followed by maize, tomatoes followed by soybeans, long berseem followed by 
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rice, wheat followed by rice, all at about 0.76. Next came broad beans followed 
by rice, and long berseem followed by maize (0.87). Finally, wheat followed 
by maize and long berseem followed by soybean (0.94). 
The net social profitability (NSP) was estimated as total revenues 
minus tradable and domestic costs of production, all valued at social prices. 
The results reveal that the NSPs for cotton and sugar cane were extremely 
negative, implying a comparative disadvantage and thus that the existing level 
of output was uneconomic. 
The social cost benefit ratio (SCB) was estimated for major crops as 
another alternative for the DRC, and was calculated by dividing traded and 
non-traded total revenue, all valued at social prices. The SCB results mirror 
the results obtained by the DRCs, implying that the government should have 
reviewed its policy for cotton, sugar cane and soybean as they suffered low 
levels of competitiveness. 
The nominal protection coefficients for major agricultural crops 
(NPCO) were estimated by comparing the output value at private prices with 
its equivalent value at world prices (at the farm gate level). The results reveal 
that the producers of export commodities were notably taxed when compared 
to those for import products over each of the three distinct periods 1986-89, 
1990-94 and 1995-2000, by about 21%, 12% and 11% respectively. The 
NPCO results for 1995-2000 imply that sugar cane, cotton and rice should be 
categorised as subsidised products, while wheat producers are almost getting 
the equivalent world price. In contrast, all the remaining products were taxed, 
at different levels, the most highly taxed being potatoes and tomatoes. 
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The NPCO results for crop rotations indicated that 79% of rotations 
were taxed, the most taxed being wheat or broad beans followed by potatoes, 
with an NPCO of 0.68. 
Nominal protection coefficients for tradable inputs (NPCI) were 
estimated by comparing tradable costs valued at private prices with their values 
at the equivalent world price (at farm gate level). The principal result was that 
the tradable inputs supplied to producers were subsidised throughout the period 
1986-2000 for all crops and crop rotations. There was a gradual increase in 
NPCls over time for all crops and crop rotations, suggesting that the level of 
protection or input subsidy was falling over time. This fall was mainly a direct 
result of the government policy introduced in the reform era, the gradual 
elimination of input subsidies and the move to a free market. 
The NPCI results for crop rotations indicate that tradable inputs 
provided for all rotations were subsidised. The lowest subsidy was for wheat 
followed by maize or potatoes, and the highest for broad beans followed by 
soybean. 
Estimates of the effective protection coefficient CEPe), which 
estimates the effects of governmental policies on both tradable input costs and 
output prices, show a similar picture to the nominal protection coefficient, 
specifically: 
~ ~ Sugar cane, rice and cotton all had positive effective protection, while 
maize, soybean, broad beans, tomatoes and potatoes were subject to 
negative effective protection; 
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~ ~ Export crops (on average) had EPCs less than one over the period 1986-
2000, thus implying potential disincentives, while import crops (on 
average) were subsidised (i.e. had EPCs greater than one); 
~ ~ The Egyptian pricing policy in the reform era still encouraged domestic 
production of import products by setting their prices above parity prices, 
while export products were taxed relative to their equivalent world prices. 
The consistency between the nominal and effective protection results 
indicates that the policies affecting the prices of agricultural products are the 
main factor in effective protection. 
The EPC results for crop rotations confirms those obtained from the 
NPCO analysis, i.e. that wheat or broad beans followed by potatoes had the 
most negative protection (tax) while other rotations were subsidised. Short 
berseem followed by cotton enjoys the highest positive protection (subsidy). 
The rankings of agricultural products according to the NPCO or the 
EPC do not differ from each other, presumably because the component of 
traded inputs in agricultural production is a relatively small proportion of the 
value of outputs. 
The comparative advantage and protection results for sugar cane and 
cotton indicate that the government incentive polices were equivocal and in 
direct opposition to the attainment of economic efficiency. According to the 
NPCO and EPC results, those products that received the highest levels of 
subsidy were those with a clear comparative disadvantage, having ORCs of 
1.33 and 1.22 respectively. On the other hand, products with a high 
comparative advantage, such as potatoes and tomatoes, were highly taxed, with 
NPCOs of 0.60 and 0.83 and EPCs of 0.44 and 0.85 respectively. This conflict 
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in pricing policies was presumably because the government of Egypt sought to 
guarantee cotton and sugar cane growers a suitable return (as they were 
considered strategic crops), regardless of the fluctuations in output price that 
accompanied their operation in a free market. 
The subsidy ratio to producer (SRP) was estimated for major crops and 
crop rotations. The results reveal that the SRPs coefficients for import 
commodities were higher than those for exports throughout the period 1986-
2000, indicating that import commodities are more protected (subsidised) than 
export commodities. These results confirm the NPCO and EPC results 
obtained earlier. The average estimated SRPs for the period 1995-2000 reveal 
that sugar cane, cotton and fodder crops had the highest SRPs, implying that 
policy divergences had increased the gross revenues for these sectors by nearly 
60%,55% and 43% respectively. In contrast, potatoes showed a negative SRP 
(-0.20) implying that divergences had reduces its gross revenues by about one-
fifth. 
As noted above, most of the positively protected (subsidised) products 
were import competing, while those negatively protected (taxed) were export 
crops. This indicates that incentives were aimed as import substitution. 
The results obtained from specific models in levels and first differences 
for measuring the impact of policy changes in crop areas indicated that there is 
a high response of change in planted area to water charges with an expected 
fall in the planted areas for the majority of the crops under investigation. 
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10.3 Recommendations/or Egypt's Agricultural Future 
There are numerous macroeconomic, trade, management, privatisation, 
and agricultural sector policies that should be continually monitored and 
adjusted to the realities of a market economy. Hereby, we make some 
recommendations that would benefit the Egyptian agribusiness. 
1. Privatisation, Efficiency and Agribusines/ 
Promoting private management and private investment in agri-
industries: That is, in activities such as cotton ginning, spinning and weaving, 
rice marketing and processing and fertiliser manufacturing and marketing. 
Economic studies2 carried out during the period 1994-96 revealed that these 
agri-industries suffer gross inefficiencies in public sector enterprises compared 
to private sector firms in similar operations, so that privati sing their 
management and investment may be expected to yield gross savmgs III 
marketing and processing costs. For example, Egyptian rice production 
amounted to 4.2 million tons in 1993, 2.4 million tons of which was sold to 
private sector merchants, 1.2 million tons was consumed on farm, 0.3 million 
tons was sold to public holding companies and 0.3 million tons was traded for 
production input. Only 12% of the 2.4 million tons sold to private sector was 
milled by public mills. There are about 1971 rice mills in Egypt. The 52 
public and 37 commercial mills, with annual capacity 2.2 million-tons and 
98,000 tons respectively accounts for 89% of total paddy milling capacity. The 
remaining (1882 mill) are village mills with an annual capacity 287,000 ton of 
I Farmers and the firms that provide inputs to farmers, as well as those firms that buy, process, 
market and sell commodities in the food and fibre system, are called agribusiness. 
2 For more information refer to Khedr et.al., 1996. 
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paddy. Public mills received a total of 550,000 ton of paddl which amounts 
only one-quarter ofthe rated capacity, with a total milling cost was £E 253/ton. 
There was a potential saving of £E 143/ ton if those public mills had been 
operated with organised and efficient management; at 87.5% capacity, the 
milling cost is only £EllOlton, saving the sector about £E 79 million per 
annum. In 1994, the results of a sample for private commercial rice mills 
showed and average cost for white rice milling of about only £E 27/ton (about 
18.5% of the 87.5% capacity costs for public mills). Thus another £E 64 
million per year could have been saved at full capacity. This example indicates 
that increasing the utilised capacity and more efficient management might have 
saved the sector about £E 143 million per year. 
Another striking example may be seen in the cotton sector. There are 
27 companies in the spinning sector in Egypt (25 of which are owned and 
managed by the public sector while the reminders are privately operated), 
spinning around 942,000 ton of raw cotton per year at an average cost about 
£E 3752 per ton. Assessments of efficiency measures in the spinning 
operation have revealed that public mills are operating at 20%-25% less than 
the global average efficiency. Thus there may be scope of saving £E 707 
million per annum if operating efficiency in public mills rose by 20%. 
Furthennore, studies have shown that achieving global rates of efficiency in 
weaving, by both improving the management and introducing competitive 
conditions in ginning could save the economy £E 302 million and £E 60 
million per annum respectively for a crop of 942,000 ton. Similar possible 
361% of which was purchased directly, while the reminder (39%) was custom milled for the 
private sector. 
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reductions have been estimated for the costs of fertiliser production and 
distribution, £E 750 million and £E 60 million per annum respectively. 
It appears that, privately owned companies are better equipped to 
manage agribusiness effectively and efficiently. Thus, privatising the 
management of public-sector firms should be accelerated as fast as possible. 
Or at least, public-sector managers who have worked mostly in state owned 
enterprises under bureaucratic conditions (in the past) should be trained to 
meet competitive market challenges. 
2. Rational use of irrigated water: 
Recent water studies4 reveal that there is a pressing need to use scarce 
resources, especially water, more efficiently. In other words, in the absence of 
appropriate water pricing or allocation policies, farmers will not consider the 
full opportunity costs or scarcity values of water. 
For example, farmers in the Nile Delta have little incentive to consider 
the opportunity cost of water in municipal and industrial uses if their only 
expense for water is the cost of pumping it from a below grade tertiary canal. 
Theoretically, allocating irrigation water using a rationing system based on 
differential cost allocation may create savings in the agricultural sector. 
Irrigation studies reveal that about 20% of water could be saved by investment 
in canal-level improvement (which would be adopted more willingly if water 
had a cost to farmers). This percentage could amount about £E 440 million per 
yearS. Moreover, there is a need to introduce and develop a plan for new water 
4 See for example, Abo-Saad, 1998; Kotb et.al., 2000; and Wichelns 2002. 
S At a shadow price of water ofO.056/cu. meter. 
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saving irrigation systems (such as drip rather than flood furrows irrigation 
system) especially in the New Lands. 
3. New Land Reclamation: 
It is crucial for Egypt to encourage the private sector to invest in and 
pursue the New Land reclamation programme, as the ratio between the arable 
land in the Nile Valley and the population is relatively very sma1l6. In 
particular, studies7 have shown that the potential increase in productivity in the 
Old Land exceeds or matches that from the reclamation of new lands in desert 
areas outside the Nile Valley. At the same time Egypt should place more 
emphasis on higher value, export oriented crop production in future 
agricultural development. 
Moreover, efforts to develop new production areas, such as northern 
Sinai and the southern desert must be evaluated with regard to: (1) the 
competing demands for limited scarce resources, such as capital and water 
supplies, and (2) the urgent need to employ more new workers in the future to 
reduce unemployment (Abo- Saad, 1996; World Bank, 1998; Handoussa and 
Kheir EL-Din, 1998). 
4. Market News and Information 
The government of Egypt should take senous steps toward 
restructuring the market news and information sector, to overcome the severe 
lack in the availability of relevant information in the agricultural sector. The 
availability of market information to all participants would be a way to 
6 The arable land per person (in hectares) during the last decade is about 0.05 in Egypt while it 
accounts 0.32 for France and O.llfor the U.K. 
7 See, for example, Nassar et aI., 1996. 
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maintain production incentives and reduce the impact of risk and uncertainty. 
Only very basic farm level data and crop budgets are collected annually and 
published in 'Agricultural Economics Bulletin' (produced by the under-
secretariat of Agricultural Economics); these data are based on monetary 
values, and do not give a breakdown of the cost into quantities and prices. It is 
recommended that a farm data handbook be produced for all agricultural crops 
on a regional basis. As seasonal analysis is crucial in agricultural studies, the 
data handbook should assess monthly data as well. A previous analysis of sub-
sector studies8 recommended that the Egyptian agri-business urgently needs 
easy access to decision-making information on domestic production, imports, 
existing stocks, consumption patterns and prices as well as on international 
markets, at least for their major export markets or input supply markets. Such 
information should be as accurate as possible, regularly updated, credible and 
available to all market participants. Moreover, the market news service should 
be developed and extended to include the gathering, analysis, interpretation 
and dissemination of news. Furthermore, there is a need to provide appropriate 
training programmes to complement this effort. 
10.4 Suggestion For Further Research 
The analysis presented in this thesis has covered the impact of 
agricultural policy reforms on major crops at the farm gate level only. Further 
research is needed to investigate other different levels of the commodity 
system i.e. farm to processor level, processing level, processor to wholesale 
market level. A commodity may be produced efficiently at the farm level but 
8 See Harrison, 1996. 
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have may be inefficiencies in transport, marketing and/or processing that 

























































































(1989-91 = 100) 
Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2002, The World Bank. 
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TABLE A2-1: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF EGYPTIAN IMpORTS AND 
EXPORTS (1990-2000) 
Imports Exports 
1990 I 2000 1990 1 2000 
Arab World 187.0 1453.9 268.4 600.0 
ESCWA 137.9 1291.6 193.9 449.7 
Europe 5241.1 6158.4 1601.9 1889.5 
EU 3861.2 4760.2 991.7 1837.0 
America* 1637.2 2618 247.6 455.9 
USA 1298.7 2087.8 221.6 404.4 
Canada 66.7 84.2 6.4 10.7 
Asia* 1195.3 2451.2 421.9 903.9 
Japan 342.4 427.7 70.2 93.8 
India 68.5 229.4 1.9 156.2 
Africa 69.1 150.5 3.2 49.1 
Oceania 455.5 511.2 1.1 3.0 
Not specified 417.3 619.5 33.9 805.1 
Total ($ Mn) 9202.5 13963.7 2578.0 4706.5 
*Note: Components may not sum 100 percent because of unclassified trade. 
Source: ESCW A 2002 
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TABLE A2-2: AREA OF MAJOR FIELD CROPS DURING 1980-2000 
FEDDAN) 
~ ~ r o p p __ I Broad Long Short Winter , Wheat Beans Berseem Berseem Tomato Maize Rice Cotton Potatoes Sugar ~ b e a n n I ~ - - ----_._- _._--- - -- - - . ~ ~
1980 1,326,179 244,746 1,721,655 989,792 135,920 1,432,727 970,096 1,244526 82,779 254,001 82,767 
1981 1,399,595 237,731 1,756,343 1,022,015 138,155 1,434,341 954,142 1,178420 85,183 251,011 109,420 
1982 1,373,613 274,091 1,790,631 914,479 136,696 1,451,846 1,023,956 1,065841 84,382 254,010 144,355 
1983 1,320,045 289,530 1,866,461 870,258 133,375 1,396,630 1,011,266 998,277 74,226 249,005 147,155 
1984 1,178,372 270,857 1,971,967 834,971 144,550 1,449,037 983,458 983,560 86,092 244,004 124,535 
1985 1,185,923 284,712 1,922,634 917,815 145,930 1,396,150 923,971 1,081,009 96,167 250,001 119,048 
1986 1,206,346 270,205 1,865,692 870,281 156,644 1,122,129 1,007,794 1,054,860 92,484 262,004 109,705 
1987 1,373,009 286,308 1,707,255 814,366 166,826 1,352,730 981,060 979,793 118,916 268,001 113,241 
1988 1,421,719 362,825 1,614,393 789,782 164,082 1,480,018 837,050 1,013,960 112,865 275,006 117,397 
1989 1,517,719 325,819 1,591,174 801,664 176,382 1,533,354 977,144 1,005,533 110,184 274,004 92,319 
1990 1,954,696 344,643 1,660,333 796,209 158,273 1,545,556 1,034,830 993,047 119,014 263,007 98,523 
1991 2,215,070 326,082 1,643,192 720,161 143,662 1,675,262 1,094,608 851,283 105,240 267,008 100,718 
1992 1,788,480 382,045 1,659,374 721,090 156,309 1,642,111 1,209,141 840,296 78,947 271,004 51,475 
1993 1,829,212 220,098 1,668,846 735,861 154,251 1,593,684 1,276,295 800,310 59,035 278,001 43,294 
1994 1,737,542 286,688 1,704,571 736,314 133,089 1,669,282 1,371,017 721,443 60,924 301,006 52,983 
1995 2,511,814 294,662 1,762,352 623,580 144,705 1,751,379 1,400,020 710,207 106,614 306,005 62,012 
1996 2,420,918 329,329 1,649,571 697,458 167,376 1,768,259 1,405,268 921,012 96,113 300,010 36,215 
1997 2,486,131 355,010 1,586,206 703,947 154,770 1,636,014 1,549,872 859,006 59,240 291,014 31,519 
1998 2,421,131 384,911 1,699,627 723,422 163,662 1,697,529 1,224,955 788,812 73,473 291,464 43,366 
1999 2,379,450 318,579 1,842,144 605,329 155,520 1,560,957 1,559,095 780,800 44,966 307,257 17,053 
2000 2,463,265 270,524 1,810,387 578,928 177,225 1,612,340 1,624,255 775,522 40,243 319,023 15,023 
Calculated from data obtained from Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Statistics Unit, Several issues. 
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TABLEA2-3: YIELDPERFEDDANOFMAJORCROPS 1980-2000 
'- ~ ~ - - - - ---- ... &.6.' ) 
Crop Wheat Broad Beans Long Short Winter Maize Rice Cotton Potatoes Sugar S O Y b e ~ J JBerseem Berseem Tomato 
1980 1.35 0.87 23.64 9.06 6.12 1.84 2.46 1.13 7.04 34.48 1.12 
1981 1.38 0.88 23.68 9.19 6.13 1.86 2.34 1.12 7.05 35.24 1.19 
1982 1.47 0.94 24.17 8.83 7.40 1.87 2.38 1.13 7.37 34.50 1.15 
1983 1.51 1.01 24.14 8.76 7.41 1.96 2.41 1.06 7.80 33.68 1.10 
1984 1.54 1.00 24.01 9.85 8.63 2.02 2.27 1.07 7.69 37.57 1.15 
1985 1.58 1.06 24.61 9.93 9.12 2.08 2.50 1.07 8.07 38.97 1.17 
1986 1.60 1.04 24.50 9.25 10.95 2.02 2.43 1.03 8.30 41.78 1.22 
1987 1.98 1.13 24.50 9.42 11.58 2.15 2.45 0.97 9.13 40.33 1.18 
1988 1.99 1.00 25.75 10.13 10.55 2.28 2.55 0.84 8.91 40.74 1.10 
1989 2.08 1.23 26.20 9.42 8.86 2.44 2.72 0.79 9.01 40.61 0.99 
1990 2.30 1.23 26.00 9.75 9.41 2.61 3.06 0.82 7.54 42.16 1.08 
1991 2.13 0.96 26.00 10.70 11.08 2.62 3.14 0.92 7.59 43.55 1.19 
1992 2.37 0.91 25.50 10.50 10.28 2.66 3.18 1.13 7.80 43.75 1.17 
1993 2.43 1.10 26.00 10.50 12.48 2.70 3.25 1.22 6.56 44.92 1.16 
1994 2.34 0.97 25.55 11.00 17.06 2.81 3.33 0.94 8.07 46.04 1.23 
1995 2.46 1.28 25.75 11.30 16.40 2.62 3.43 0.90 8.43 46.18 1.04 
1996 2.56 1.32 25.47 11.67 16.78 2.93 3.49 0.98 8.10 46.73 1.11 
1997 2.35 1.33 25.80 10.89 15.85 3.19 3.54 1.07 8.64 47.90 1.11 
1998 2.66 1.36 26.99 11.86 16.36 3.23 3.64 0.79 8.09 49.50 1.11 
1999 2.81 0.95 27.90 12.50 16.59 3.32 3.74 0.96 8.12 47.14 1.11 
2000 2.80 1.29 28.56 12.34 16.41 3.30 3.76 0.98 8.15 48.90 1.13 
Calculated from data obtained from Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Statistics Unit. Several issues. 
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TABLE A2-4: TOTAL PRODUCTION OF MAJOR CROPS IN 1980-2000 
(TON) 
Crop Wheat Broad Long Short Winter Maize Rice Cotton Potatoes Sugar Soybean I Beans Berssem Berssem Tomato 
1980 1,790,342 212,929 40,699,924 8,967,516 831,830 2,636,218 2,386,436 1,406,314 582,764 8,757,954 92,699 
1981 1,931,441 209,203 41,590,202 9,392,318 846,890 2,667,874 2,232,692 1,319,830 600,540 8,845,628 130,210 
1982 2,019,211 257,646 43,279,551 8,074,850 1,011,550 2,714,952 2,437,015 1,204,400 621,895 8,763,345 166,008 
1983 1,993,268 292,425 45,056,369 7,623,460 988,309 2,737,395 2,437,151 1,058,174 578,963 8,386,488 161,871 
1984 1,814,693 270,857 47,346,928 8,224,464 1,247,467 2,927,055 2,232,450 1,052,409 662,047 9,167,230 143,215 
1985 1,873,758 301,795 47,316,023 9,113,903 1,330,882 2,903,992 2,309,928 1,156,680 776,068 9,742,539 139,286 
1986 1,930,154 281,013 45,709,454 8,050,099 1,715,252 2,266,701 2,448,939 1,086,506 767,617 10,946,527 133,840 
1987 2,718,558 323,528 41,827,748 7,671,328 1,931,845 2,908,370 2,403,597 950,399 1,085,703 10,808,480 133,624 
1988 2,829,221 362,825 41,570,620 8,000,492 1,731,065 3,374,441 2,134,478 851,726 1,005,627 11,203,744 129,137 
1989 3,156,856 400,757 41,688,759 7,551,675 1,562,745 3,741,384 2,657,832 794,371 992,758 11,127,302 91,396 
1990 4,495,801 423,911 43,168,658 7,763,038 1,489,349 4,033,901 3,166,580 814,299 897,366 11,088,375 106,405 
1991 4,718,099 313,039 42,722,992 7,705,723 1,591,775 4,389,186 3,437,069 783,180 798,772 11,628,198 119,854 
1992 4,238,698 347,661 42,314,037 7,571,445 1,606,857 4,368,015 3,845,068 949,534 615,787 11,856,425 60,226 
1993 4,444,985 242,108 43,389,996 7,726,541 1,925,052 4,302,947 4,147,959 976,378 387,270 12,487,805 50,221 
1994 4,065,848 278,087 43,551,789 8,099,454 2,270,498 4,690,682 4,565,487 678,156 491,657 13,858,316 65,169 
1995 6,179,062 377,167 45,380,564 7,046,454 2,373,162 4,588,613 4,802,069 639,186 898,756 14,131,311 64,492 
1996 6,197,550 434,714 42,014,573 8,139,335 2,808,569 5,180,999 4,904,385 902,592 778,515 14,019,467 40,199 
1997 5,842,408 472,163 40,924,115 7,665,983 2,453,105 5,218,885 5,486,547 919,136 511,834 13,939,571 34,986 
1998 6,440,208 523,479 45,872,933 8,579,785 2,677,510 5,483,019 4,458,836 623,161 594,397 14,427,468 48,136 
1999 6,686,255 302,650 51,395,818 7,566,613 2,580,077 5,182,377 5,831,015 749,568 365,124 14,484,095 18,929 
2000 6,8971142 3481976 51,704z653 7,143,972 2,908z262 51320,722 6,107,199 760,012 327,980 15,600,225 16,976 
Calculated from data obtained from Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Statistics Unit, Several issues. 
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TABLE A2-5: FARM GATE PRICES OF MAJOR CROPS IN 1980-2000 
(LEITON) 
Crop Wheat Broad Long Short Winter Maize Rice Cotton Potatoes Sugar Soybean ! Beans Berssem Berssem Tomato 
1980 88.00 199.10 9.87 9.87 86.50 122.90 81.29 299.68 79.61 9.60 210.00 
1981 91.80 234.71 12.03 12.03 103.57 93.90 98.80 362.48 84.50 14.90 230.00 
1982 81.73 240.13 14.20 14.20 113.36 124.90 130.12 380.70 79.08 15.50 260.00 
1983 109.93 251.29 16.82 16.82 132.00 167.60 130.25 413.52 110.00 18.20 260.00 
1984 124.33 277.48 17.46 17.46 150.00 172.80 130.56 470.10 131.00 20.20 285.00 
1985 171.73 318.06 19.35 19.35 176.30 194.30 211.50 614.98 131.08 27.20 285.00 
1986 225.00 459.64 21.91 29.01 194.65 219.47 247.25 617.73 147.94 30.50 375.00 
1987 220.59 550.00 34.46 44.81 200.27 255.35 206.00 725.86 135.00 34.00 425.00 
1988 237.40 554.02 29.51 37.51 247.58 324.57 256.50 913.96 196.23 38.00 500.00 
1989 436.57 579.90 29.67 41.27 256.00 405.13 362.00 1284.05 275.00 50.00 800.00 
1990 473.84 694.10 37.23 49.60 327.74 427.86 376.00 1669.14 290.21 58.00 800.00 
1991 499.90 883.12 43.38 52.70 395.18 441.57 435.80 2026.90 353.71 58.00 850.00 
1992 506.31 956.30 49.72 59.00 330.00 443.09 475.20 2061.00 398.94 58.20 840.00 
1993 535.00 1005.80 63.12 73.30 287.00 457.77 504.24 2366.60 473.70 72.50 800.00 
1994 535.00 1005.80 63.12 73.30 253.10 477.82 605.40 2071.59 585.70 81.00 875.00 
1995 562.30 1050.40 70.83 80.70 352.91 512.55 655.80 3455.55 402.10 90.00 1050.00 
1996 640.40 1116.03 85.20 93.00 372.30 537.03 702.17 3266.73 423.20 90.00 1050.00 
1997 665.00 1227.80 95.96 113.68 389.13 550.25 717.89 3005.98 434.73 95.00 1050.00 
1998 681.40 1248.90 106.30 120.90 387.80 579.59 723.83 2230.25 411.70 100.00 1050.00 
1999 690.60 1258.30 108.62 121.21 395.10 606.41 729.80 2206.04 414.80 95.00 1050.00 
2000 695.00 1262.24 113.72 131.60 390.50 645.49 745.60 2250.60 420.00 100.00 1075.00 
Calculated from data obtained from Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, Statistics Unit, Several issues 
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TABLE A3-1: AGRICUL rURAL POLICIES BEFORE AND AFfER POLICY REFORMS 
Crop/Policy 
A. Minor Crops 
B. Wheat and 
Maize 
C. Rice 
Before Policy Reform 
(1981-86) 
• Eight minor crops were 
affected by various degrees of 
quotas, price controls, marketing 
controls, input subsidies, and 
exchange rate and trade controls 
during 1981-86. These crops were 
broad beans, lentils, sesame, ground 
nuts, onions, garlic, soybeans and 
potatoes. 
• Neither acreage restrictions nor 
delivery quotas were applied to 
these eight crops during 1981-86. 
Government procurement prices 
were in effect but delivery was not 
obligatory. Intergovernmental 
transport was restricted and would 
have had some impact on 
geographical price pattern and 
efficiency distribution by areas. 
• Area restrictions were imposed 
on wheat but not maize. Quota and 
fixed procurement price applied but 
only nominally to maize and to less 
than 10% of wheat procured. Real 
farm gate prices increased 52% for 
wheat and 45% for maize from 
1981 to 1986. Farm gate prices 
averaged 85% of world price for 
maize and 80% for wheat, from 
1984 to 1986. 
• Marketing, processing and 
imports were controlled by the 
government. 
• The full range of (procurement 
quotas) and fixed procurement 
control of marketing, processing 
and exports applied throughout the 
period. Over 50% of milling 
capacity was owned by the 
government. There was no transport 
or export by private sector. 
• Official prices increased 94% 
over this period; average farm price 
increased 150%. 
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After Policy Reform 
(1987-94) 
• All crop area, quota and price 
restrictions were eliminated by 
1987, except that floor prices were 
introduced. Marketing restrictions 
were eliminated in 1987, except for 
rice, cotton and sugarcane. 
• Area restrictions, quotas and 
fixed procurement prices were 
removed for wheat and maize, in 
March 1987. Marketing and 
processing were controlled for 
approximately 50% of production 
by public sector firms. Consumer 
subsidies on bread depressed farm 
prices, as did subsidies on maize to 
feed manufactures. Private sector 
was allowed to import maize in 
1991. Private wheat flour imports 
were allowed in 1992. Wheat prices 
increased between 1987 and 1992. 
• Area was still controlled for 
anti -salination and water allocation 
purposes. 
• Procurement quota was 
eliminated for the 1991 crop. Prices 
from 1987-90 were between 75% 
and 90% of world prices. During 
1991 market prices remained at 82-
89% of world prices. 
• All controls on price 
D. Cotton 




• Government procured 48% of procurement, marketing and exports 
production were removed in 1991. 
• Weighted average market price 
was 45%of world price between 
1981 and 1984. 
• Strict acreage controls were 
enforced by fines; 100% quota 
delivery of fixed prices at less than 
50% of the border price equivalent; 
prohibition of transport, ginning, 
domestic trade and foreign trade by 
private sector; and strict cropping 
pattern controls by region and by 
variety of cotton. 
• Procurement prices averaged 
52% of border prices during the 
period and fell to 40% during 1987-
90. 
• Fertilizer subsidy averaged 
about 50% in 1981-86 and 24% in 
1987-88. 
• Fertilizer subsidy was over 
50% and pest control subsidy was 
100% for cotton 
• All fertilizer was distributed by 
the Principle Bank for Development 
and Agricultural Credit. Credit was 
tied to subsidized fertilizer 
purchases. 
• Rice milling capacity was still 
over 50% publicly owned. 
• Strong political pressure was 
exerted to reduce rice area by 30% 
in 1987 and 13.3% more in 1988. 
Acreage was stable at about 1.1 
million feddan in 1989-93. 
• Consumer subsidy was high 
and was removed in April 1993. 
• Domestic market restrictions 
on private trade were removed in 
1991 
and 1992. 
• 1981-86 policies continued as 
constraints through 1991, except 
procurement price was gradually 
increased to approximately 75% of 
the 1991 border price. 
• Procurement price was 114% 
of border price in 1992 and 132% 
in 1993, priced at market exchange 
rate. 
• Acreage controls were 
removed for the 1992 and 1993 
crop. 
• All marketing restrictions and 
quota requirements remained the 
same. The marketing of cotton was 
liberalized in 1994. 
• Input subsidies of 50-60% 
applied to minor crops, although the 
link between fertilizer distribution 
subsidies and credit allocation may 
have distorted the pattern of 
subsidy actually received by 
farmers, as the Principle Bank for 
Development and Agricultural 
Credit distributed fertilizer by 
providing credit in kind, which 
credit was allocated according to 
priorities set on a crop basis. 
• General fertilizer subsidy was 
increased 13% in 1986-88 and 
declined to zero in 1992. 
• No explicit water charges. 
Implicit water subsidy was 
approximately double for rice 
compared with other crops. 
• In 1985-88, land reclamation 
• Imported yellow maize was programs were allocated almost 
subsidized to feed mills. 100% to private individuals. 
• Ex-factory prices of fertilizer 
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• Prior to 1985, most newly reached 105-112% of border prices. 
reclaimed land was allocated to 
public enterprises. • Cotton fertilizer subsidy was 
removed by 1991. 
• Wheat and maize were 
imported by the government only. 
There were import subsidies and 
consumer subsidies. 
• Exchange rate was highly 
overvalued, depressing farm gate 
prices relative to import prices and 
favoring imports over exports. 
• Exchange rate over valuation 
caused LE 55 million out of 
agriculture during this period. 
• No private rice exports were 
allowed. 
• Cotton, both for exports and for 
domestic mills, was traded at 
administrated prices by the public 
sector only. 
• Cotton was exported only at the 
official rate. Mill prices, for 
example, during 1981/82-1986/87 
for Giza were virtually identical to 
the farm gate price. Thus, mills 
were subsidized by the amount of 
domestic ginning and marketing, 
and procured raw materials at the 
depressed farm gate price of about 
50% of the export prices. 
• The market exchange rate 
increased from LE 0.90/$ in 1981 to 
2.30/$ in 1991, while the official 
exchange rate remained constant at 
LEO.70/$. 
• The policy of taxing farmers 
through low procurement prices was 
enforced by fixed prices and 
monopoly marketing through the 
public trading companies. 
A-I0 
• Cotton pest control subsidy 
was reduced by 25% in 1992, 
further reduced in 1993, and 
removed for the 1994 crop. 
• The government adjusted the 
official exchange rate from LE 
0.70/$ in 1988, then increased to 
LE 2.30/$ in 1991. The rate was 
freed in 1991. 
• The subsidy on maize was 
decreased by 81% in 1986-88. The 
private sector was allowed to 
process domestic and imported 
wheat. 
• Real wheat prices increased 
less than 2% in 1987-92. Real 
maize prices declined 25%. 
• The fertilizer subsidy was 24% 
until 1988 and was eliminated in 
1992. 
• Implicit subsidies on maize and 
wheat imports were caused by 
overvaluation of the exchange rate, 
eliminated in 1991. Bias was 
extreme and in favor of imports of 
wheat and maize during 1987-89 
and against major export crops, 
including cotton, fruits, vegetables 
and rice. 
• 1990 domestic prices were 
close to border price for both wheat 
and maize. 
• An import subsidy (US, EU) 
of about 20% affected both grains 
during the entire period. 
• The consumer subsidy for 
wheat and bread was continued the 
subsidy on wheat bran was reduced 
by 50% in 1991 and to zero in 1992 
• Minimum export prices were 
set in 1991 but eliminated in 1992. 
Rice exports were opened to the 
private sector in 1991. 
• Cotton exports were made at 
the official rate, the official asking 
price was much higher than the true 
border price, and the procurement 
price therefore did not fully reflect 




• Land rental value was 
controlled and being determined at 
seven times the agricultural land tax 
Appendixes 
procurement prices would have 
been less than 20-30% of the true 
border price if the full impact of 
exchange rate overvaluation had 
ben passed to farmers. 
• Land rent was raised to twenty 
two times the agricultural land tax 
in 1992, and then at the end of a 
five years transition period, it was 
set allowed operate completely free 
in September 1997. 
SOurce lor A: B. C. D. E and F: t:eliiriiii. Fletcher "Egypt's Agnculture In a Relonn Eri".lowa State Umverslty Press. AmeS. Iowa, USA: 1996. 
Ch. 4. p.63-64 
Source for G: compiled by author from documents of tile MOF. 
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TABLE A3-2: COMPARISON BETWEEN OLD AND NEW PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 







Law 97 (old) 
Company mangers are nder the 
control of their respective public 
sector organisations (PSOs) and 
technical ministry that has 
supervisory authority. 
Companies are supposed to help 
realise the State's economic and 
social objectives, regardless of the 
impact upon their own efficiency. 
Companies are dependent upon 
the Government for operational 
subsidies and financing of capital 
expenditure, out of captive 
sources of funds on subsidised 
terms. 
Law 203 (new) 
Company managers are autonomous 
and free to decide on all business 
matters; they have no links to 
technical ministries. 
Companies have only one objective: 
to maximise profits and, as a result, 
their value. 
Companies are financially 
independent of the Government and 
parent holding companies; the latter 
would not be allowed to routinely 
subsidise their affiliates. 
Company investments should be 
financed on commercial terms 
through capital markets 
4. Corporate 
Form 
Public enterprises established Joint-Stock company listed on the 
under Law No. 97 of 1983 stock exchange in Egypt 
5. Privatisation Not allowed Allowed 
6. Liquidation Not allowed, except under very Allowed 
special circumstances. 
7. Bankruptcy Not allowed 
Companies are unifonnly subject 
8. Employment to the provision of Law 48 on 
PSE employment 
Source: Abdel-Khalel (2001, p. 48) 
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Allowed 
Law 48 is repealed, and companies 
are free to set their own terms and 
conditions of employment 
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TABLE AS-I: ESTIMATING THE SHADOW EXCHANGE RATE USING THE PREMIUM APPROACH 
Official Import Import Export EXI!0rt Import Duties + Premium on Shadow I 
Years Imports Exports Exchange Rate Duties LE Duties Duties Duties Export Duties Exchange Exchange Rate 
SMillion SMillion LEIS Million S Million LE Million SMillion SMiIlion Rate % LEIS 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1991 7914.60 3692.50 3.33 3422.00 1026.95 0.00 0.00 1026.95 0.09 3.63 
92 8292.90 3049.90 3.34 4941.00 1480.09 0.00 0.00 1480.09 0.13 3.77 
93 8187.00 3109.60 3.37 5428.00 1609.82 0.00 0.00 1609.82 0.14 3.85 
94 9592.00 3474.80 3.39 6585.00 1941.91 0.00 0.00 1941.91 0.15 3.89 
95 11738.90 3444.10 3.39 7352.00 2168.73 0.00 0.00 2168.73 0.14 3.87 
96 13038.20 3539.60 3.39 8255.00 2436.54 0.00 0.00 2436.54 0.15 3.89 
97 13211.00 3921.00 3.39 8460.00 2497.05 0.00 0.00 2497.05 0.15 3.88 
98 16166.00 3130.00 3.41 9100.00 2672.54 0.00 0.00 2672.54 0.14 3.88 
99 16022.00 3559.00 3.69 9983.00 2705.42 0.00 0.00 2705.42 0.14 4.20 
2000 13963.70 4706.50 3.84 10408.00 2710.42 0.00 0.00 2710.42 0.15 4.40 
Sources: 
I-National AccoUIIIS Studies oflhe ESCW A Regioa. Uuitcd NItioas, Se-.J issues. {colwms (I). (2)) 
2-Intematiooal Monetary Fomd, IntematiooaI FiDaociaI SIatistics. The World Bank, Several issues. { colwms (3) } 
3-Intematiooal Monelllry Fomd, Go_ Finance StItistics Yearbook, The World Bank, Several issues. {colunms (4). (6) } 
N.B: 
1- Column (5) = Column (4) I Column (3). 2- Column (7) = Column (6) / Column (3). 3- Column (8) = Column (5) + Co1unm (7) 
4- Column (9) = {[Column (8) + Column (1) + Column (2)] / [Column (1) + Column (2)] } - 1. 
5- Column (11) = [1 + Column (9)] x Column (3) 
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TABLE A5-2: ESTIMATING THE SHADOW EXCHANGE RATE USING THE SCF APPROACH 
Official Import Duties Iml!ort Duties Export Duties EXl!ort Duties Standard Shadow Exchange Rate 
Imports Exports Exchange LE Million $ MiUion LE Million ~ ~Million Conversion Factor LE/$ 
Years $Million SMillion RateLE/$ ratio 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1991 7914.60 3692.50 3.33 3422.00 1026.95 0.00 0.00 0.92 3.63 
92 8292.90 3049.90 3.34 4941.00 1480.09 0.00 0.00 0.88 3.77 
93 8187.00 3109.60 3.37 5428.00 1609.82 0.00 0.00 0.88 3.85 
94 9592.00 3474.80 3.39 6585.00 1941.91 0.00 0.00 0.87 3.89 
95 11738.90 3444.10 3.39 7352.00 2168.73 0.00 0.00 0.88 3.87 
96 13038.20 3539.60 3.39 8255.00 2436.54 0.00 0.00 0.87 3.89 
97 13210.00 3908.00 3.39 8460.00 2497.05 0.00 0.00 0.87 3.88 
98 16537.00 3207.00 3.41 9100.00 2672.54 0.00 0.00 0.88 3.87 
99 16022.00 3559.00 3.69 9983.00 2705.42 0.00 0.00 0.88 4.20 
2000 13963.7 4706.50 3.84 10408.00 2710.42 0.00 0.00 0.87 4.40 
Sources: 
I-NatioDaI Accounts Studies oflhe ESCW A RegioD. UDiIed Natioas, Several issues. (columns (I), (2)} 
2-1Dtematicmal Monelary FUDCI, Intenntioaal FiDanciaI Statistics, The WOOd Bank, Several issues. { columos (3) } 
3-1Dtematicmal MODeIary FUDCI, Govaument FiDaIK:e Statistics Yearboolc, The World Bank, Several issues. {columns (4), (6)} 
N.B: 
1- Column (5) = Column (4) I Column (3)_ 2- Colunm (7) = Column (6) I Column (3). 
3- Column (8) = 1/1 + {[Column (7) + Column (5) + Colunm (1) + Colunm (2)] I [Colunm (1) + Colunm (2)] } -1. 
4- Column (9) = Column (3) /Colunm (8). 
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TABLE A5-3: ESTIMATING THE REER ASSUMING CPI (U.s) = CPID 
Official Import Iml!ort EXl!ort 
Imports Exports Excbange Duties Duties Export Duties Duties 
Years SMiliion SMiliion Rate LEIS LE Million S Million LE Million S Million CPIW CPID CPIW/CPID RER PRIM REER 
- -- - -----
- _._---
-- ---
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1991 7914.60 3692.50 3.33 3422.00 1026.95 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.33 1.09 3.63 
92 8292.90 3049.90 3.34 4941.00 1480.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.34 1.13 3.77 
93 8187.00 3109.60 3.37 5428.00 1609.82 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.37 1.14 3.85 
94 9592.00 3474.80 3.39 6585.00 1941.91 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.39 1.15 3.89 
95 11738.90 3444.10 3.39 7352.00 2168.73 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.39 1.14 3.87 
96 13038.20 3539.60 3.39 8255.00 2436.54 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.39 1.15 3.89 
97 13211.00 3921.00 3.39 8460.00 2497.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.39 1.15 3.88 
98 16166.00 3130.00 3.41 9100.00 2672.54 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.41 1.14 3.88 
99 16022.00 3559.00 3.69 9983.00 2705.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.69 1.14 4.20 
1000 13963.7 4706.5 3.84 10408.00 2710.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.84 1.15 4.40 
Sou"i'Cei: 
1· NatioDal Accounts Studies ofdle ESCW A Region. United Natioas. Several issues. {columDs (1). (2). (8). (9» 
2· IDtematiooaJ Monetary FUDd. iDteraDtioaal FiDaDcial Sbtistics, The World BIIIk, Several issues. { co1unms (3) } 
J.1DtematiooaJ Monetary Fund, Government Fioaoce SIatistics Ycmbook, The World BIIIk, Several issues. {columns (4). (6) } 
N.B: 
1- Column (5) = Column (4) I Column (3). 2- Column (7) = Column (6) I Column (3). 
3- Column (10) = Column (8) I Column (9) 
4- Column (11) = Column (10) x Column (3). 
5- Column (12) = Column (1) + Column (2) + Column (5) + Column (7) I Column (1) + Column (2) 
6- Column (13) = Column (11) x Column (12). 
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TABLE A5-4: ESTIMATING THE REER USING CPI (1995 = 100%) 
Offldal Import Iml!ort Export EXl!ort 
Imports Exports Exchange Duties Duties Duties Duties 
Years SMillion SMillion Rate LEIS LE Million ~ ~Million LE Million ~ ~ Million CPI (U.S) CPID CPI (U.S) tCPID RER PRIM REER j 
--
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1991 7914.60 3692.50 3.33 3422.00 1026.95 0.00 0.00 62.70 89.40 0.70 2.34 1.09 2.54 
92 8292.90 3049.90 3.34 4941.00 1480.09 0.00 0.00 71.30 92.10 0.77 2.58 1.13 2.92 
93 8187.00 3109.60 3.37 5428.00 1609.82 0.00 0.00 79.90 94.80 0.84 2.84 1.14 3.25 
94 9592.00 3474.80 3.39 6585.00 1941.91 0.00 0.00 86.40 97.30 0.89 3.01 1.15 3.46 
95 11738.90 3444.10 3.39 7352.00 2168.73 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 3.39 1.14 3.87 
96 13038.20 3539.60 3.39 8255.00 2436.54 0.00 0.00 107.20 102.90 1.04 3.53 1.15 4.05 
97 13211.00 3921.00 3.39 8460.00 2497.05 0.00 0.00 112.10 105.30 1.06 3.61 1.15 4.13 
98 16166.00 3130.00 3.41 9100.00 2672.54 0.00 0.00 116.80 107.00 1.09 3.72 1.14 4.23 
99 16022.00 3559.00 3.69 9983.00 2705.42 0.00 0.00 120.40 109.30 1.10 4.06 1.14 4.63 
2000 13963.70 4706.50 3.84 10408.00 2710.42 0.00 0.00 123.10 114.00 1.08 4.15 1.15 4.75 
SourCes: 
1- Natioaal Aa:ouats Studies of the ESCW A Region, Uuited Natioos, SeYeraI issues. (columns (1). (2). (8). (9)} 
2- IntaDatioDaI Mooewy FUDd, IDterantioaa1 FiuaclaI Statistics, The World BanIc, Several issues. { columns (3) } 
3- IntaDatioDaI Mooewy FUDd, Gowmmeat FiDmc:c SllIIistic:s Yeubook, The WOI'Id Bank, Several issues. {columns (4). (6) } 
N.B: 
1- Column (5) = Column (4) / Column (3). 2- Colunm (7) = Colunm (6) / Column (3). 
3- Column (10) = Colunm (8) t Column (9) 
4- Column (11) = Column (10) X Column (3). 
5- Column (12) = Column (1) + Column (2) + Column (5) + Column (7) t Column (1) + Column(2) 
6- Column (13) = Column(ll) X Column(12). 
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TABLEA5-5: ESTIMATINGTHEREER USING U.S CPI (1992 = 100%) 
Official Import Iml!ort Export EXl!ort I Imports Exports Exchange Duties Duties Duties Duties 
I 
Years SMillion SMillion Rate LEIS LE Million ~ ~ Million LE Million ~ ~ Million CPI(U.S) CPID CPI (U.s) ICPID RER PRIM REER 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1991 7914.60 3692.50 3.33 3422.00 1026.95 0.00 0.00 87.94 97.07 0.91 3.02 1.09 3.29 
92 8292.90 3049.90 3.34 4941.00 1480.09 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 1.00 3.34 1.13 3.77 
93 8187.00 3109.60 3.37 5428.00 1609.82 0.00 0.00 112.06 102.93 1.09 3.67 1.14 4.19 
94 9592.00 3474.80 3.39 6585.00 1941.91 0.00 0.00 121.18 105.65 1.15 3.89 1.15 4.47 
95 11738.90 3444.10 3.39 7352.00 2168.73 0.00 0.00 140.25 108.58 1.29 4.38 1.14 5.00 
96 13038.20 3539.60 3.39 8255.00 2436.54 0.00 0.00 150.35 111.73 1.35 4.56 1.15 5.23 
97 13211.00 3921.00 3.39 8460.00 2497.05 0.00 0.00 157.22 114.33 1.38 4.66 1.15 5.34 
98 16166.00 3130.00 3.41 9100.00 2672.54 0.00 0.00 163.81 116.18 1.41 4.80 1.14 5.47 
99 16022.00 3559.00 3.69 9983.00 2705.42 0.00 0.00 168.86 118.68 1.42 5.25 1.14 5.98 
2000 17335.20 3900.00 3.84 10408.00 2710.42 0.00 0.00 172.65 123.78 1.39 5.36 1.15 6.13 
Soan:cs: 
I·NBioaa1 A<:couIIIs Studies of the ESCW A Rcgioa, UDited Nations, Several issues. {cohmms (I). (2), (8), (9)} 
2-lDtanatioa.aI MODeIlIr)' FUIId, Intermtioaal Fiamcial SI8IisIics, The World Bank, Several issues. { cohmms (3) } 
3-lDtanatioa.aI MODeIlIr)' FUIId, Government FiDmce S1aIistics Yearbook, The World Bank, Several issues. {columos (4). (6) } 
RB: 
Column (5) = Column (4) I Column (3). 2- Column (7) = Column (6) I Column (3)_ 
3- Column (10) = Column (8) I Column (9) 
4- Column(ll) = Column (10) X Column (3). 
5- Column (12) = Column (1) + Column (2) + Column (5) + Column (7) I Column (I) + Column (2) 
6- Column (13) = Column (11) X Column (12). 
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TABLE A5-6: ESTIMATION OF IMpORT PARITY PRICE FOR SOYBEAN AT FARM LEVEL 
Estimation Stee! Unit I 1986 I 87 I 88 I 89 I 90 I 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 
World Price (Rotterdam) SffON 208.42 215.75 303.50 275.00 246.75 239.56 235.52 255.25 252.83 259.25 304.50 295.42 245.42 199.58 211.80 
Add: 
Freight & Insurance SffON 12.50 12.70 13.00 13.20 15.20 15.25 9.20 9.60 10.10 10.60 11.20 11.99 12.50 13.00 13.10 
Add: 
Import Duties (2%) + Fees( 8.3%) SffON 21.47 22.22 31.26 28.33 25.42 24.67 24.26 26.29 26.04 26.70 31.36 30.43 25.28 20.56 21.82 
World Price at Alexandria Port SffON 242.39 250.67 347.76 316.53 287.37 279.48 268.98 291.14 288.97 296.55 347.06 337.84 283.20 233.14 246.72 (CIF) 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate LEIS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
Border Price at Alexandria Port LEffON 327.22 381.02 772.03 797.64 778.76 1013.70 1015.10 1121.56 Il25.52 1148.90 1348.69 1311.42 1097.85 979.13 1068.31 
Add 
Transportation from Port to Fact LEffON 7.40 8.50 10.00 13.50 16.00 17.20 18.00 19.00 20.00 21.00 22.30 24.00 25.20 26.00 27.10 
World Price at Fact LEITON 334.62 389.52 782.03 811.14 794.76 1030.90 1033.10 1140.56 Il45.52 1169.90 1370.99 1335.42 1123.05 1005.13 1095.41 
DedIlct: 
Trans. From Market to Fact LEffON 7.00 8.10 9.60 13.00 15.70 16.50 17.90 18.95 19.55 20.90 22.00 23.85 25.00 26.00 27.00 
World Price at Farm Gate LEITON 327.62 381.42 772.43 798.14 779.06 1014.40 1015.20 1121.61 Il25.97 Il49.00 1348.99 1311.57 1098.05 979.13 1068.41 
Multiply 
Conversion Allowance LElTon 327.62 381.42 772.43 798.14 779.06 1014.40 1015.20 112t.61 1125.97 1149.00 1348.99 1311.57 1098.05 979.13 1068.41 
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TABLE A5-7: ESTIMA nON OF IMpORT PARITY PRICE FOR MAIZE AT FARM LEVEL 
Estimation Stees I Uoit 11986 I 87 I 88 I 89 I 90 I 91 I 92 I 93 I 94 I 95 I 96 97 98 99 I 2000 I 
World Price (FOB-US Gulf) SffON 87.77 75.57 107.06 1ll.39 109.42 107.45 104.30 101.94 107.85 123.59 164.52 117.29 101.55 90.13 88.56 
Add: 
Freight & Insurance SffON 15.25 20.36 20.90 21.00 24.00 24.30 14.35 14.70 14.80 15.00 15.10 15.50 15.40 15.35 16.00 
Add: 
Import Duties (2%) + Fees( 8.3%) SffON 9.04 7.78 11.03 11.47 11.27 11.07 10.74 10.50 11.11 12.73 16.95 12.08 10.46 9.28 9.12 
World Price at Alexandria Port SffON 112.06 103.72 138.99 143.86 144.69 142.82 129.40 127.14 133.75 151.32 196.57 144.87 127.41 114.77 113.68 (CIF) 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate LEIS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
Border Price at Alexandria Port LEffON 151.29 157.65 308.55 362.53 392.11 518.01 488.33 489.79 520.96 586.24 763.87 562.37 493.91 482.00 492.26 
Add 
Transportation from Port to LEffON 7.40 8.50 10.00 13.50 16.00 17.20 18.00 19.00 20.00 21.00 22.30 24.00 25.20 26.00 27.10 Market 
World Price at Market LEffON 158.69 166.15 318.55 376.03 408.11 535.21 506.33 508.79 540.96 607.24 786.17 586.37 519.11 508.00 519.36 
Deduct: 
Trans. From Market to Farm LEffON 7.00 8.10 9.60 13.00 15.70 16.50 17.90 18.95 19.55 20.90 22.00 23.85 25.00 26.00 27.00 
World Price at Farm Gate LEffON 151.69 158.05 308.95 363.03 392.41 518.71 488.43 489.84 521.41 586.34 764.17 562.52 494.11 482.00 492.36 
Multiply 
Conversion Allowance @ 110% LEffon 166.85 173.85 339.84 399.34 431.65 570.58 537.28 538.83 573.55 644.98 840.59 618.77 543.52 530.20 541.59 
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TABLE AS-8: ESTIMATION OF IMpORT P ARlTY PRICE FOR SUGAR CANE A T FARM LEVEL 
I · Estimation Steps Unit 1 1986 I 87 88 89· IJfl 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 I 2000 I 
World Price (FOB- Caribian) 
Add: 
Freight & Insurance 
Add: 
Import Duties (0%) + Fees( 0%) 
World Price at Alexandria Port (CIF) 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate 
Border Price at Alexandria Port 
Add 
Transportation from Port to Factory 
(Hawamdia) 
World Price at Market 
Deduct: 
Trans. From Fact. To Farm 
World Price at Farm Gate 
Multiply 
Conversion Allowance @ 0.11 % 
srrON 133.10 148.72 224.18 281.82 275.22 197.56 199.54 220.44 266.42 292.16 263.12 250.80 197.56 137.94 177.76 
Sf[ON 25 .15 31.36 35.10 36.21 36.10 36.20 25.10 25.80 25.95 25.50 25.12 25 .15 25.75 25.90 26.00 
srrONO.OO 0.00 · 0.00 · 0.00 .. 0-:-00 O - : - O O ' O ~ O O - ~ ~ O . O O O ,::-' Q;QQ.;.. 0.00.-:-0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
srrON 158.25 180.08259.28 318.03 311.32 233.76 224.64 246.24 292.37 317.66 288.24 275.95 223 .31 163.84 203.76 
LEIS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.40 
LElTON 213.64 273.72 575.60 801.44 843 .68 847.85 847.77 948.59 1138.75 1230.68 1120.10 1071.18 865.68 688.10 896.54 
LElTON 17.25 17.75 18.50 21.00 21.90 23 .00 24.36 25 .00 25 .48 26.10 26.98 27.52 28.43 29.68 30.10 
LFJTON 230.89 291.47 594.10 822.44 865.58 870.85 872.13 973.59 1164.23 1256.78 1147.08 1098.70 894.11 717.78 926.64 
LFJTON 32.00 45.32 69.64 82.60 105.96 135.99 160.25 196.35 215.60 240.36 246.90 250.98 260.90 270.00 275.00 
LFJTON 198.89 246.15 524.46 739.84 759.62 734.86 711.88 777.24 948.63 1016.42 900.18 847.72 633.21 447.78 651.64 
LElTon 21.88 27.08 57.69 81.38 83.56 80.83 78.31 85.50 104.35 111.81 99.02 93.25 69.65 49.26 71.68 
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TABLE A5-9: ESTIMATION OF IMpORT PARITY PRICE FOR BROAD BEANS AT FARM LEVEL 
Estimation Steps I Unit I 1986 I 87 I 88 I 89 I 90 I 91 I 92 I 93 I 94 I 95 I 96 I 97 98 99 2000 
World PriceAT ALEX INC. ALL FEES $rrON 269.50 450.50 371.50 370.00 371.10 393.27 390.74 286.81 303.83 314.72 391.04 371.92 366.40 323.01 335.36 
C."":" _ ... Add: 
---' Freight & Insurance $rrON 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Add: 
Import Duties (2%) + Fees( 8.3%) $rrON 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
World Price at Alexandria Port (elF) $rrON 269.50 450.50 371.50 370.00 371.10 393.27 390.74 286.81 303.83 314.72 391.04 371.92 366.40 323.01 335.36 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate LEIS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
Border Price at Alexandria Port LErrON 363.83 684.76 824.73 932.40 1005.68 1426.39 1474.63 1104.86 1183.39 1219.30 1519.57 1443.72 1420.38 1356.59 1452.15 
Add 
Transportation from Port to Market LEffON 7.40 8.50 10.00 13.50 16.00 17.20 18.00 19.00 20.00 21 .00 22.30 24.00 25.20 26.00 27.10 
World Price at Market LEffON 371.23 693 .26 834.73 945.90 1021.68 1443.59 1492.63 1123.86 1203.39 1240.30 1541.87 1467.72 1445.58 1382.59 1479.25 
Deduct: 
Trans. From Market to Farm LEffON 7.00 8.10 9.60 13.00 15.70 16.50 17.90 18.95 19.55 20.90 22.00 23.85 25.00 26.00 27.00 
World Price at Farm Gate LEffON 364.23 685.16 825.13 932.90 1005.98 1427.09 1474.73 1104.91 1183.84 1219.40 1519.87 1443.87 1420.58 1356.59 1452.25 
Multiply 
Conversion Allowance LErron 364.23 685.16 825.13 932.90 1005.98 1427.09 1474.73 1104.91 1183.84 1219.40 1519.87 1443.87 1420.58 1356.59 1452.25 
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TABLE AS-l 0: ESTIMATION OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE FOR RICE AT FARM LEVEL 
Estimation Stees Unit 1 1986 1 87 I 88 I 89 I 90 1 91 I 92 I 93 I 94 I 95 96 97 98 99 I 2000 I 
World Price (Thiland-Bangkok) $ll'ON 195.67 214.42 277.25 299.75 270.67 293.67 267.67 237.25 269.46 320.80 338.06 302.47 305.42 248.97 202.40 
Add 
Quality factor (2%) $ll'ON 3.91 4.29 5.55 6.00 5.41 5.87 5.35 4.75 5.39 6.42 6.76 6.05 6.11 4.98 4.05 
Deduct: 
Freight & Insurance $/fON 12.00 7.60 7.75 7.82 8.96 9.00 5.35 6.10 7.00 8.72 I3.SO 14.10 15.25 15.30 16.10 
World Price at Alexandria Port (elF) $ll'ON 187.58 211.11 275.05 297.93 267.12 290.54 267.67 235.90 267.85 318.SO 331.32 294.42 296.28 238.65 190.35 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate LEIS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
World Price of milled rice at Alexandria LErfON 253.24 320.88 610.60 7SO.77 723.90 1053.81 1010.17 908.74 1043.25 1233.92 1287.51 1142.88 1148.55 1002.28 824.23 
Port 
Deduct: 
Transportation from mill to port LErfON 7.40 7.50 9.00 10.67 11.20 11.90 12.35 13.00 13.56 14.25 15.20 15.90 16.20 16.78 17.00 
World of milled rice Price at Mill LErfON 245.84 313.38 601.60 740.10 712.70 1041.91 997.82 895.74 1029.69 1219.67 1272.31 1126.98 1132.35 985.50 807.23 
Domestic Price of Bran LErfON 10.SO 13.75 16.47 18.98 23.89 28.90 29.10 29.78 30.00 30.15 30.45 31.00 31.89 32.00 32.86 
MUled Rice Yeildffon Paddy Rice Yeilcllfon 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Bran YeUdffon Paddy Rice Yellcllfon 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Joint product, Paddy rice LErfON 169.12 215.70 410.85 505.02 488.15 711.67 682.02 613.44 703.79 831.88 867.47 769.69 773.60 674.66 554.79 
Deduct: 
Milling Margin + Trans. From Farm to LErfON 15.70 18.50 17.80 19.10 33.00 33.05 MUI 33.60 34.60 36.00 37.10 39.15 
40.12 41.11 42.21 43.00 
World Price. Paddy rice at Farm Gate LErfON 153.42 197.20 393.05 485.92 455.15 678.62 648.42 578.84 667.79 794.78 828.32 729.57 732.49 632.45 511.79 
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TABLE AS-II: ESTIMATION OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE FOR TOMATOES AT FARM LEVEL 
Estimation Steps ---- ] -Unit I 1986 I 87 I 88 O[l 90 I 91 I 92 I 93 I 94 I 95 I 96 I 97 ! 98 I 99 I 2000 I 
World Price (CAPMS) AT ALEX. Inc All $rrON 315.85209.75193.25282.50231.20267.60 270.32 247.96231.92 192.03 144.91104.99 118.36 185.32215.43 
Fees 
Deduct: 
Freight & Insurance $rrON 
World Price at Alexandria Port $rrON 315.85 209.75 193.25 282.50 231.20 267.60 270.32 247.96 231.92 192.03 144.91 104.99 118.36 185.32 215.43 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate LEI$ 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
World Price at Alexandria Port LErrON 426.40 318.82 429.02 711.90 626.55 970.60 1020.16 955.23 903.32 743.97 563.12 407.56 458.83 778.31 932.83 
Deduct: 
Transportation & Marketing Cost LErrON 37.40 41.50 45 .00 47.67 51.20 52.90 56.35 58.00 59.56 62.25 67.20 70.90 72.20 74.78 75.00 
World Price at Farm gate LEffON 389.00 277.32 384.02 664.23 575.35 917.70 963.81 897.23 843.76 681.72 495.92 336.66 386.63 · 703.53 857.83 
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TABLE A5-12: ESTIMATION OF EXPORT PARITY PRICE FOR POTATOES AT FARM LEVEL 
Estimation SteDs 
World Price (CAPMS) AT ALEX .Inc All $rrON 203.42 196.87 189.55 172.88 165.42 219.52 204.48 183.44 200.99 243.89 194.32 176.99 188.96 180.12 169.93 
Fees 
Deduct: 
Freight & Insurance $rrON 
World Price at Alexandria Port $rrON 203.42 196.87 189.55 172.88 165.42 219.52 204.48 183.44 200.99 243.89 194.32 176.99 188.96 180.12 169.93 
Multiply: 
Shadow Exchange Rate LEIS 1.35 1.52 2.22 2.52 2.71 3.63 3.77 3.85 3.89 3.87 3.89 3.88 3.88 4.20 4.33 
World Price at Alexandria Port LEffON 274.62 299.24 420.80 435.66 448.29 796.19 771.67 706.68 782.85 944.86 755.14 687.03 732.52 756.48 735.82 
Deduct: 
Transportation & Marketing Cost LEffON 28.30 32.32 35.25 38.03 41.85 43.85 47.00 48.14 50.52 52.70 58.07 61.04 63.07 64.90 65.47 
World Price at Farm gate LEffON 246.32 266.92 385.55 397.63 406.44 752.34 724.67 658.54 732.33 892.16 697.07 625.99 669.45 691.58 670.35 
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n 23 M 15 Z 6 ~ ~
I ~ ~ U ~ ~... l __ l ___ L 1 8 5 I I ~ . . L ~ ~ ~ I _ . ~ ~ I ~ . I ' . l l 3531 .... 1 1 9 1 7 . ~ ' - - 0 I I l ! 1 _ . . l l 526"7·111 I TIi7.oo I Z631.00 I 351&'00 I 2&3.00 I 2373.10 I 2000.00 I 1574.00 I 2212.00 I 2215.00 1 935.80 I 3975.00 13000.00 I 3001.00 
1916. 16I4.G. 
Im- I 4l54M1 7I4Ui 16121.m 
1 ___ 1 KU.u 15515.231 11 ... 
1129."1M3.n .... 12... "... 
I 'I"-Sl 1721; 
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11t.?4 
"""iUS 
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ItI5=r -2.1' W7.05 4N4.71 Ml7.73 6tl5.42 1047.61 
1_-1 uo ut 11_ M3&.I2 5Q6AI _.34 724U!1 1""-16 9 1 0 0 ~ ~
1m - . r o.iiOl iU - I if:"3 171.3Z 467041 IU'AI 3375.15 317&.23 5794.21 1346t.54 lIW., JIII54C 
34.46 1441.22 417.16 IWI.91 2326.94 4056.141 Im5064 19461.55 37"1.27 ilia I ,"'''-1 
... 3.45 21;04 146.33 ~ 5 . 1 7 7 1163.47 U3UG 7542.N 1_.24 33913.14 48755. 133. 
0.00 2.10 29.21 212.55 465.39 I2IUO 625.77 1-.c'7 271JUI 4lI'79, 161. 
0.00 2.f3 4UI l39.e -.72 2262..D _.eo 1"'1.36 35103.63 33 J5II.39 
4.05 27.91 146.02 905.15 3269.54 1I:JN.8l U572.54 27 
.... 2.19 29.20 271.55 1307..12 Y97.41 14743.52 
" 0.80 I 2.92 I 54.31 392.34 227I.M 73'71.76 n 
0.00 ..J. 5Al 71.47 al.& m 
0.00 7 ... 136.74 ... 
I 2948.70 I 5710..1 110157.13 I 27452.741 31152.111 -'71 15&147.56 I I I I I I 1995 I 32112.: 
.  I ... , I 2284.3. I !IO'IIU6 I 16471064 I 271"-" I 44773.37 I 52332M I _" ... ,-- --,-----, -T· ----.i9Mr ~ ~
41.00 13.67 176.92 .a5.JO 1 1 203lAl 1 1l35..12 1 16311.1.1 31341.36 1 41"'.24 1 53657.111 64170.36 1 1 1m I 397: 
1"" 10.80117 & 137.06 
13.71 
00 
22.57 I iil.0t 1-'011.73 T 3923.36-1 9&17..16 111711.441 31575. 
0.00 I 21.10 I lIU5 I 1177.01 I 3922.95 
0.00 I 2U3 I 235.40 I 1176.11 
o.GI I 23.54 I 235.31 
~ ~
..... -:::::::I..1l 
The second raw indicates the number of imported tractors as a proxy of the tractor stock in use. 
The frrst value in each column represents the value of the tractor at farm. gate level (previously estimated in table 19 line number 10). 
. Pt *N t +Pt-I *N t_1 +--------+Pt -10 *Nt_IO [Pt *Nt +Pt - I *N t -1 +--------+Pt-IO *N t _IO 020] Value of tractor m year (t) = + x . 
Nt *1+Nt_1 *0.9+-------+N t _10 *0 Nt *1+N t _1 *0.9+-------+N t _10 *0 
Val e fthe tractor in 1986 = 14966.16·11000+7242.85·8456+5540.34·7917+5626.41·3531+2438.82·6400+1168.52'13009+574.39·5282+199.66·2850+22.24·6000+2.84·3498+0.00·1849 = 7667 36 
u 0 11000.1+8456.0.9+ 7919.0.8+3531.0. 7+6400.0.6+13009'"0.5+5282.0.4+2850.0.3+6000.0.2·3498.0.1+1849.0 • 
= 7667.36 + (0-20*7667:36) = 9200.38 
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TABLE A5-14: SOCIAL PRICE FOR MACHINERY SERVICE (TRACTORS) 
C-- - Tractors Year ]-1986 87 88 89 90 91 1 92 r 93 94 951 96 97 98 99 1 " 2000 1 
I ·I-Fised CoR • 
World Price al Port, Aleoodria 
Multiply 
Shadow Exchange Rale 
World Price al Port, Aleoodri. 
Add 
Port Fees + ibodliog 
Total Lauded Cost 
Add 
Transport 10 Warehouse 
Add 
Markup@ 10'Y. 
Price al Warehouse 
Add 
Transport to Farm 
Total Price at Farm 
Salvage Value@ 20% 
Inilial Capilal Cost 
Use Life 
Rat< of loterest 
Hours of VselYear 
Depreciatioo 
Capital Cost 
Sub Total Cosl 1 
2-VarbbleCOSL-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































) ) . ~ 6 6
16.62 
Appendixes 
Appendix Chapter 6 
TABLE A6-1: NET PRIVATE PROFITABILITY FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT DURING THE PERIOD 1986-2000 . 
............................. JF-o rv ...... - . ..,--..-.....-
Wheat Broad beans Long berseem Short berseem Tomatoes Maize Rice Cotton Potatoes Sugar cane Soybean 
- - - --
1986 339.48 78.29 554.40 112.04 226.24 173.79 262.72 153.88 35.42 130.00 12.79 
1987 457.83 116.89 991.78 218.55 257.52 337.04 123.86 161.99 34.35 140.70 19.77 
1988 467.08 113.08 755.05 167.69 282.42 602.23 210.25 207.88 78.67 180.89 15.77 
1989 1155.73 137.05 727.06 169.32 224.97 891.41 539.83 415.74 141.80 258.51 29.65 
1990 1696.06 156.44 883.08 183.75 305.93 1012.11 682.66 635.06 39.96 331.47 30.62 
1991 1741.45 117.87 1021.50 201.25 413.15 1007.53 789.05 889.95 59.80 259.59 38.04 
1992 1467.49 118.41 1097.25 222.46 300.07 892.67 872.35 1156.93 55.99 243.11 10.89 
1993 1195.09 46.09 1357.47 207.76 279.16 562.28 745.31 1250.73 32.47 285.38 -3.33 
1994 1024.31 54.89 1309.39 227.44 311.83 696.20 1241.70 440.62 119.83 396.34 2.06 
1995 1711.42 141.88 1618.07 242.62 527.95 625.18 1489.26 1228.11 56.89 457.18 1.95 
1996 2239.45 192.34 1989.47 372.15 674.99 958.86 1711.55 1647.26 58.67 445.27 5.94 
1997 2071.52 258.21 2365.39 432.28 593.64 1230.00 1871.32 1436.72 40.63 502.50 5.08 
1998 1709.11 123.35 2672.95 542.25 587.56 829.73 1256.75 168.71 2.93 428.83 -2.19 
1999 2084.48 -14.79 2896.53 434.48 593.08 1156.39 1703.99 254.13 8.06 318.24 0.31 
2000 2224.22 108.54 3253.62 474.93 653.98 1261.16 1771.56 306.91 4.69 427.90 0.12 
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TABLE A6-1: NET SOCIAL PROFITABILITY FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT DURING 
THE PERIOD 1986-2000. 
(Million Egyptian pounds) 
'" 
e e ~ ~= ~ ~ ~ ~ '" 
.... 
" 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
= 
<II = = ~ ~
'" 








~ ~~ ~ ~ ~
1986 43 2 128 212 291 -81 -156 17 65 -88 -10 422 
1987 54 71 464 66 88 -138 -165 43 86 -ll2 -12 444 
1988 251 35 23 -30 109 167 114 35 87 116 6 913 
1989 552 80 -292 -104 391 60 361 55 85 264 -10 1443 
1990 329 83 -258 -170 435 26 351 75 3 216 -15 1076 
1991 365 60 -363 -217 567 351 602 154 202 -148 -17 1554 
1992 238 4 -375 -305 658 141 453 -149 141 -153 -15 639 
1993 19 -75 71 -215 1071 47 76 95 45 -159 -15 960 
1994 46 -120 -16 -199 1066 64 352 42 III 59 -15 1390 
1995 ll9 -33 53 -225 409 -154 609 50 306 -58 -44 1032 
1996 1238 16 240 -339 340 595 978 -628 93 -131 -8 2393 
1997 126 61 566 43 -66 27 756 -1 51 -99 -5 1459 
1998 965 96 1400 216 39 -584 1165 -419 77 -129 -5 2819 
1999 975 -138 1528 191 817 13 988 -544 74 -521 -3 3380 
2000 676 24 1840 218 1418 159 -8 -440 75 -344 -4 3613 
Source: PAM results. 
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TABLE A6-3: EXPORT AND IMpORTS OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL OUTPUTS IN EGYPT DURING THE PERIOD 1986-2000. 
Export Crops Import Crops 
Cotton TOlWltoes Rice Potatoes Wheat Maize Broad beans Sugar Soybean 
Year t ... t ... t ... E GO E GO C GO E ... C GO C ~ ~




::I :c ::I ... ::I :c ::I :c ::I 1:1 1:1 .. 1:1 .. 1:1 "; 1:1 "; = "; = "; 1:1 "; 1:1 -; 
" ~ ~ " OIl " OIl 01 .. 01 01 ::I ::I ;> ::I ;> ::I :> ::I :> ::I ;> ::I :> ::I ;> ::I ;> 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 
1986 145,637 440,762 17,279 5,458 40,048 16,022 107,740 21,917 6,333,327 906,000 2,028,000 239,000 1,995 1,729 17,000 3,723 45,000 10,835 
1987 129,907 388,872 23,398 4,908 100,844 39,657 123,327 24,280 7,076,042 897,000 2,200,000 189,000 21,186 9,700 44,555 10,470 54,884 12,245 
1988 79,924 287,039 15,147 2,927 71,353 17,635 166,206 31,505 7,239,380 1,177,000 1,300,000 143,000 Na Na 49,835 11,857 38,930 7,704 
1989 58,407 274,502 14,960 4,227 32,905 8,291 155,510 26,884 6,881,924 1,327,300 1,433,180 210,000 4 113,752 39,543 46,295 14,758 
1990 39,438 186,092 20,438 4,725 75,718 18,181 135,571 22,426 6,439,468 1,062,885 1,900,000 249,000 502 179 235,773 98,165 24,659 4,006 
1991 12,986 60,687 23,417 6,267 150,952 38,710 217,837 47,817 6,187,623 724,912 1,300,000 174,000 Na Na 269,000 90,000 Na Na 
1992 15,541 52,546 41,532 11,184 187,472 57,313 209,365 42,649 5,683,217 768,193 1,443,817 177,788 Na Na 58,932 15,312 Na Na 
1993 18,394 43,586 28,470 7,059 144,124 40,051 175,470 32,184 5,038,050 643,672 2,148,000 239,859 54,016 16,421 26,000 6,838 62,990 16,023 
1994 113,159 232,900 25,081 5,817 247,175 78,588 131,865 26,516 7,125,006 834,307 2,021,007 262,831 120,983 37,253 381,408 109,352 79,591 21,455 
1995 67,415 152,216 9,696 1,862 156,787 56,741 418,744 102,116 5,472,352 937,436 2,425,162 349,271 127,476 40,347 392,494 143,926 54,856 14,100 
1996 23,290 91,830 10,726 1,555 327,884 117,723 411,173 79,909 6,086,572 1,246,798 2,471,502 435,404 87,488 33,983 646,186 208,625 124,178 37,899 
1997 41,791 110,223 12,353 1,297 202,604 71,363 232,963 41,249 6,990,774 839,015 3,059,000 385,391 28,764 11,140 800,000 263,195 \39,476 42,536 
1998 66,258 158,173 19,486 2,306 428,925 \35,190 228,467 43,224 7,425,257 775,600 3,042,914 388,074 56,000 16,000 375,000 80,500 115,153 31,9\1 
1999 111,535 238,160 5,344 990 306,977 87,592 255,569 46,034 6,062,500 558,467 3,584,900 386,943 226,655 71,055 445,000 63,500 242,676 52,821 
2000 63,221 \32,272 1,745 454 393,056 112,565 48,464 7,699 4,972,824 722,291 5,161,556 582,523 172,446 53,975 536,000 184,900 349,941 79,258 
Quantity in Mt and Values in 1000 U.S $ 
Source: F AO Database. 
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TABLE A9-1: AREA MODELLING IN LEVELS AND FIRST DIFFERENCES DA TA FOR MAJOR CROPS IN EGYPT (GENERAL AND SPECIFIC MODELS) 
Crop Regressor 
LAW Po PI /32 /33 /34 /35 /36 /37 /38 /39 /310 R2 
'" 
(Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPT) (LPM) (LPC) (LPR) eLl'S) (LPP) Q;, 
General 11.2 -1.1 0.9 2.8 0.70 0 .60 1.00 0.37 -1.57 1.02 -0.17 cu [0.011] [0.5181 [0.1801 [0.145] [0.4661 [0.5851 [0.303] [0.366] rO.052] [0.440] [0.574] 0.91 ~ ~
... Specific 12.7 0.10 0.75 2.36 0.60 0.01 0.69 0.11 -1.75 -0.003 0.89 
" r·0001 r.8961 rO.1891 [0.145] rO.4921 rO.7791 [0.377] [0.5831 rO.017] 
- [0.989] ... 
..c 
~ ~ DLAW rO rl Y2 Y3 Y4 r5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 YIO R2 ... 
"" (Constant) (DLPW) (DLPBB) (DLPLB) (DLPSB) (DLPT) (DLPM) (DLPC) (DLPR) (DLPS) (DLPP) ... ;: 
'" ... ... ... 0.26 -2.02 3.01 5.69 0.59 -1.01 0.97 0.77 -4.20 0.09 -.518 i i : ; ~ ~ General 
rO.022] [0.026] rO.0341 rO.0501 rO.0661 rO.0401 rO.0971 rO.0121 [0.042] [0.768] [0.031] 0.99 is 0.27 -1.97 3.11 5.95 0.57 -0.98 1.04 0.76 -4.33 -0.52 Specific [0.003] [0.004] rO.0051 rO.0071 [0.021] [0.0071 rO.0141 rO.0011 [0.007] - [0.007] 0.99 
LASB /30 PI /32 /33 /34 /35 /36 /37 /38 /39 /310 R2 
'" 
(Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPT) (LPM) (LPC) (LPR) (LPS) (LPP) Q;
13.81 0.06 -0.45 0.48 -0.03 0.05 0.22 -0.09 0.06 , Levels -0.36 -0.02 cu LO.OOll [0.945] 10.161] rO.5331 [0.951] [0.920] rO.5911 rO.6031 [0.233] [0.919] [0.908] 0.92 E ~ ~
... 
13.79 0.04 -0.45 0.44 0.04 0.21 -0.09 -0.36 0.07 -0.02 ... Specific 0.92 '" [0.000] [0.953] [0.077] [0.288] - [0.920] rO.5061 rO.524] rO.1591 [0.897] [0.8721 ... ... 
= ... Yo YI Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 r7 Y8 Y9 YIO ... DLASB Rl 0 ... 
..c OJ (Constant) (DLPW) (DLPBB) (DLPLB) (DLPSB) (DLPT) (DLPM) (DLPC) (DLPR) (DLPS) (DLPP) CIl ... ;: II> ... 
... ... 
-0.13 0.58 -1.44 3.62 -0.01 0 .32 0.71 -0.33 -2.46 0.44 0.17 .- cu General 0.99 r..::: 
ro.Ol11 [0.036] [0.0181 rO.0151 rO.8651 rO.0451 [0.023] [0.007] [0.014] rO.0361 . [0.032] is 





LALB /30 /31 /32 /33 /34 /35 /36 /37 /38 /39 /310 
Rl 
'" 
(Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPn (LPM) (LPC) (LPR) (LPS) (LPP) 
~ ~
.. General 15.27 0.65 -0.04 0.21 -0.07 0.50 -0.09 -0.04 -0.23 -0.50 0.12 Q,I 
rO.0001 rO.0501 rO.5681 rO.339] rO.571] rO.0281 rO.443] [0.436] [0.0401 rO.0451 rO.045] 0.96 5 ~ ~Q,I 15.04 0.47 0.06 0.41 -0.23 -0.40 0.09 Q,I Specific 
'" rO.0001 rO.0001 - rO.2501 - ro.OOOl - - [0.0021 ro.OOO] ro.OOO] 0.95 ... Q,I 
.Q 
IOD Yo Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 YIO Rl = Q,I DLALB Q ... (Constant) (DLPLB) (DLPn mLPM) (DLPC) (DLPR) (DLPS) (DLPP) ...l 
... = (DLPW) (DLPBB) (DLPSB) 
'" Q,I ... ... 0.01 0.55 -0.22 0.61 -O.Q7 0.46 -0.21 -0.02 0.05 -0.48 0.09 r ; ~ ~ General 
rO.731] rO.1461 rO.6401 rO.5821 rO.5951 rO.0921 [0.465] [0.769] [0.9481 [0.1191 [0.321] 0.94 is 
-0.0007 0.47 0.01 0.39 -0.27 -0.36 0.08 Specific 
_IQ·.212L rO.0031 - rO.9431 - rO.OOll - - rO.0291 rO.003] rO.0181 0.91 
-
LAR /30 /31 /32 /33 /34 /35 /36 /37 /38 /39 /310 Rl 
'" 
(Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPT) (LPM) (LPC) (LPR) (LPS) (LPP) 
.. 
-0.86 .. Levels 12.46 0.77 -0.66 -0.29 -0.53 0.64 0.06 -0.57 
0.76 -0.11 Q,I 
rO.OOOl rO.1911 rO.0191 rO.2481 rO.3541 ro.1851 [0.0841 rO.6371 rO.0381 rO.1361 rO.2921 0.99 ~ ~
Specific 13.05 -0.41 0.69 -0.78 -0.23 0.53 -0.65 
0.35 
Q,I rO.OOOl rO.098] rO.OOll rO.0181 - ro.1741 rO.0321 - rO.0071 rO.l021 - 0.98 
... 
c;;: 
Yo YI Y2 Y3 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y9 YIO Q,I DLAR Y4 Y8 R2 
... (Constant) (DLPW) (DLPBB) (DLPLB) (DLPSB) (DLPT) (DLPM) (DLPC) (DLPR) (DLPS) (DLPP) 
... = 
'" Q,I ... ... 
-0.06 -0.70 1.67 -2.69 -0.25 -0.51 \.19 0.04 -1.88 0.95 -O.Q3 r ; ~ ~ General [0.521] rO.3841 rO.2631 rO.3941 rO.4981 rO.3291 [0.1921 [0.8251 rO.381] [0.189] rO.8861 0.94 is 
-0.08 -0.62 2.07 -3.75 -0.47 1.46 -2.42 0.95 Specific 




Crop R ~ r e s s o r r
LAT /30 /31 /32 fJ3 /34 /35 /36 /37 /38 /39 fJlO R2 
.., (Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPT) (LPM) (LPC) (LPR) (LPS) (I"PP) ~ ~
.. General 11.64 0.32 0.06 0.30 -0.46 -0.27 -0.22 0.0006 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 
" rO.0031 [0.778] [0.8721 rO.7751 [0.468J [0.7061 rO.7oo1 rO.998] [0.8631 [0.967) [0.848) 0.71 ..J
.., 11.77 0.33 0.44 -0.49 -0.25 -0.31 .. Specific 0.70 0 





DLAT Yo Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Ys Y6 Y7 Ys Y9 YIO R2 E- .. 
... (Constant) (DLPW) (DLPBB) (DLPLB) (DLPSB) (DLPT) (DLPM) (DLPC) (DLPR) (DLPS) (DLPP) .... c: 
'" .. ... ... 
-0.01 0.75 0.15 0.23 -0.53 0.07 -0.33 -0.24 -0.36 -0.23 0.04 ~ ~ ~ General [0.9521 rO.6161 [0.950) [0.968) [0.4761 rO.9421 [0.815) [0.5371 rO.9261 rO.8371 rO.9301 0.62 Ci 0.003 0.21 0.33 -0.31 -0.24 -0.31 Specific 
rO.9011 rO.3111 - rO.3771 . [0.330] [0.2051 rO.2391 - - - - 0.45 
LAM /30 /31 /32 /33 /34 /35 /36 /37 /38 fJ9 /310 R2 
.., (Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPT) (LPM) (LPC) (LPR) (LPS) (LPP) ~ ~ 14.02 0.04 0.15 -0.49 0.001 -O.OS -0.09 0.04 -0.02 .. Levels 0.33 -0.15 .. 
rO.OOll rO.9641 rO.6371 rO.5871 rO.531] [0.9991 rO.8741 rO.6851 [0.630) [0.9531 [0.9081 0.73 ..J 
Specific 14.02 0.17 -0.57 0.40 -0.02 -0.08 -0.15 0.72 .. [0.000] rO.0811 rO.IS01 [0.162) - rO.8591 rO.261] [0.391) - -N 
'; 
~ ~ Yo YI Y2 Y3 Y4 Ys Y6 Y7 Ys Y9 YIO R2 Q,I DLAM 
IJ (Constant) (DLPW) (DLPBB) (DLPLB) (DLPSB) (DLPT) (DLPM) (DLPC) (DLPR) (DLPS) (DLPP) .... c: 
.., .. 
... ... 0.12 -0.27 -1.67 3.47 0.28 -0.15 -0.95 0.09 2.51 -0.48 -0.16 ~ c : : General 
rO.l501 rO.6181 rO.1651 [0.1921 rO.3281 rO.6551 [0.163) [0.5241 rO.I721 [0.300) [0.335) 0.85 Q 
0.03 -0.32 0.31 0.25 -0.30 0.04 0.3S Specific 





Crop R ~ r e s s o r r
LAC /30 /31 /32 /33 /34 /35 /36 /37 /38 /39 /310 R] 
til (Constant) (LPW) (LPBB) (LPLB) (LPSB) (LPT) (LPM) (LPC) (LPR) (LPS) (LPP) 
.. 
12.62 -0.67 -0.21 0.25 -0.40 -0.60 0.18 0.20 -0.13 , General 0.17 0.57 0.84 QJ [0.004] [0.617] [0.631) [0.837) [0.574) [0.477) [0.788] [0.509) [0.682] [0.564] [0.589) ..J 
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